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  1 Why do firms innovate ? What determines the amount of money invested in 
innovative activities in a given industry ? Such questions are of importance, if one 
believes that innovation is a key factor to long-run economic growth and 
development, as stated in modern macroeconomic theory. They may be especially 
relevant in Newly Industrialized Countries (hereafter, NIC) for two reasons: first, a 
better knowledge of the interactions between innovation and economic growth in 
these countries may contribute to explain a number of so-called “economic miracles”. 
Second, in a comparative perspective, relating the determinants of innovation in NIC 
to those identified in Western countries (which have comparatively longer innovation 
histories) may contribute to increase general economic knowledge. 
 
Indeed, standard macroeconomic theory expects that, behind cultural 
differences, the drivers of economic growth (and well-being) are broadly the same in 
every country. Thus, according to macroeconomic theory, one could expect to see the 
economic growth of all countries converge in the long-run; in other words, 
macroeconomic theory states that all countries have the potential to achieve economic 
prosperity, thriving on trade and fair competition. What one does then, when studying, 
in an microeconomic perspective, the development of innovation in NIC is no less 
than providing some empirical evidence that may, or may not, support the 
conventional view of macroeconomic theory. 
 
Although the determinants of innovation have been examined in a fairly large 
number of empirical studies (either at the industry or at the firm level), these generally 
concentrate on western countries and, to a lesser extent, Japan. This research is an in-
depth investigation into the causes and consequences of firms’ innovation activity in 
Taiwan’s manufacturing industries. It considers that innovation is a multi-dimensional 
activity, and does not only address the question “why do firms innovate ?”, but also 
“how do firms innovate ?”. In order to put these issues back into the broader reflection 
presented above, we also had to examine the impact of innovation activities on the 
productivity of Taiwan’s manufacturing firms.  
 
These questions will be addressed in an empirical perspective, which means that 
we will rely on econometrics, as our main analytical tool. The dissertation will be 
organized in three chapters, each of them dealing with one of the questions outlined 
  2 above. However, before going further in our explanation of how the research will be 
carried out, it is necessary to present some stylized facts about Taiwan, as well as the 
data that will be analyzed. 
 
A short history of innovation in Taiwan 
 
The recorded history of innovation in Taiwan is shorter than in other 
industrialized countries (and particularly, much shorter than in Japan or the USA): in 
the past decades, Taiwan’s economic development relied mainly on its relatively 
cheap labor force, in order to produce low valued-added, “labor-intensive” goods. At 
the end of the 1980s, however, this comparative advantage began to fade away, for a 
number of different reasons, which we will examine in more details below : a rise in 
labor costs, fluctuations in Taiwan’s currency, and a harsher competition from other 
Asian countries. In that context, technological innovation became a key factor to 
improve Taiwan’s industrial competitiveness (and, ultimately, its economic position 
on the international market) by shifting its production towards high value added-
products. Thus, changes in the economic and industrial environment of Taiwan may 
have provided Taiwanese firms with a strong incentive to innovate. 
 
It is a fact that Taiwan has been challenged by the increasing international 
competition from other Asian developing countries since the 1990s. The steep rise in 
labor costs over that period put a heavy pressure on the Taiwanese economy. At the 
same time, the adoption of a (managed) floating exchange rate made Taiwanese 
exported products less competitive on the international market. Traditional Taiwanese 
industries faced increasing difficulties in competing with the low value-added and 
labor-intensive goods produced by more recently industrialized Asian countries (such 
as Thailand or Indonesia).  
 
To answer these challenges, Taiwan chose to speed up its industrial upgrading 
process, in order to build an industrial structure where high-technology firms would 
play a leading role. To counterbalance the growing competitive weaknesses of 
Taiwanese firms operating in traditional industries, industrial policies encouraging 
these firms to upgrade their technological level have been implemented. At the same 
  3 time, policies have been designed to speed up the development of high-technology 
industries by promoting firms’ Research and Development (hereafter, R&D) activity. 
Such policies are expected to increase the growth of productivity (and, in fine, 
competitiveness) at the industry level. Thus, by examining the determinants and 
consequences of innovation in Taiwan, our study is addressing questions which are at 
the very core of Taiwan’s current industrial policies. 
 
A rich firm-level panel dataset 
 
Our research relies on the econometric analysis of an impressive dataset 
recording more than 27000 manufacturing firms. This firm-level dataset was provided 
by Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA), and comes from the yearly 
census conducted by the Statistical Bureau of the MOEA. It is therefore a panel, the 
27000 firms being observed each year between 1992 and 1995. This panel data covers 
the whole manufacturing sector of Taiwan.  
 
This dataset presents many advantages over those that are classically used in the 
empirical literature: first of all, it covers a broader range of industries than most 
previous existing datasets. Moreover, most studies have to rely on data that has been 
gathered through questionnaire surveys; this method of data collection may lead to a 
sample biased toward larger firms. Since our population has been constituted by 
means of a yearly census, we may expect it to be exempt from such a bias. Finally, 
cross-section data is often the only available data.  By using the panel structure / 
longitudinal dimension of our data, we should be able to overcome the limitations 
faced by studies that rely on cross-sectional analysis. For instance, we may be able to 
control precisely for unobserved heterogeneity in our econometric estimations. 
 
The main limitation of our data comes from the number of variables: where 
questionnaire surveys may provide the researcher with a number of variables that are 
designed to fit with the analytical framework of economic theory, our census data 
only contains a small number of variables. Fortunately, these variables are the most 
relevant for an applied economic analysis. We have information about: firms’ age, 
number of employees, total sales, stock of capital, material expenditures, payroll, 
  4 R&D expenditures, expenditures on importation of technologies. Additional dummy 
variables allow us to know whether a firm is a subsidiary or not, and whether it 
exports technology. Finally, categorical variables inform us on the industry to which a 
firm belongs (identified by a 4-digit code). This information allowed us to match the 
MOEA panel with an industry-level database, provided by the Directorate General of 
the Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS). The main interest of the DGBAS 
data is that it gives information on exportations at the industry-level. To put in a 
nutshell, our final dataset is a very rich four-years panel of more than 27000 firms, 
with some minor limitations regarding variables (our main regret being the lack of 
information on the quality of the labor force).  
 
Innovation and its determinants in Taiwan 
 
The classical industrial organization literature traditionally considers that R&D 
and innovation are synonymous; however, recent theoretical and empirical 
developments have begun to underline that it isn’t so. Although it plays a prominent 
role, R&D is only one of the many activities that constitute the innovation process. In 
the first chapter of this dissertation, we will follow the recent development of the 
literature by proposing a broader definition of “innovation”. Rather than considering 
R&D as the only source of knowledge, we will also take into account the possibility 
for firms to purchase external knowledge from foreign countries.  
 
Although there exist several external sources of knowledge (from R&D 
cooperation to the recruitment of new researchers), our data does not identify them. In 
our research, we will thus have to consider that the importation of disembodied 
technology is the only external source of knowledge, while R&D is the only internal 
source of knowledge. By “disembodied knowledge”, we refer to all royalties-inducing 
such as licenses and patents.  
 
The rationale is the following: given that major new technologies are not always 
immediately available in Taiwan, buying licenses from international firms has 
become vital for the survival of Taiwanese firms. There is some evidence as to how 
  5 helpful technology purchases have been in post-war Japan; and Taiwan has 
encouraged this practice in the hope of stimulating industrial innovation in the 1990s.  
 
Keeping in mind the simplifying assumption we had to make (“innovation = 
R&D + purchase of foreign technologies), we will develop an empirical model of the 
decision to innovate decision at the firm level. This model will consider the relative 
impacts of global economic changes, industry-level factors and firm characteristics on  
the decision to innovate. 
 
The chapter will be organized as follows : after presenting the stylized facts of 
innovation in Taiwan, we will emphasize, through a survey of the economic literature, 
the role that variables such as market power / structure, firm size, and firm age may 
play, at a conceptual level, in the decision to innovate. We will then get closer to 
empirical facts, and explain why the stronger international competition that Taiwan 
had to contend with in the 1980s may be an important determinant of the decision to 
innovate. 
 
In that chapter, the core of our analysis consists in the estimation of a Logit 
model for panel data, on our whole population of 27754 manufacturing firms. Among 
those firms, 5219 may be identified as “innovation firms”, i.e. firms which have either 
done R&D or imported technology at least one time between 1992 and 1995. Our 
econometric estimation will allow us to identify the determinants of the probability to 
be an innovation firm (rather than a non-innovating firm). Our potential explanatory 
variables will be those recorded in the previous section, in particular: firm size, firm 
age, market concentration and degree of openness to international trade. 
 
How do Taiwan’s firms innovate ? 
 
After identifying, in the first chapter, the determinants of the decision to 
innovate in Taiwan, we need to bring the analysis one step further down the road. 
Rather than focusing on the “innovate / not innovate” decision, we will now examine 
the choice of innovation strategy. In other words, the main questions we will address 
  6 in this chapter are: “how do Taiwan’s manufacturing firms innovate ?” and “is their 
innovation strategy consistent over time ?”.  
 
We explained above that, in our analytic framework, innovation can occur 
through two channels: in-house R&D (internal knowledge sourcing) on the hand, and 
the importation of technology (external knowledge sourcing) on the other. A firm 
which intends to innovate thus faces a strategic choice between three options, three 
“innovation strategies”: (1) to internalize the innovation process by doing R&D, (2) to 
purchase the requisite technology on foreign markets without doing any R&D, or (3) 
to purchase technologies while conducting R&D. 
 
By formulating our main question in those terms, we implicitly raise the issue of 
complementarity between R&D and the importation of technology. Looking for 
complementarities will thus be the secondary objective of the research carried out in 
the second chapter. The chapter will be organized as follows: a survey of the relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature will allow us to put forward three hypothesis 
regarding the determinants of the choice of innovation strategies: 
 
“H1: the larger a firm is, the more likely it is that will either (a) rely only on in-house 
R&D only or (b) import technology as a complement  to in-house R&D. On the 
contrary, small firms are more likely to rely only on the importation of technology.” 
 
“H2: the stronger the competition is, the more likely firms are to import technology. On 
the contrary, firms with more dominant positions (monopoly, oligopoly) are more likely 
to rely primarily on internal R&D, possibly importing technology as a complement.” 
 
“H3:  the younger a firm is, everything else being equal, the more likely it is to adopt 
the “only importing technology” innovation strategy.” 
 
To test these hypotheses we develop an empirical method in two steps, using the 
same panel of 27000 Taiwanese manufacturing firms as in Chapter 1. In the first step, 
we will use the time-averaged values of our variables (a time-aggregate approach) to 
examine the determinants of the innovation behavior in the whole population of firms. 
Firms in that population have four possible innovation behaviors: (1) to innovate 
  7 through R&D only; (2) to innovate through the importation of disembodied 
technologies only; (3) to innovate through a combination of both activities; and (4) 
not to innovate. In this time-aggregate approach, a firm choosing option (4) is a firm 
that never innovates, i.e. a non-innovation firm. This first step allowed us to explain 
simultaneously why do firms innovate and how they do so. 
 
In the second step, we will use the panel structure of the MOEA data to examine 
only the innovation firms, i.e. firms which innovate at least one year between 1992 
and 1995, through R&D and/or the importation of technology (more than 5000 firms 
were identified as such). In the panel approach, firms face four options in each year t: 
(1) do R&D only, (2) rely only on the importation of technology, (3) combine both 
options in a “mixed” strategy and (4) not to engage in innovation activities for that 
year. It is important to note that, since we focus here on innovation firms, a firm 
choosing option (4) is a firm that do not innovate in year t only. This second step of 
the analysis should be seen as a comparison of sorts,  allowing us to explain why 
some firms innovate regularly over the years, whereas others restrain from innovating 
on certain years. 
 
In both steps, two econometric models will be used to explain firms’ choice of 
an innovation behavior/strategy: a multinomial Logit on the one hand, and a bivariate 
Probit on the other. The latter will allow us to check for complementarity between 
R&D and the importation of technology, through an indirect (or “activity adoption”) 
approach, which consists in examining the correlation of the residuals The rule to 
check for complementarity is fairly simple: if, after including the relevant covariates, 
the residuals are still positively correlated, then there is some evidence consistent with 
complementarity, but it is impossible to explain the remaining correlation. On the 
contrary, if the residuals are no longer correlated, one can find some convincing 
evidence of complementarity. 
 
Innovation strategies and the growth of productivity at the firm level 
 
While the point of the first two chapters is to explain how Taiwan’s firms build 
their innovation strategy, we will focus, in our third and final chapter, on the 
  8 consequences of these strategic choices at the firm-level. The objective of this chapter 
is to evaluate the impact of innovation strategies on firms’ productivity in Taiwan, 
focusing only on the sub-population of 5219 innovation  firms that we began to 
examine in Chapter 2. Two measures of productivity will be used: first, total factor 
productivity (TFP), and, second, labor productivity (LP). The rationale for using LP is 
that, for similar industries, the goods produced in Taiwan may be, on the average, 
more labor-intensive than those produced in Western economies. 
 
Most existing studies on the effect of innovation on firm’s activities only take 
into account R&D, and rarely consider alternative innovation strategies. Following 
our previous logic, two innovation strategies will be considered in the third chapter: 
doing R&D on the one hand, and importing technology (IT) on the other. These 
strategies may be used simultaneously or as alternatives. In other words, firms may 
either rely on a single strategy, or combine both strategies, in order to innovate. We 
thus address again (in a different way) the issue of a possible complementarity 
between these strategies. We will stress the importance of that issue for Taiwan, 
where it is directly related to current industrial and science policies. 
 
To achieve our objective, we will estimate a structural model of productivity 
growth, using first TFP and second LP as the dependent variable. Regressions will be 
run first on the whole sample of 5219 innovation firms, then on firms which use a 
single strategy (either only doing R&D or only importing technology) over the period, 
and finally on firms who adopt a mixed strategy (i.e. using more than one strategy 
over the period). Our main econometric framework will use of the panel structure of 
our data; however, we will complement it (as in Chapter 2) with a cross-sectional 
approach relying on the time-averaged values of our variables. 
 
To examine the question of complementarity, we will add an interaction effect 
(R&D times Importation of Technology) in our models of productivity growth. This 
approach to complementarity issues is known either as the “direct” or “productivity” 
approach. Using both the panel and the time-averaged methods, the regressions will 
be run on the whole sample and on the “mixed strategy” sub-sample, the latter being 
further divided into three groups: traditional, basic and high-tech industries. We will 
  9 try to conclude this chapter by relating our findings to actual science and innovation 
policies issues debated in Taiwan. 





Firms’ Decision to Innovate in Taiwan: 
















This chapter examines the determinants of Taiwanese firms’ decision to innovate (i.e. 
to engage in R&D or to purchase foreign technologies).  To do so, we estimate a Logit model 
on a panel of more than 27000 manufacturing firms observed between 1992 and 1995. Our 
main findings echoes the results of existing empirical studies on Western countries 
and Japan: first of all, concentration has an overall positive effect on the decision to 
innovate, which strongly varies across industries. Second, we observe a ‘inverted u-
shape’ relationship between firms’ size and the probability to innovate. Third, firms 
tend to innovate less toward the end of their life cycle. Our last important finding is 
more specific to the economic context of Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s: the growth 
rate of Taiwan’s exportations significantly increases the probability to innovate 
(especially in the electronic industry), which suggests that innovation in Taiwan may 
be more “demand-pulled” than “technology-pushed”. 
  
  11  1. Introduction 
 
Why do firms innovate ? What determines the amount of money invested in 
innovative activities (such as Research and Development, hereafter R&D) in a given 
industry ? Such questions are of importance, if one believes that innovation is a key 
factor to long-run economic growth and development, as has been stated in modern 
macroeconomic theory (e.g. Romer, 1990).  
Although the determinants of innovation have been examined in a fairly large 
number of empirical studies (either at the industry or at the firm level), these generally 
concentrate on western countries and, to a lesser extent, Japan. But few, if any, 
researches have focus on how innovation develops in Newly Industrialized Countries 
(NIC). However, studying (from an economic perspective) the development of 
innovation in these countries may be interesting for two reasons: first, it may yield 
some substantive results about the interaction between innovation and economic 
growth in these countries (which could contribute to explain a number of so-called 
“economic miracles”). Second, in a comparative perspective, it may allows to relate 
the determinants of innovation in these countries to the factors identified in the 
comparatively longer innovation histories of Western countries. 
The present contribution focuses on the determinants of innovation in Taiwan, 
in an empirical, firm-level, perspective. The recorded history of innovation in Taiwan 
is shorter than in most Western countries: in the past decades, Taiwan’s economic 
development relied mainly on its relatively cheap labor force, to produce low valued-
added, “labor-intensive” goods. At the end of the 1980s, however, this comparative 
advantage began to fade away, for a number of different reasons (rise in labor costs, 
fluctuations in Taiwan’s currency, and harsher competition from other Asian 
countries). In that context, technological innovation became a key factor to improve 
Taiwan’s industrial competitiveness (and, ultimately, its economic position on the 
international market) by shifting its production towards high value added-products. 
These changes in the economic and industrial environment of Taiwan may 
thus have provided Taiwanese firms with a strong incentive to innovate. The objective 
of this research is to investigate this assumption with an empirical model of 
innovation decision at the firm level. This model will consider the relative impacts of 
both global economic changes (such as the harsher international competition) and 
firm (or industry)-level factors (market structure, firm size, and firm age) traditionally 
  12  pointed out in the economic literature. Where many earlier studies relied on cross-
section data, our empirical model will be estimated on a panel of more than 27,000 
Taiwanese manufacturing firms observed from 1992 to 1995.  This panel consists in 
census data collected yearly by the Statistic Bureau of Taiwan's Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (MOEA). As such, it covers a broader range of industries (namely, the whole 
of Taiwan’s manufacturing sector) than most previous studies (which moreover relied 
on questionnaire surveys, thereby introducing a bias toward larger firms). Finally, this 
chapter proposes a broader definition of “innovation firms”: rather than considering 
R&D as the only source of knowledge (and innovation), we also take into account the 
possibility for firms to purchase external knowledge from foreign countries. 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents some “stylized facts” 
of innovation in Taiwan. Section 3 surveys the theoretical literature on the 
determinants of innovation, and examine its empirical applications. Section 4 
examines how the economic context of the 1990s and the late 1980s may have 
influenced Taiwanese firms’ decision to innovate. Our econometric model is 
developed in Section 5, while our data and main variables are described in Section 6.  
The results of the estimation are presented in Section 7, and Section 8 concludes the 
chapter. 
 
2. The stylized facts of innovation in Taiwan. 
 
In this section, we will sketch a brief of Taiwan’s economic development since 
1945, when it became the Republic of China (ROC). We will especially focus on the 
interactions between innovation and economic activity. For over 50 years, Taiwan has 
experienced a drastic economic growth; this “economic miracle” attracted the world’s 
attention and caused Taiwan to be counted as one of  the “Asian Tigers”
1.  
Although Taiwan’s economy has been quite dynamic over this period, it did not 
seem to rely, until recently, on innovation. Innovation activities can only be tracked 
back to the early 1980s, when the Taiwanese government began to encourage the 
development of high-tech industries
2. It was in those days that investment in R&D 
began to enter public records.   
                                                 
1 Along with Hong Kong, Singapore, and South Korea. 
2 Six periods can be distinguished in the process of Taiwan’s economic development : (1) Economic 
Reconstruction in the 1940s; (2) Development of Consumer Commodity Industry in the 1950s; (3) 
  13  Table 1 presents the evolution of Taiwan’s GDP over the last 20 years; it also 
reports the evolution of the ratio of global R&D expenditures to GDP (which 
measures the “intensity” of a nation’s innovation activity) from 1985 on. Overall, the 
growth rate of GDP in Taiwan was higher in the 1980s than in the 1990s, while the 
R&D/GDP ratio steadily increased from the mid-1980s until 2000. This may 
correspond to a significant change in Taiwan’s production: until the 1990s, Taiwan 
produced mainly labor-intensive goods, but, as the competition from Asian 
developing countries increased,  Taiwan started to produce goods that were more 
“knowledge-intensive”. 
Table 1: Taiwan’s economic growth and innovation intensity 
Year  Yearly Growth of GDP  Growth of R&D/GDP 
1981 6.2  - 
1982 3.6  - 
1983 8.4  - 
1984 10.6  - 
1985 5  0.96 
1986 11.6  1.03 
1987 12.7  1.01 
1988 7.8  1.14 
1989 8.2  1.24 
1990 5.4  1.39 
1991 7.6  1.66 
1992 6.8  1.78 
1993 6.3  1.75 
1994 6.5  1.77 
1995 6  1.78 
1996 5.7  1.8 
1997 6.8  1.88 
1998 4.8  1.97 
1999 5.4  2.05 
2000 5.9  2.05 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), 2001, Taiwan Statistical Yearbook, 
Republic of China. 
 
This reorientation of the production activity may have come “spontaneously” 
from the independent decisions of the firms themselves. However, it was also clearly 
stated as a public policy objective: in the 1990s, the Taiwanese government strongly 
encouraged and supported firms’ investment in R&D, in an effort to stimulate 
innovation and, ultimately, economic growth. This policy relies implicitly on an 
assumption which is very similar to the fundamental hypothesis of the endogenous 
growth theory, namely that the economic growth of developed countries is 
increasingly “knowledge-based”. 
                                                                                                                                            
Rapid Growth of Light Industries in the 1960s; Development of Capital-and Technology-Intensive 
Industries in the 1970s; Development of Hi-Tech Industries in the 1980s and Industrial Restructuring in 
the 1990s (see MOEA, 1999, Development of  Industries in Taiwan, ROC). 
  14  This makes the 1990s a particularly relevant period to investigate firms’ 
innovation activity in Taiwan. As a preliminary overview, we will examine some 
stylized facts of innovation in Taiwan: we will first take a look at the main inputs 
entering the innovation process at the macroeconomic level; after going down to the 
industry level, we will then examine the macroeconomic output of innovation 
activities in Taiwan. In each case, we will focus primarily on the 1990s; whenever 
possible, we will sketch a comparison with the situation in the 1980s. 
 
2.1 The innovation process at the macroeconomic level : R&D expenditures 
 
  At the macroeconomic level, the main indicator of the importance of a 
nation’s innovation activity is the amount of R&D expenditures (which can be 
interpreted as the “investment in R&D”, or “R&D effort”, of this nation). Figure 1.a 
reports the yearly total R&D expenditures (i.e. including ‘academic’ R&D conducted 
outside the business sector) in Taiwan from 1982 to 2000. It shows a strong upwards 
trend, or, in other words, a steady growth of R&D expenditures in Taiwan over the 
period, starting from about 17,000 millions New Taiwan Dollars (NT$) in the early 
1980s, to reach 200,000 millions in 2000. 
In the economic literature, total R&D expenditures in Asian newly 
industrialized countries are often reported in US dollars (as in Figure 1.b below). This 
may lead to misinterpretations, however. Indeed, the trend in Figure 1.b is quite 
similar to the one observed previously (in Figure 1.a), with one exception regarding 
the year 1997. For that year, Figure 1.b suggests a slackening of the growth in R&D 
expenditures, whereas Figure 1.a revealed a continuous growth. This difference can 
be explained by an increase in the exchange rate (NT$ per US $) in that year, as 
reported in Table 2; the decrease observed in Figure 1.b. is thus caused by a 
‘monetary’ effect, and not by a ‘real’ effect. To avoid this kind of misinterpretations, 
all (monetary) figures, as well as the monetary variables used in the econometric 
estimations, will be reported in NT$ in the remainder of this chapter. 
Table 2 reports the yearly growth in total R&D expenditures over the 1982-
2000 period, in NT $ and in US $; the exchange rate (in NT $ per US $) is also 
reported, in the third column of the table. This table underlines the aforementioned 
differences between Figure 1.a and Figure 1.b. We see that Taiwan’s R&D 
expenditures (measured in NT $) increased at an increasing rate between the early 
  15  1980s and the early 1990s, and kept on increasing, although at a decreasing rate, after 
that date. When R&D expenditures are measured in US $, the apparent growth rate is 
negative for the year 1997; however, as was explained above, this is a pure monetary 
effect, as the exchange rate (measured in NT $ per US $) increased to 33 that year. 
 
Figure 1.a: Taiwan’s R&D expenditures in NT$ (1982-2000) 











Source: Indicators of Science and Technology, Taiwan. 
 
Figure 1.b: Taiwan’s R&D expenditures in US $ (1982-2000) 

















  16  Table 2: R&D growth in Taiwan and NT$/US$ exchange rate (1981-2000) 
Year  R&D Growth % 
(NT$) 
R&D Growth % 
(US$) 
Exchange rate 
(NT$ per US$) 
1981 -  -  37.84 
1982 -  -  39.91 
1983 13.85  12.83  40.27 
1984 16.89  19.26  39.47 
1985 13.15  12.07  39.85 
1986 13.01  26.86  35.5 
1987 28.14  59.33  28.55 
1988 19.19  20.80  28.17 
1989 24.97  34.58  26.16 
1990 30.58  26.01  27.11 
1991 14.27  20.31  25.75 
1992 15.97  17.57  25.4 
1993 9.26  4.22  26.63 
1994 10.67  12.32  26.24 
1995 9.02  4.90  27.27 
1996 10.3  9.45  27.49 
1997 13.31  -4.56  32.64 
1998 12.87  14.35  32.22 
1999 7.97  7.8  32.27 
2000 3.73  1.46  32.99 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), 1999, Taiwan Statistical Yearbook, 
Republic of China. 
 
Imported technologies constitute another important input entering the 
innovation process in Taiwan. However, in order to examine the relative importance 
of this input (with respect to R&D), it is better to go down to the industry level, and 
focus on the business sector, since academic research seldom makes use of imported 
technologies. 
 
2.2  Innovation expenditures at the industry level 
 
 
Figure 2.a shows the evolution, from 1982 to 2000, of : (1) the industrial R&D 
expenditures (net of academic research) in Taiwan and (2) the sum of these 
expenditures and of the monetary value (in NT $) of imported technologies in Taiwan. 
For this second curve, the figures for 1991 and 1996 were interpolated, since no 
observations of the value of imported technologies were available in those years.  
The “R&D” curve confirms, on the industry level, what was observed on the 
macro level in Figure 1.a: industry R&D expenditures steadily increased over the 
period, starting from about 8,000 millions NT$ in the early 1980s, to over 120,000 
millions NT$ at the end of the 1990s. This steady growth was characterized by three 
  17  steps, which occurred in 1986, 1990 and 1995, and which saw an increase in the rate 
of growth.  
The “R&D + imported technology” curve follows a similar upwards trend. 
However, from 1982 to 1986, there is hardly any difference between the two curves; 
only after 1986 does the monetary value of imported technologies reach a high level 
(i.e. more than a few thousand millions of NT $). After 1987, this monetary value 
(depicted by the positive difference between the two curves) grows steadily, following 
the same trend as R&D expenditures do. This can largely be explained by the 
industrial policy that Taiwan’s government adopted at the end of the 1980s: in order 
to accelerate the upgrading of Taiwan’s industrial structure, and to allow for a more 
knowledge-intensive production, the government encouraged firms to import new 
technologies.  
 





























Source: Indicators of Science and Technology, Taiwan. 
 
Figure 2.b presents a breakdown by industry of the evolution of innovation 
expenditures (i.e. the sum of R&D expenditures and of the monetary value of 
imported technologies) in Taiwan. Four industries are taken into consideration: the 
“Electronic” industry, the “Metal and Machinery” industry, the “Chemical” industry, 
and the “Food, Textile and Others” industry. Overall, the first two (“Electronic” and 
  18  “Metal and Machinery”) account for the largest share of innovation expenditures, 
whereas the other two (“Chemical” and “Food, Textile, etc.”) are more traditional and 
naturally require less innovation. Before 1991, most of the innovation expenditures 
came from the “Metal and Machinery” industry; after that date, however, the 
“Electronic” industry took the lead at a pace that set it far above the other sectors.  
As can be seen in Figure 2.b, the innovation expenditures in the “Electronic” 
industry grew steadily between 1990 and 1994, and at an increased rate between 1995 
and 1998. It was still growing over the last two years of the observation period, 
although the rate of growth was somewhat less important. This impressive increase in 
the innovation expenditures of Taiwan’s electronic industry may reflect the 
emergence of the high-tech industries in 1990s, an emergence which was strongly 
supported and encouraged by governmental policies. 
 









1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Food, Textile and Others Chemical Industry Metal and Machinery Industry Electronic Industry  
Source: Indicators of Science and Technology, Taiwan. 
 
 
2.3. Innovation process and patenting activity in Taiwan 
 
Although innovation is said to have monetary returns, those are difficult to 
measure statistically, whether one looks at the macroeconomic or at the industry 
levels. A rather straightforward way, however, to observe the output of innovation 
  19  activities is to look at patents. Figure 3.a shows the number of patents granted each 
year, in the USA, to Taiwanese firms/organizations over the 1988-2000 period: 
starting from about 500 in the late 1980s, this number grew steadily over the years, to 
finally reach almost 6000 patents in year 2000. Although no breakdown by industry 
was readily available, one may assume that this increase  has largely been driven by 
Taiwan’s electronic industry. 
  
















Taiwan Patent in US  
Source: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office  
 
While Figure 3.a provide some indication regarding the importance of the 
impact of Taiwan’s innovation activities on the international level, Figure 3.b focuses 
on the national level. It presents a comparison between the number of patents applied 
for each year in Taiwan by Taiwanese firms/institutions, and the number of patents 
granted eventually. The number of patents applied for has grown steadily from 1982 
to 2000, with three successive threshold levels being reached in 1988, 1995 and 1999 
respectively. Overall, the number of patents granted can be characterized by a very 
similar trend, although the curve indicates some important yearly fluctuations around 
that trend (due to the selection activity from Taiwan’s Patent Office). 
 

















Patents applied for Patents granted  
Source: Indicators of Science and Technology, Taiwan. 
 
 
3. Firms’ decision to innovate : a survey of the literature 
 
3.1. Schumpeter (1942) and the theoretical debate on market power 
 
When it comes down to explaining firms’ decision to innovate, the industrial 
organization literature traditionally focuses on the impact of market structure. In that 
perspective, innovation is seen to result only from firms R&D effort (the importation 
of technology is generally not taken into account).  
According to Schumpeter (1942)’s groundbreaking work, the possession of an 
ex ante market power may provide firms with a strong incentive to innovate: first of 
all, a monopoly (or oligopoly) can dedicate a huge amount of internal financial 
resources to innovation (i.e. can invest in R&D). The reason for doing so is a 
monopolistic (or oligopolistic) firm is always concerned about a potential rival 
entering its market with a new and better  product, which would constitute an 
attractive substitute for the monopoly’s customers. Should this event occur, the 
monopoly would experience a dramatic decrease of its profit. This threat of entry may 
thus give a monopoly (or oligopoly) a strong incentive to invent – leading 
monopolistic firms to perform more R&D than competitive ones.  
  21  However, Schumpeterian analyses don’t pretend that a concentrated market 
structure will systematically yields a greater incentive to innovate. When the threat of 
entry is not enforceable, a monopolistic firm has no real incentive to invent new 
products or to improve its production process. In that case, competitive firms (i.e. 
firms that operate in a market where pure competition prevails) may be more 
innovative. In particular, the possibility of ex post (anticipated) market power may 
provide a competitive firm with a strong incentive to conduct R&D. Another 
condition under which innovation may be more likely to occur in a competitive 
market than in a situation of monopoly is that of perfect ex post appropriability : 
simply said, this assumption states that each firm, when performing R&D, is able to 
appropriate the full returns to innovation. To put it in a nutshell, a competitive firm 
innovates in the hope of getting a higher profit. This alternative view has been 
formalized by Arrow (1962), in a work that questions Schumpeter’s hypothesis.  
Building on Arrow (1962)’s seminal work, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) propose 
an alternative explanation to the relationship between concentration and innovation 
intensity observed by Schumpeter (1942). They argue that, except in the short run, the 
relationship between market structure and the nature of inventive activity may not be 
a causal one, contrary to the thesis defended in post-Schumpeterian researches. For 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), both concentration and innovation are determined by a 
number of common elements. They mention demand conditions, the technology of 
research, the nature of the capital market and laws regarding property rights. A brief 
description of both Arrow (1962)’s and Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1980)’s models is given 
in Appendix (I).  
Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1980)’s model has serious empirical implications: in its 
oligopolistic version, it shows that if the elasticity of demand to output is constant, 
there is a proportional relationship between concentration and innovation intensity. As 
a consequence, “in a cross-section study of different industries with the same demand 
elasticity in equilibrium, but varying by way of the size of the market and R&D 
technologies they face, one would observe a linear relationship between research 
intensity and concentration. But there [would be] no causality to be imputed to this 
relationship: industrial concentration and research intensity are simultaneously 
determined” (Dasgupta & Stiglitz, 1980, p. 276, underlined by the authors). 
These considerations however, have comparatively little importance for the 
empirical study at hand, for several reasons. First, as Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) 
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may be possible in the short run. Since our empirical analysis deals with the 1992-
1995 period, it can be safely considered as short run. Moreover, our analysis will be 
run on panel data, which allows to deal with possible simultaneity biases that may 
affect cross-section study. Finally, our research will not deal with R&D intensity, but 
with firm’s decision to innovate, which is fairly different from the focus of Dasgupta 
& Stiglitz (1980)’s model. This difference is all the more significant since our 
definition of innovation includes, besides R&D, the importation of technology.  
In order to put our work in a larger perspective, we summarize briefly, in sub-
section 3.2., the existing empirical literature on the determinants of innovation. This 
short survey will allow us to take into consideration more factors than just market 
structure. We will especially insist on appropriability conditions, demand conditions, 
technological opportunities and firm size. 
 
3.2. Market power and innovation: empirical investigations 
 
In order to clarify Schumpeter’s conjecture regarding ex ante market power and 
the propensity to innovate, many researchers have empirically examined the effect of 
concentration  (as a measure of market power) on innovation activity (generally 
captured by R&D expenditures). Many of them conclude that some degree of market 
concentration tends to increase innovation (Hamber, 1964; Scherer, 1967a; and 
Mansfield, 1968). However, this relationship may well be non-linear, and, more 
precisely, appropriately represented by a concave, inverted U-curve (Scherer, 1967a; 
Scott, 1984; Levin et al., 1985)
3. According to these studies, a moderate amount of 
competition in an industry may be the most appropriate context to foster innovation.  
Indeed, it has often been observed that huge firms with a significant amount of 
market power seldom innovate, or adopt a “catching-up” strategy. According to 
Scherer (1990), this is because insulation from competitive pressures tends to breed 
bureaucratic inertia and to discourage innovation. However, the effect of 
concentration on innovation seems to be  sensitive to industry conditions. When some 
                                                 
3 Scherer (1967a), using U.S. data, found that R&D employment (as a share of total employment) 
increased with industry concentration up to when the 4-firm concentration ratio (CR4) was between 
50% and 55%, and declined with concentration afterwards. 
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4, the coefficient 
and the t-statistic on concentration often drop by an order of magnitude or statistical 
significance (Scherer, 1967; Scott, 1984; Levin et al., 1985; Geroski, 2001). 
Using U.S. data, and controlling for types of industries (chemical, electrical, 
mechanical, and traditional) and types of products (durable vs. non-durable, consumer 
vs. producer goods), Scherer (1967) found that the contribution of concentration to the 
variance of R&D intensity was attenuated. Using data on R&D intensity at the 
business unit level, Scott (1984) found that the addition of fixed company and 2-digit 
industry effects rendered statistically insignificant the coefficients associated to 
concentration and to its square. Levin et al. (1985) replicated Scott (1984)'s results for 
both R&D intensity and innovative performance. 
In their effort to control for industry conditions, empirical researchers have 
come to consider three elements : appropriability conditions, market demand, and 
technological opportunities (for a survey, see Cohen and Levin, 1989; Scherer and 
Ross, 1990). Another element that may be of importance is the average firm size in 
the industry; this was already taken into consideration in Schumpeter (1942)’s 
seminal work, whereas the three aforementioned ‘industry conditions’ gradually 
appeared in the subsequent empirical literature. 
 
3.3. The impact of appropriability on innovation 
 
Schumpeter (1942)’s work allowed for the possibility that ex post (i.e. expected) 
market power may provide an incentive to innovation as strong as ex ante market 
power. As was said above, the impact of anticipated market power on innovation 
activities theoretically depends on the appropriability conditions which prevails in an 
industry. If innovators expect to appropriate the full benefit of their R&D investment, 
the existence of knowledge spillovers (i.e. of knowledge generated by R&D but not 
fully appropriable by the firm which conducted the R&D) creates a disincentive to 
generate new knowledge. Spence (1984) predicts that the R&D intensity in an 
industry will rise with appropriability; on the contrary, the output of innovation will 
decrease with an increase in spillovers.  
                                                 
4 Generally, an OLS regression using R&D intensity (i.e. the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales) as the 
dependent variable. 
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the new knowledge. By increasing the technological capability of the firms which 
receive the new knowledge, spillovers may encourage imitative R&D. Assuming that 
firms have a certain capability to absorb new knowledge, Cohen and Levinthal (1990) 
predict that an increase in spillovers will stimulate a specific kind of R&D, namely 
absorptive  R&D, which allows firms to upgrade their technological structure. 
Knowledge spillovers can thus enhance the overall technological capability of the 
imitator, rendering it a more potent rival in the long-run. Mansfield (1988) and 
Rosenberg and Steinmueller (1988) claim that Japanese firms offer a good illustration 
of that phenomenon: they have a decisive advantage over their (international) 
competitors because they are able to use effectively technological knowledge which 
has been developed externally. 
To examine the effect of the ex post market power on R&D intensity, empirical 
researches generally rely on indirect indicators of appropriablity conditions – which 
may vary across industries. These studies generally seek to test the  hypothesis which 
states that, when firms are able to appropriate the full returns to innovation, they  are 
more likely to invest in R&D (Levin et al., 1985;  Cohen et al., 1987; Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1987).  
However, data limitations have often made it difficult to directly observe the 
anticipated post-innovation returns. Many empirical researches use patent as 
instrumental variables, but this hardly leads to convincing general evidence: only in a 
few industries do patents actually seem to reveal an incentive to conduct R&D 
(Mansfield et al., 1981; Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al.,1987). Rather than relying on 
patents, Geroski (2001) uses expected price-cost margins as a proxy for anticipated 
monopoly power; although he finds a positive effect of post-innovation returns in the 
UK, the magnitude of this effects is relatively small
5. Thus, whether greater 
appropriability encourages innovation thus remains unclear. 
 
3.4. Market demand and innovation (the demand condition) 
  
Schmookler (1962) has been among the first to examine to which extent 
innovation is demand-pulled,  i.e. to which extent demand creates an incentive for 
                                                 
5 Some studies use the growth of exportations to capture the effect of appropriability: thus Pugel (1978) 
suggested that exports, by increasing the size of the U.S. market, did increase the returns to innovation. 
  25  innovation. Schmookler (1962) assumes that, at any point in time, a common pool of 
technological knowledge is uniformly available to firms for industrial applications. 
The author then tries to characterize the industries in which the use of this common 
resource, together with complementary investments in applied research, leads to 
process or product innovation. He found that these industries are those which face 
large and/or growing markets. 
Empirically, it is difficult to characterize and estimate consumers’ demand for 
product innovation. Typically, empirical studies follow Schmookler (1962), and use 
sales and the rate of growth of sales to capture the static and dynamic effect of market 
size. Some studies also use the shares of output dedicated to personal consumption, or 
the relative share of exports in the total disposition of industry output (cf. Scherer and 
Ross, 1990). 
However, the hypothesis stating that there exists a common pool of 
technological knowledge uniformly distributed across industries is quite unrealistic, 
and, at best, debatable. To overcome the limitations inherent to this assumption, 
subsequent studies have considered that firms belonging to different industries may 
face different technological opportunities, i.e. may have access to different sets of 
technological knowledge. 
 
3.5. Technological opportunities and innovation (the supply condition) 
 
The neo-classical theory defines technological opportunities as the set of 
production possibilities which allow to translate research resources into new 
techniques of production employing conventional inputs. Dasgupta and Stigliz 
(1980a) and Spence (1984) define technological opportunity as the elasticity of the 
unit cost with respect to R&D expenditures.  
Regardless of the definition, considering that firms face different “technological 
opportunities” allows to take into account the fact that firms’ ability to innovate may 
vary across industries. Using agriculture and the coal industry as examples, Parker 
(1972) and Rosenberg (1974) demonstrate that the sequence of particular applications 
of a "generic" technological idea is not determined by demand. It is rather conditioned 
by the state of knowledge and by the inherent technological complexity of particular 
industrial applications.  
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opportunity’ empirically operational. To control for technological opportunity in the 
analysis of R&D activities, most studies use either conventional 2-digit industry 
dummies, or a set of dummy representing the degree of “closeness to science” of each 
industry (Scherer, 1965a, 1982c; Link and Long, 1981; Levin et al., 1987; Lunn and 
Martin, 1986; Cohen et al., 1987; Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). Most studies conclude 
that the proxy variables representing “closeness to science” significantly contribute to 
explain inter-firm (or inter-industry) differences in R&D intensity. 
Some studies used other proxy variables: Griliches (1979) and Pakes and 
Schankerman (1984) represent technological opportunities by the stock of knowledge. 
Waterson and Lopez (1983) use capital intensity to reflect technological opportunities 
in an industry; this proxy successfully explain inter-industry differences in R&D 
intensity in the United Kingdom. Brage and Willmore (1991) suggest that export 
market generate more rigorous requirements of new technologies than domestic 
markets
6. Most studies generally expect a positive relationship between technological 
opportunities and R&D expenditures. 
Controlling for technological opportunities generally affect the results regarding 
concentration and market power. Using 3-digit British manufacturing industries over 
the 1970-1979 period, Geroski (2001), controlling for technological opportunities, 
found that a high concentration was more likely to retard (rather than stimulate) 
innovation. Lunn and Martin (1986) even conclude that the effect of concentration is 
significant in "low opportunity" industries only. 
 
3.6. The Impact of Firm Size on R&D Activity 
 
 
Alongside the effect of market power, many empirical studies have examined 
another hypothesis originally formulated by Schumpeter (1942): innovation would 
supposedly increase more than proportionately with firm size. The empirical literature 
suggests that there exists a continuous and positive relation between firm size and 
innovation activity (R&D intensity). This positive, linear relationship has been 
observed in both industry-specific studies and in studies covering several industries 
(Mansfield, 1964; Grabowski, 1968; Soete, 1979; Link, 1980; Meisel and Lin, 1983). 
                                                 
6 At the firm level, Lall (1983) suggests that outward-oriented firms will be more aware of new 
technologies and will strive to keep their technologies more competitive. 
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estimated Tobit and Probit models, and concluded that the size of the business unit 
affected its decision to engage in R&D. 
A more subtle, non-linear relationship has been identified by a number of 
other researchers. Scherer (1965a, 1965b) suggested that R&D intensity increases 
more than proportionally with firm size; however, after reaching a certain threshold, 
the effect of firm size becomes either weakly negative or insignificant. This finding 
was widely accepted as a tentative consensus in the early 1980s (Malecki, 1980; Link, 
1981), and a non-linear relationship has also been found in other investigations. For 
instance, Bound et al. (1984), using U.S. data, found that very small and very large 
firms have a higher R&D intensity than average-sized firms. 
 
4. The determinants of Taiwanese firms’ decision to innovate 
 
 
As was explained in Section 2, Taiwan doesn’t have a long history of 
innovation. Until recently, the lack of investment in R&D closely related Taiwan to 
those newly-industrialized countries which rely mainly on labor-intensive products. 
However, since the late 1980s, Taiwanese firms producing labor intensive, low value-
added products found more and more difficult to compete with low-cost producers 
located in China and in other Asian industrializing countries. As a result, Taiwan’s 
government felt an urgent need to upgrade the country’s industrial structure toward a 
high value-added, technology-intensive production.  
To achieve this objective, the government actively supported firms’ investment 
in R&D and innovation. In that perspective, the main factors leading Taiwanese firms 
to innovate might come from overall changes that occurred in the economic and 
industrial environment between the 1980s and the 1990s. In this section, we give a 
detailed account of the three main challenges Taiwanese firms had to face since the 
1980s: (1) a steep rise in labor costs, (2) important fluctuations in the value of 
Taiwan’s currency, and (3) a strong industrial growth in export market. To face these 





  28  4.1. A steep rise in labor cost  
 
 
To illustrate the steep rise in labour costs experienced by Taiwanese firms since 
the late 1980s, we use census data from the Directorate General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS). The DGBAS census was taken in 1986, 1991, 
and 1996. Table 3 gives the change in the ratio of real wages per employee, by 
industry, for the 1986-1991 and 1991-1996 periods.  
 
Table 3 : change in the ratio of  annual real wages per employee (by industry) 
Industry  (ratio91 – ratio86) / ratio86  (ratio96 – ratio91) / ratio91 
Food, Textile and Other Industry   41.3 %  20.9 % 
 Food  Manufacturing  64.4  17.6 
  Textile Mill Products  35.5  11.5 
  Wearing Apparel & Accessories  38.3  16.4 
  Wood & Bamboo Products  34.9  18.7 
  Furniture & Fixtures  35.6  18.8 
  Non-Metallic Mineral Products  56.3  25.4 
  Misc. Industrial Products  25.5  37.7 
      
Chemical Industry  48.5 %  25.7 % 
  Leather & Fur Products  24.9  24.8 
  Pulp, Paper & Paper Products  55.7  16.4 
 Printing  Processing  51.6  30.0 
  Chemical Matter Manufacturing  47.9  13.7 
 Chemical  Products  46.9  11.5 
  Petroleum & Coal Products  94.9  70.3 
  Rubber Products Manufacturing  28.1  15.6 
  Plastic Products Manufacturing  28.3  26.1 
      
Metal and Machinery Industry  54.0 %  18.0 % 
  Basic Metal Industries  56.1  16.4 
  Fabricated Metal Products  49.7  25.5 
  Machinery & Equipment  50.6  20.1 
 Transport  Equipment  59.6  10.0 
      
Electronic Industry  56.6 %  21.4 % 
  Electrical & Electronic Machinery  62.6  23.7 
 Precision  Instruments  50.6  19.2 
Total  51.0 %  21.8 % 
Note: the real wage are the nominal wages deflated by a consumer price index (2001=100).  
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics of Taiwan's Executive Yuan, Report 
of Industrial and Commercial Census, 1986, 1991, and 1996. 
 
 
For the whole manufacturing sector, the annual real wage increased by 51% 
between 1986 and 1991, and kept on increasing, although at a smaller rate (22%) 
between 1991 and 1996. This trend remains the same across all industries. The growth 
in the real wage across both periods varies hugely depending on the industry: thus, for 
the 1986-1991 period, the lowest rate is 25% (in “leather and fur products”) and the 
  29  highest is 95% (in “petroleum and oil products”). To allow for comparison with the 
growth of R&D expenditures (Figure 2.b., Section 2), we propose an intermediate 
classification based on the same four industrial categories as in Section 2: Electronic, 
Metal and Machinery, Chemical, and Food, Textile and Others. 
Again, the “Electronic” and “Metal and Machinery” industries account for the 
most important increases in real wages : in the electronic industry, the real wage 
increased by 57% in the first period, and by 21% in the second period; in the metal 
and machinery industry, its increased by 54% in the first period, and by 18% in the 
second. Since these industries are those where the growth in R&D expenditures from 
1982 to 2000 was the most important (cf. Figure 2.b), there is a high probability for 
the increase in wages and the increase in R&D expenditures to be correlated. This is 
more particularly the case for the electronic industry. It is difficult, however, to decide 
whether the increase in the real wages pushed Taiwanese firms to perform more 
R&D, or whether the increase in labor costs merely reflects a decision to increase 
investments in R&D (through the hiring of high skilled labor force, for instance). 
 
4.2. Fluctuations in the value of Taiwan’s currency 
 
 
  The fluctuations in the value of Taiwan’s currency represent another factor 
which could motivate firms to innovate (in order to compensate higher production 
costs). Table 4 show the evolution of the exchange rate of US $ in NT $ (measured in 
number of NT $ per unit of US $) over the 1981-1996 period. This table indicates that 
there has been considerable fluctuations of the Taiwan dollar against the US dollar 
since the beginning of the 1980s. 
In the early 1980s, the rate of change was approximately of 40 NT $ for a 
U.S. $ ; after 1985, however, the rate gradually decreased to 27 NT $ for a U.S. $ in 
1990, which correspond to a remarkable appreciation of the Taiwan dollar. On the 
1991-1996 period, the exchange rate remained between 25 and 27 NT $ for a US $. 
The sharp appreciation of the New Taiwan dollar in the 1990s implicitly lead to an 
increase in the production costs of Taiwanese firms; the repercussion of these higher 
costs on the sales price made Taiwanese products relatively less competitive on the 
international market.  To compensate for this reduced cost-competitiveness of their 
products, Taiwanese firms may have focused on quality-competitiveness in the 1990s, 
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engage in innovation. 
Table 4: yearly variation in Exchange Rate in Taiwan (1981-1996) 
(i) Exchange  Rate  Year 
(b)  Measure in NT $ 
per US $  









1985 39.85  -0.38 
1986 35.5  -4.35 
1987 28.55  -6.95 
1988 28.17  -0.38 
1989 26.16  -2.01 
1990 27.11  0.95 
1991 25.75  -1.36 
1992 25.4  -0.35 
1993 26.63  1.23 
1994 26.24  -0.39 
1995 27.27  1.03 
1996 27.49  0.22 
Source: Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), 1999, Taiwan Statistical Yearbook, 
Republic of China. 
 
 
4.3. Growth of exportations 
 
  We will now examine how changes in exportations may influence a firm’s 
decision to innovate. Table 5 gives the ratio of the value of exportations to total sales 
(“exportations intensity”) in the years 1986, 1991 and 1996 (columns I, II, and III 
respectively), as well as the change in this ratio between these  dates (columns IV and 
V). Depending on the industry, exportations intensity varies from less than 5% to 
more than 70%. As before, the various Taiwanese industries are regrouped into four 
industrial categories: “Electronic”, “Metal and Machinery”, “Chemical”, and “Food, 
Textile and Other”. The most exportation-intensive of these four sectors are the 
“Food, Textile and Other” industry and the “Electronic” industry. The “Metal and 
Machinery” industry, and the chemical and process industries, have comparatively 
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Food, Textile and Other Industry 52.4  36.4  29.4  -15.9  -7.0 
 Food  Manufacturing  26.3  19.4  18.3  -6.9  -1.2 
  Textile Mill Products  48.1  36.5  33.0  -11.7  -3.5 
  Wearing Apparel & Accessories  78.8*  58.2*  42.0*  -20.6  -16.2 
  Wood & Bamboo Products  51.7  24.6  19.2  -27.1  -5.5 
  Furniture & Fixtures  71.0*  49.7  36.5  -21.3  -13.2 
  Non-Metallic Mineral Products  19.8  10.4  7.2  -9.4  -3.2 
  Misc. Industrial Products  70.7*  56.3*  50.0*  -14.4  -6.4 
            
Chemical Industry  27.6  23.6  21.7  -4.0  -2.0 
  Leather & Fur Products  71.4*  55.1*  42.6*  -16.3  -12.6 
  Pulp, Paper & Paper Products  7.1  10.6  10.7  3.4  0.2 
 Printing  Processing  5.4  4.1  2.7  -1.4  -1.3 
  Chemical Matter Manufacturing  22.1  26.8  28.1  4.7  1.3 
 Chemical  Products  11.0  13.4  13.6  2.4  0.2 
  Petroleum & Coal Products  5.6  3.3  8.5  -2.3  5.2 
  Rubber Products Manufacturing  45.6  42.7  39.7  -2.8  -3.1 
  Plastic Products Manufacturing  52.5  33.0  27.3  -19.5  -5.7 
            
Metal and Machinery Industry  28.1  19.4  20.5  -8.7  1.1 
  Basic Metal Industries  11.7  9.7  12.2  -2.0  2.5 
  Fabricated Metal Products  39.4  24.5  22.1  -14.9  -2.4 
  Machinery & Equipment  34.6  25.9  27.8  -8.7  2.0 
 Transport  Equipment  26.6  17.4  19.9  -9.2  2.5 
            
Electronic Industry  65.8  56.8  55.5  -9.0  -1.3 
  Electrical & Electronic Machinery  66.8*  53.8*  55.8*  -13.0  2.0 
 Precision  Instruments  64.8  59.7*  55.2*  -5.1  -4.6 
Total 39.6  30.2  27.2  -9.3  -3.0 
Note: a * denotes that the industry is one of the five highest in terms of export-intensity in each year. 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics of Taiwan's Executive Yuan, Report 
of Industrial and Commercial Census, 1986, 1991,1996. 
 
Regarding the changes in the exportations intensity ratio, more than four-fifths 
of the twenty-one industries reported in Table 5 experienced a decrease in their 
exportation share between 1986 and 1991. Traditional industries such as “Wood & 
Bamboo Products” and “Furniture & Fixtures” experienced the most substantial 
decreases in the ratio. However, the overall decrease in Taiwan’s exportations 
intensity apparently stabilized in the first half of the 1990s:  only a little bit more than 
half of the twenty-one industries experienced a decrease between 1991 and 1996, and 
the magnitude of the decrease is much lower than in the previous period. 
Most of the decrease in the exportations intensity ratio comes from the “Food, 
Textile and Others” industry. According to the figures put forward in Table 5, 
Taiwan’s industry can be said to have been challenged on the exportation market 
since the early 1980s.  This significant loss of comparative advantage is more 
  32  apparent in traditional industries, where the process of production usually relies on 
comparatively low-skilled workers. 
 
Table 6 : rate of growth of the monetary value of  Taiwan’s exportations by industry (in %) 
Industry 1986-1991  1991-1996 
Food, Textile and Other Industry   1.11  -16.5 
 Food  Manufacturing  -5.5  23.1 
  Textile Mill Products  -19.8  -7.8 
  Wearing Apparel & Accessories  -35.3  12.5 
  Wood & Bamboo Products  -13.1  -67.0 
  Furniture & Fixtures  38.8  -18.0 
  Non-Metallic Mineral Products  -10.6  -2.7 
  Misc. Industrial Products  83.3  -55.6 
      
Chemical Industry  61.5  27.1 
  Leather & Fur Products  66.9  -64.5 
  Pulp, Paper & Paper Products  55.5  26.9 
 Printing  Processing  16.1  -0.1 
  Chemical Matter Manufacturing  61.2  64.7 
 Chemical  Products  81.0  47.0 
  Petroleum & Coal Products  -16.3  235.4 
  Rubber Products Manufacturing  189.8  -44.8 
  Plastic Products Manufacturing  38.3  -47.6 
      
Metal and Machinery Industry  36.3  61.5 
  Basic Metal Industries  47.5  94.3 
  Fabricated Metal Products  -5.3  34.7 
  Machinery & Equipment  66.7  72.4 
 Transport  Equipment  36.2  44.4 
      
Electronic Industry  48.6  62.7 
  Electrical & Electronic Machinery  38.3  120.7 
 Precision  Instruments  58.9  4.8 
Total  9.6 55.9 
Source: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics of Taiwan's Executive Yuan, Report 
of Industrial and Commercial Census, 1986, 1991,1996. 
 
  Table 6 gives the rate of growth in the monetary value of exportations between 
1986 and 1991, and between 1991 and 1996. The rate of growth varies hugely across 
industries and across periods: it ranges from -35% to 190% in the first period, and 
from –67% to 235% in the second period. Again, we regroup industries in four main 
categories: “Electronic”, “Metal and Machinery”, “Chemical” and “Food, Textile and 
Other”. The overall trend is a significant increase in both periods, except for the latter 
industry (Food, Textile, etc.), which experiences a very small growth (1.1 %) between 
1986 and 1991, and a significant decrease (-16.5%) between 1991 and 1996.   
Again, a division appears between traditional industries on the one hand and 
high-tech industries on the other: although exportations from chemical and process 
industries grow over both period, they do so at a decreased pace between 1991 and 
  33  1996. On the contrary, both “Metal and Machinery” and “Electronic” industries grow 
continuously over both period, and keep on growing at an increased rate between  
1991 and 1996. 
 
5. Econometric Modeling 
 
 
Taiwanese firms may have reacted differently to the challenges which 
appeared since the 1980s, according to the specific industry conditions they faced. 
These industry conditions include a variety of factors reviewed in Section 3. To 
examine the effect of these factors on firms’ decision to innovate in the 1990s, we 
engage in an econometric analysis using a firm-level panel provided by Taiwan’s 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (hereafter, MOEA) and covering the 1992-1995 period. 
The decision of firm i to innovate at any period t is represented by a Logit 
model for panel data. At each t, only the outcome of the decision of each firm i is 
observed; it is represented by the dichotomous variable Yit which is equal to 1 if firm i 
innovates at time t, and to 0 otherwise. It is assumed that firm i will take the decision 
to innovate (yit = 1) if and only if the (unobserved) expected returns to innovation, y
*
it 
are above a certain threshold (arbitrarily set to zero): 
(1)   yit = 1 if  y
*
it > 0,  yit = 0 otherwise. 
The latent variable y
*
it is supposed to be a linear function of a vector Xit of k 
explanatory variables : 
(2)     it it it X y ε β + = .
*
where β is a vector of parameters to be estimated.  
The panel nature of the data allows to write the residual εit as the sum of an 
individual effect ui (specified here as a random effect) and a transitory term vij : 
(3)   εij = ui + vij 
It comes from Equations (1) to (3) that the probability to observe the outcome yit = 1 
(firm  i innovates at time t) is a non-linear function of the vector of explanatory 
variables Xit by: 
(4)   Prob(yit = 1)  = Prob(β.Xit + εit > 0) 
    =   P r o b ( εit > - β.Xit) 
= Prob(vit > - β.Xit - ui) 
    =   F(-β.Xit - ui)  
where F is the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the random term εij. 
  34  Since we adopt a Logit specification, F represent the Logistic distribution, and we can 
rewrite Equation (4) as : 












which is the model to be estimated. 
If we note Pit = Prob(yij = 1) then the model given by Equation (5) can be 
rewritten as: 
















log β  
The model is estimated by the Maximum Likelihood (ML) technique. The ML 
estimator is known to have good properties in large sample (consistency, asymptotical 
efficiency, and asymptotically normality). Since ui is specified as a random effect, it is 
assumed to be independent from Xit, and the likelihood of the model can be written: 




i= ∏  
where Li is the contribution to the likelihood of the i
th observation: 
(8)   Li = P[yi1,…, yiT | Xit] = () i i
T
t










+ = β  
Maximizing the likelihood for each observation i implies to calculate the integral 
given in the right hand-side of Equation (8) ; in practice, this integral is approximated 





6.1. Data source : the MOEA panel 
 
 
This research used census data gathered by the Statistic Bureau of Taiwan's 
Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA). The Statistical Bureau of MOEA conducts a 
yearly census survey, and collects data on every plant in operation that holds a 
registered certificate in the manufacturing sector. This data covers all manufacturing 
industries in the Taiwanese economy. In Taiwan, most manufacturing firms are 
single-plant producers, so the distinction between plant and firm is not as relevant as 
  35  in Western industrialized countries. Thus, we will refer to the MOEA data as “firm-
level data” hereafter.  
As was said in Section 2, the history of innovation in Taiwan is not a long one, 
the most important event being the industrial restructuring which took place 
throughout the 1990s, with a strong support from the government. Thus, when 
studying innovation in Taiwan, it makes sense to focus on the 1990s. When the 
present research was started, post-1997 data was not available. Moreover, the MOEA 
census was not conducted in 1991 and 1996. For these reasons, our research will 
focus on the 1992-1995 period only (this period will be referred to as the “observation 
period”). 
Over this period, we observed a panel of more then 27,000 Taiwanese 
manufacturing firms. The MOEA census data provides reliable information on firms’ 
total R&D expenditures, as well as on the monetary value of imported technologies 
(i.e. new/recent technologies purchased by the observed Taiwanese firms on the 
international market between 1992 and 1995). We use this information to build our 
dependent dichotomous variable yit, which identifies innovation and non-innovation 
firms. An “innovation firm” will be defined as a firm which either conducted R&D or 
imported technology, for at least a year between 1992 and 1995. On the contrary, an 
“non-innovation firm” will be defined as a firm which didn’t engage in any of these 
two activities over the observation period.The distribution of innovation and non-
innovation firms is described in the next sub-section.  
The additional information available in the MOEA data includes (among other 
variables) firms’ sales and number of employees. This information is used to build our 
explanatory variables, as is explained in the last sub-section.  
 
6.2 Composition of the MOEA panel by type of firms   
  
As explained in 6.1., two types of manufacturing firms are distinguished in this 
research: innovation firms on the one hand, and non-innovation firms on the other. 
This distinction is based on whether a firm either engaged in R&D or imported 
technology in any given year of the observation period (1992-1995). Table 7 reports 
the total number of innovation and non-innovation firms by year. Each year, we 
observe between 3000 and 3500 firms; in other words, the proportion of innovation 
firms in the panel is quite stable over time (12% on average). 
  36  Table 7 : breakdown of the MOEA panel by type of firm 
Year   Innovation firms  Non-innovation firms  Total 
1992  3365 (12%)  24389 (88%)  27754 (100%) 
1993  3542 (13%)  24212 (87%)  27754 (100%) 
1994  3279 (12%)  24475 (88%)  27754 (100%) 
1995  3158 (11%)  24596 (89%)  27754 (100%) 
 
 
Table 8 gives a more detailed breakdown of the MOEA panel by industry and 
by type of firm (on average over the 1992-1995 period). This table shows that the 
panel covers a wide range of industries (21 in total), and the proportion of innovation 
firms varies significantly across industries. The four industries which gathers the 
largest proportion of innovation firms are the “Fabricated Metal Products”, the “Food 
Manufacturing”, the “Plastic Products Manufacturing” and the “Machinery & 
Equipment” industries. On the contrary, the smallest proportion of innovation firms is 
to be found in the “Petroleum & Coal Products”, “Leather & Fur Products”, “Rubber 
Products Manufacturing” and “Wearing Apparel & Accessories” industries. 
 
Table 8: the distribution of  sample (1992-1995) by industries 
Industry Total  innovation    No-innovation 
  firms  % Firms  (%) Firms  (%) 
Food, Textile and Other Industry   9967  35.91  931 (9)  9036 (91) 
  Food Manufacturing  3161  11.39  282 (9)  2879 (91) 
  Textile Mill Products  1806  6.54  241 (13)  1565 (87) 
  Wearing Apparel & Accessories  366  1.32  40 (11)  326 (89) 
  Wood & Bamboo Products  839  3.02  12 (1)  827 (99) 
  Furniture & Fixtures  994  3.58  75 (8)  919 (92) 
  Non-Metallic Mineral Products  1592  5.73  153 (10)  1439 (90) 
  Misc. Industrial Products  1209  4.36  128 (11)  1081 (89) 
          
Chemical Industry  6281  22.63  861 (14)  5420 (86) 
  Leather & Fur Products  227  0.82  54 (24)  173 (76) 
  Pulp, Paper & Paper Products  789  2.84  70 (9)  719 (91) 
  Printing Processing  782  2.82  30 (4)  752 (96) 
  Chemical Matter Manufacturing  616  2.22  173 (28)  443 (71) 
  Chemical Products  1172  4.22  309 (26)  863 (73) 
  Petroleum & Coal Products  13  0.04  6 (46)  7 (54) 
  Rubber Products Manufacturing  335  1.21  48 (14)  287 (86) 
  Plastic Products Manufacturing  2347  8.46  171(7)  2176 (93) 
          
Metal and Machinery Industry  9028  32.53  913 (10)  8115 (90) 
  Basic Metal Industries  1493  5.38  148 (10)  1345 (90) 
  Fabricated Metal Products  3313  11.94  242 (7)  3071 (92) 
  Machinery & Equipment  2329  8.39  246 (10)  2083 (89) 
  Transport Equipment  1893  6.82  277 (15)  1616 (85) 
          
Electronic Industry  2478  8.93  635 (26)  1844 (74) 
  Electrical & Electronic Machinery  11890  6.81  542 (29)  1348 (71) 
  Precision Instruments  588  2.12  93 (16)  495 (84) 
Total  27754  100  3373 (12)  24417 (88) 
 
 
  37  As before, we regroup these 21 industries in four “aggregated” categories: 
“Electronic”, “Metal and Machinery”, “Chemical”, and “Food, Textile and Others”.    
The last category regroup the largest number of manufacturing firms (36% of the 
panel), but comparatively to other categories, the smallest proportion of innovation 
firms (only 9% of this category are classified as innovation firms). On the contrary, 
the “Electronic” category has the smallest number of firms (only 9% of the panel), but 
represents the category where the proportion of innovation firms is the largest (26% 
of the firms recorded in this category are innovation firms). 
 
6.3. Explanatory variables  
 
We define here the explanatory variables that will be used in the Logit 
analysis presented in Section 5. These variables try to account for both the theoretical 
determinants of the decision to innovate (cf. Section 3) and for the factors that are 
specific to Taiwan (cf. Section 4). From a theoretical point of view, market structure, 
firm size, and technological opportunities are said to be the main determinants of the 
decision to innovate. From the viewpoint of Taiwan’s innovation history, three main 
types of factors could lead Taiwanese firms to innovate: (1) the increase in labor 
costs, (2) the fluctuations of Taiwan’s currency and (3) growth of the export market. 
Table 9 gives summary statistics for all our explanatory variables. 
The MOEA panel data did not keep track of the economic context of the 
1990’s, however. In our effort to build reliable proxy variables for the stylized facts 
highlighted above,  we had to use the information provided from the Directorate 
General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (DGBAS) of Taiwan’s Executive Yuan. 
The DGBAS data was presented to some extent in Section 4 (Tables 5 and 6): it 
comes from a large survey conducted every five years by the DGBAS, and available 
at the 4-digit industry level. This data records nominal wages and the monetary value 
of Taiwan’s exportations (by industry) in 1986, 1991 and 1996; the value of the real 
wages can be computed by dividing the DGBAS nominal wages by the Consumer 
Price Index
7. The DGBAS data can be used to compute industry-level indicators; 
these indicators can then be added to the MOEA panel. The matching is made 
                                                 
7 Available from the DGBAS, 2001, Commodity-Price Statistics Monthly in Taiwan, Taiwan's 
Executive Yuan. The Consumer Price Index is normalized to 100 for year 2001. 
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which each firm belongs. 
Our initial intention was to build two indicators, one for the changes in labor 
costs and another one for the changes in exportations. Unfortunately, only the latter 
was meaningful, as the DGBAS data does not allow us to distinguish between high-
skill and low-skill labor. This lack of information on the quality of the labor force 
makes it irrelevant to include (for instance) the growth of real wages (at the industry-
level) in our model : because we don’t know if it is driven by a demand of high-skill 
or low-skill labor, it is impossible to interpret the effect of a rise in labor costs. A 
higher demand for high-skilled  workers may be correlated with more R&D activity; 
on the contrary, a higher demand for low-skilled workers may come from firms that 
either rely only on the importation of technology, or that do not innovate. 
 
Table 9: summary statistics 
Variable  Description  Mean (Std Error) 
Grexp91-86  Rate of growth of exportations between 1986 and 1991  0.22 (1.01) 
Grexp96-91  Rate of growth of exportations between 1991 and 1996  1.44 (6.89) 
dEt-86  Variation of NT$/ US$ exchange rate from 1986 to year t 
(t = 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995). 
-9.50 (0.47) 
 
CR4  Concentration Ratio, Level 4 (%)  26.89 (16.24) 
Size50  Firm size (number of employees) small than 50  0.83 (0.38) 
Size100  Firm size (number of employees) between  50 and 100  0.087 (0.28) 
Size500  Firm size (number of employees) between  100 and 500  0.063 (0.24) 
Size1000  Firm size (number of employees) between  500 and 1000  0.006 (0.08) 
Size1001  Firm size (number of employees) bigger 1000  0.017 (0.13) 
Age  Firm’s age in years   13.19 (6.48) 
D1  1 if firm belong to (11) Food Industry, 0 otherwise  0.11 (0.32) 
D2  1 if firm belong to (13) Textile Industry, 0 otherwise  0.07 (0.25) 
D3  1 if firm belong to (14), (16), or (17) industries (Wearing Apparel, 
Leather, Wood, Furniture), 0 otherwise  0.08 (0.27) 
D4  1 if firm belong to (15), (18) or (19) industries (Paper, Printing) 
and 0 otherwise  0.06 (0.25) 
D5  1 if firm belong to (21) Chemical Industry, 0 otherwise  0.02 (0.15) 
D6  1 if firm belong to (22) or (23) industry (Chemical Products, Oil 
and Coal Products), 0 otherwise  0.04 (0.20) 
D7  1 if firm belong to (24) Rubber Industry, 0 otherwise  0.01 (0.11) 
D8  1 if firm belong to (25) Plastic Industry, 0 otherwise  0.08 (0.29) 
D9  1 if firm belong to (26) Non-Metal Mineral Products Industry, 0 
otherwise  0.06 (0.23) 
D10  1 if firm belong to (27) Basic Metal Industry, 0 otherwise  0.05 (0.23) 
D11  1 if firm belong to (28) Fabricated Metal Products Industry, 0 
otherwise  0.12 (0.32) 
D12  1 if firm belong to (29) Machinery Industry, 0 otherwise  0.08 (0.28) 
D13  1 if firm belong to (31) Electronic Industry, 0 otherwise  0.07 (0.25) 
D14  1 if firm belong to (32) Transportation Industry, 0 otherwise  0.07 (0.25) 
D15  1 if firm belong to (33) Precision Instruments Industry, 0 otherwise  0.02 (0.14) 
D16  1 if firm belong to (39) Miscellaneous Industry, 0 otherwise  0.04 (0.20) 
 
 
  39  Thus, our model will not include any information about changes in the labor 
costs; this may lead to more unobserved heterogeneity between firms, but we are 
confident that this heterogeneity can be captured either by our industry fixed effect or 
by the individual random effect. Even if the DGBAS data had provided us with 
information on the quality of the labor force, this information would only have 
controlled for inter-industry differences anyway. 
Nonetheless, the DGBAS data proved useful in that it allowed us to represent 
the effect of changes on the export market on firms’ probability to innovate. For that, 
we calculate the growth of exportations in industry j over two subsequent periods 
(1986-1991 and 1991-1996): 
















where expjt is the export shipment in industry j at year t. As stated in Sections 3 and 4, 
the growth of exportations is expected to have a positive impact on the probability to 
innovate, through a higher technology requirement. By using these indicators, we 
want to test for the possibility of a simultaneous impact (growth of exportations 
between 1991 and 1996, which roughly correspond to the observation period of the 
MOEA panel) and of lagged impact (growth of exportations between 1986 and 1991, 
i.e. just before the observation period of the MOEA panel). 
  
A similar approach was adopted in order to represent the fluctuations of the New 
Taiwan Dollar, which is an even broader environment variable. The exchange rate of 
NT dollar to US dollar is available in Taiwan Statistical Yearbook
8, which allowed us 
to compute the  difference in the exchange rate between each year t in the observation 
period (t = 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) and a year of reference (1986): 
(11)     dEt-86=exchange ratet - exchange rate86 
Again, this indicator was matched, for each year, to the MOEA panel data. 
If the MOEA panel was lacking of some contextual/environmental variables, it 
provided us, however, with several explanatory variables that are directed related to 
the classical theoretical framework of industrial organization theory. The most 
                                                 
8 Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), 1999, Taiwan Statistical Yearbook, ROC Taiwan. 
  40  important of these variables, from a theoretical perspective, may be our indicator of 
market structure, the concentration ratio (CR4). 
 
The CR4 measures the market share of the 4 largest firms in industry j at time t: 





where  jt it ijt S S S =  is the market share of the i  firm at time t in industry j, S
th
it being 
the sales level of firm i at time t and Sjt the total sales of industry j at time t
9. The CR4 
has a maximal value of 100% (which corresponds to the case of a pure monopoly). 
In order to control for possible simultaneity biases, we will consider several 
alternative specifications for our Logit model: the first one is “simultaneous”, and 
involves the CR4 at year t as an explanatory variable for the probability to innovate in 
that year. The others are “lagged” specifications using CR4t-1 or CR4t-2 (rather than 
CR4t) to explains the probability to innovate in year t.  
Another important explanatory variable is firm size (Sizeit), which is 
represented by a 5-categories variable
10 based on Nit, the number of employees of  the 
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By taking Category 2 as the reference, it is possible to control for the presence of non-
linearity in the size-innovation relationship. Finally, we also control for firms’ age 
(Ageit), computed in years, and for industry, thanks to 16 industry dummies (with 






                                                 
9 In this chapter, following classical IO literature, we use sales to compute the CR. In some cases, 
alternatives have been used, such as: the number of employees, the value added, and the output. 
10 We initially used a continuous variable (the number of employees) to represent firm size, but, as this 
lead to some serious scaling problems, the 5 categories variable was finally preferred. 
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The Logit model for panel data described in Section 5 was estimated several 
times : first, on the whole population of 27754 manufacturing firms captured by the 
MOEA census, and then, on four sub-groups of this population. These sub-groups 
correspond to the four industry categories already used in Section 4, namely: the 
Electronic industry, the Metal and Machine industry, the Chemical industry and the 
Food, Textile, and Others industries. We will first present the results of the analysis 
conducted on the whole panel, and then detail the results by category of industry. 
 
7.1. Results of the Logit estimation on the whole panel 
 
Table 10 present the results for the whole panel of 27754 manufacturing firms. 
Three alternative models (with a different vector of explanatory variables) have been 
estimated. The first one use CR4 as a indicator of market concentration
11 in a 
simultaneous specification; the second and third models use (respectively) a one-year 
and two-years lag of CR4 instead, which allows to reduce potential simultaneity 
biases. The effects of the “simultaneous CR4” and of the “1-year lagged CR4” on the 
probability to innovate are almost identical: both are significantly positive at the 1% 
level, with a low magnitude (the parameter value is 0.008, which means that the odd 
ratio increases proportionally with the CR4).  
The similar effects of the ‘simultaneous’ and ‘1-year lagged’ CR4 probably 
come from the fact that the concentration ratio stays very stable over time (around 
27% on average each year) in our panel, which is not surprising: on a short 
observation period such as 1992-1995, the degree of concentration in an industry is 
unlikely to experience important variations. Moreover, the effect of the 2-years lagged 
CR4 is also very similar in terms of magnitude and standard deviation; it is, however, 
less significant (10% level). 
A second important result regards the effect of firm size on the probability to 
innovate: in all three models, we find that very small firms (with less than 50 
employees) have a significantly lower probability to innovate. Then, as firms size 
grows from 50-99 employees to 100-499 employees and 500-999 employees, the 
                                                 
11 We also used more sophisticated indicators such as the Herfindhal index (in both contemporaneous 
and lagged specifications), but this doesn’t significantly change the final results. 
  42  probability to innovate increase. Larger firms (1000 employees or more), however, 
have a lower probability to engage in innovation. To summarize these results, it can 
be said that firm size has a significant non-linear effect on the probability to innovate: 
this probability first increases as firm size increases, but begins to decrease after a 
certain threshold has been reached. 
 
Table 10: parameter estimates of the panel Logit model (27754 manufacturing firms) 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
Constant  -3.587 (0.44)***  -4.396 (0.503)***  0.685 (1.707) 
Grexp86-91  0.119 (0.03)***  0.087 (0.053)*  0.195 (0.555)*** 
Grexp91-96  0.005 (0.005)  0.0006 (0.006)  0.012 (0.009) 
Et-1986  -0.146 (0.035)***  -0.201 (0.041)***  0.451 (0.183)** 
Size 50  -2.747 (0.073)***  -3.720 (0.105)***  -5.881 (0.218)*** 
Size 100  (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
Size 500  2.335 (0.099)***  2.855 (0.131)***  4.229 (0.244)*** 
Size 1000  4.885 (0.337)***  6.429 (0.404)***  8.928 (0.511)*** 
Size 1001  -1.655 (0.187)***  2.827 (0.229)***  -4.885 (0.427)*** 
Age  -0.028 (0.005)***  -0.038 (0.006)***  -0.054 (0.011)*** 
CR4 0.008  (0.002)***     
CR4_lag1    0.006 (0.002)***   
CR4_lag2      0.006 (0.003)* 
D1  -1.187 (0.271)***  -0.872 (0.295)***  -0.950 (0.543)* 
D2  -1.041 (0.280)***  -0.717 (0.304)**  -0.906 (0.555) 
D3  -2.490 (0.299)***  -2.503 (0.349)***  -3.180 (0.584)*** 
D4  -1.535 (0.283)***  -1.320 (0.322)***  -1.391 (0.567)** 
D5  1.466 (0.319)***  2.500 (0.335)***  3.121 (0.642)*** 
D6  1.209 (0.281)***  2.140 (0.318)***  2.950 (0.568)*** 
D7  -0.117 (0.461)  0341/ (0.469)  0.196 (0.885) 
D8  -1.530 (0.279)***  -1.146 (0.304)***  -1.297 (0.557)** 
D9  -1.185 (0.303)***  -0.964 (0.345)***  -0.888 (0.612) 
D10  -1.216 (0.302)***  -0.880 (0.341)**  -1.066 (0.581)* 
D11  -1.348 (0.276)***  -1.115 (0.301)***   1.577 (0.549)*** 
D12  -0.558 (0.279)**  -0.168 (0.301)  -0.458 (0.559)*** 
D13  1.225 (0.268)***  2.079 (0.297)***  3.409 (0.559)*** 
D14  -0.187 (0.281)  0.052 (0.311)  0.143 (0.568) 
D15  (ref.)  (ref.) (ref.) 
D16   -0.356 (0.306)  0.227 (0.335)  -0.214 (0.559) 
Observations 103744  77808  51872 
Log Likelihood  -21576.66  -15741.58  -10160.32*** 
Chi-Square 4283.55***  3844.71***  2552.55 
Rho  0.773 (0.001)***  0.829 (0.001)***  0.916(0.001)*** 
Standard errors are reported in brackets. Significance levels are: *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
NB: gray cells indicate that variables are not included in the regression model. 
The one before last line reports the Chi-Square associated with the LR test of the null hypothesis 
H0: “β = 0” ; the stars indicate the level of significance at which H0 is rejected. 
 
These findings are consistent with those observed in the empirical literature; in 
particular, we find, as Cohen et al. (1987), that the size of a business unit affects its 
decision to innovate. That this effect may be non linear should not be surprising, if 
one considers that a non-linear relationship between R&D intensity and firm size has 
  43  been identified in a number of previous studies (Scherer, 1965a, 1965b; Malecki, 
1980; Link, 1981; Bound et al., 1984). 
  Our third important result regards firms’ age: on the average, older firms have 
a significantly lower (1% level) probability to innovate. Again, this result is consistent 
across all three models. Let us now focus on the results related to the economic 
context of Taiwan in the 1990s and the late 1980s. 
  First of all, our indicator of the fluctuations of Taiwan’s currency (the 
variation in the exchange rate of the US $ / NT $ between 1896 and year t) has a 
significantly negative effect on the probability to innovate in models 1 and 2. This 
effects become positive, but less significant, in the third model. A plausible 
explanation of that result is that, by construction, the indicator of the fluctuations of 
the NT $ captures some of the time specific effect. For this reason, the results may 
change when the panel of firms is observed on a shorter period of time (the third 
model, with a 2-years lag in CR4, can only be run for years 1994 and 1995). 
Second, the growth of the export market has over the 1991-1996 period has no 
significant effect on the probability to innovate: thus, firms’ decision to innovate may 
not depend on the current growth of the external market. However, the past growth of 
the external market, captured here by the growth of Taiwan’s exportations over the 
1986-1991 period, seems to matter: it has a significantly positive effect on the 
probability to innovate in the first and the third models. In the second model, 
however, the effect is not significant, although the parameter remains positive 
This puzzling result may be partially explained by the relative importance of 
each industry: the foreign demand is important only for some industries, whereas 
some industries, like the chemical of metal industries, have always sold their product 
on the domestic market only. This explanation is reinforced by further empirical 
investigation: when running the Model 2 on all industries but  the Metal and 
Machinery category, the parameter associated to the “Growth of Exportations86-91” 
variable becomes significant and positive again. In order to better understand this 
result, we will examine the  results of these regressions by category of industry in 
Sub-Section 7.2. 
Finally, the last line of the Table 10 features a parameter Rho which captures 
the contribution of the variance the individual (random) effect to the total variance of 
the dependent variable. Here, Rho is significantly different from zero (at the 1% level) 
  44  in all three models, which means that the individual effect does capture some 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
7.2. Results of the estimations by categories of industry. 
 
  After estimating our Logit model for the whole panel, we needed to further the 
analysis and examine the results by type of industry. As before, four categories of 
industry were distinguished: “Electronic”, “Metal & Machinery”, “Chemical”, and 
“Food, Textile & Others”. Again, we used a “simultaneous” specification of the 
model (i.e., using CR4t to explain Pit, the probability to innovate at time t) and two 
“lagged” specifications (using respectively CR4t-1 and CR4t-2 to explain Pit). Table 11 
presents, for each category of industry, the results of the estimation of the first 
(“simultaneous”) model. The results of the two lagged models were quite similar, and 
are presented (for the sake of concision) in Appendix III. 
  A first interesting result is that the degree of industry concentration (captured 
by the CR4) has a significantly positive effect on the probability to innovate, in both 
the “Electronic” and “Food & Textile” industry categories. However, the effect is 
insignificant in both the “Metal and Machinery” and the “Chemical” categories. This 
result still holds when using the (one or two years) lag of CR4  (c.f. Appendix III). It 
shows that the concentration-innovation relationship often observed in the literature 
has an industry-specific dimension, as emphasized by Cohen and Levin (1989) and by 
Scherer and Ross (1990). 
  The effect of firm size is quite similar across industries: in every industry 
category, firms with less than 50 employees have a significantly lower probability to 
innovate. The non-linear relationship between firm size and the probability to 
innovate that we observed on the whole panel is verified here in every industry 
category except the “Electronic” industry. In the electronic industry, the probability to 
innovate increases as the categorical variable “Size” increases, but the effect of the 
highest category (more than 1000 employees) is insignificant (whereas it is 
significantly negative in all other industries). 
  Similarly, firms’ age has a significantly negative effect (at the 1% level) on the 
probability to innovate in all industries except the electronic industry. As was said 
before, this industry is relatively young in Taiwan, so the age effect does not really 
  45  matter, all electronic firms in Taiwan being equally young and likely to rely 
intensively on knowledge and innovation. 
  
Table 11: parameter estimates of the panel Logit model by category of industry 









Constant  -4.446 (0.675)***  -4.357 (0.762)***  -5.144 (0.703)***  -4.807 (1.026)*** 
Grexp86-91  0.180 (0.052)***  -0.275 (0.134)**  0.045 (0.036)  0.426 (0.135)*** 
Grexp91-96  0.165 (0.031)***  0.226 (0.060)***  -0.005 (0.005)  0.664 (0.135)*** 
Et-1986  -0.098 (0.064)  -0.085 (0.073)  -0.244 (0.065)***  -0.154 (0.096) 
Size 50  -2.525 (0.135)***  -3.017 (0.144)***  -2.817 (0.138)***  -2.482 (0.191)*** 
Size  100  (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) 
Size 500  2.438 (0.162)***  2.079 (0.218)***  2.286 (0.198)***  2.155 (0.264)*** 
Size 1000  3.476 (0.406)***  7.558 (1.211)***  5.995 (0.770)***  5.458 (0.675)*** 
Size 1001  -2.097 (0.326)***  -1.609 (0.401)***  -1.818 (0.398)***  0.674 (0.518) 
Age  -0.025 (0.007)***  -0.014 (0.010)  -0.053 (0.010)***  -0.004 (0.014) 
CR4  0.008 (0.003)**  -0.0005 (0.004)  -0.0019 (0.003)  0.022 (0.006)*** 
D1 (ref.)       
D2 0.089  (0.164)       
D3 -1.162  (0.192)***       
D4    (ref.)     
D5    3.273 (0.266)***     
D6    3.240 (0.227)***     
D7    1.218 (0.372)***     
D8    -0.009 (0.175)     
D9 -0.289  (0.199)       
D10      (ref.)   
D11      -0.285 (0.213)   
D12      0.655 (0.218)***   
D13        0.983 (0.303)*** 
D14      1.049 (0.218)***   
D15        (ref.) 
D16   0.820 (0.208)***       
Log-Likelihood  -6547.59 -5162.84 -6846.84 -2916.52 
Chi-Square  1378.28*** 1043.79*** 1062.31***  592.23*** 
Rho  0.761 (0.003)***  0.771 (0.003)***  0.786 (0.003)***  0.777 (0.004)*** 
Standard errors are reported in brackets. Significance levels are: *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
NB: gray cells indicate that variables are not included in the regression model. 
The one before last line reports the Chi-Square associated with the LR test of the null hypothesis 
H0: “β = 0” ; the stars indicate the level of significance at which H0 is rejected. 
 
Let us now examine the variables describing Taiwan’s economic context in 
the late 1980s and mid-1990s. The effect of the variation in the exchange rate (with 
respect to 1986) on the probability to innovate is consistently negative in all 
industries, although it is significant in some industries only. This result holds in the 1-
year lagged model; however, in the 2-years lagged model, the exchange rate becomes 
positive in all industries (but is significant in the “Metal & Machinery” and 
“Electronic” industries only). Again, this may happen because, by construction, the 
“exchange rate” variable captures part of the time-specific effect. 
  46    More interesting is the effect of the variations in Taiwan’s exportation across 
the 1986-1991 and 1991-1996 periods: across the various specifications (simultaneous 
and lagged), both variables appear to have a significant effect on the probability in all 
industries except “Metal and Machinery”. When it is significant, the growth of 
exportations  across the period always increase the probability to innovate. The 
growth of exportations before the period also significantly increases the probability to 
innovate in the “Food and Textile” and “Electronic” industry groups, but has a 
negative effect in the “Chemical” industry. Depending on the model specifications, 
however, this negative effect is not always significant. 
These results shed a new light on the findings of Sub-Section 7.1. : the effect 
of the growth in Taiwan’s exportations on Taiwanese firms’ probability to innovate 
varies across industry. We find here that innovation in the “Electronic”, “Food & 
Textile” and, to some extent, “Chemical” industries are strongly driven by the 
exportations, which in turn suggests that innovation in Taiwan may be more 
“demand-pulled” than “technology-pushed”. 
  Finally, as before, we find that the individual (random) effect is significant 
(the contribution of its variance to the total variance of the dependent variable is 
significantly different from zero). Thus we may be fairly confident that the results 
presented above are not severely biased by unobserved heterogeneity (raising for 





The objective of this chapter was to identify (some of) the determinants of 
firms’ decision to innovate in Taiwan. To do so, we estimated an empirical model of 
innovation decision at the firm level using a panel of more than 27,000 Taiwanese 
manufacturing firms observed from 1992 to 1995.  This panel consisted in census data 
collected yearly by the Statistic Bureau of Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MOEA), and covered the whole of Taiwan’s manufacturing sector. Moreover, the 
MOEA panel identified firms which engage in R&D, and firms which purchase 
foreign technology.  This allowed us to define an “innovation firm” has a firm who 
either did engage in R&D or imported technology during the observation period 
(rather than considering R&D as the only source of knowledge). 
  47  We used a Logit specification to model empirically the probability that a firm 
engages in innovation (in the above sense) in any given year between 1992 and 1995. 
This model consider the impacts of both economic changes and firm-level / industry-
level factors traditionally emphasized in the literature. The former include the 
fluctuations of Taiwan’s currency, and the rate of growth of Taiwan’s exportations, 
while the latter include market structure, firm size, and firm age. The econometric 
model was estimated first on the whole panel, and second on each of the four sub-
groups (industry categories) in which this panel could be divided: “Electronic”, 
“Metal and Machinery”, “Chemistry”, and “Food & Textile”. 
Our main findings are the following: first of all, whether it is used in 
“simultaneous” or “lagged” form, the concentration ratio (CR4) has an overall 
positive effect on the probability to innovate. A similar relationship between market 
structure and firm size has often been observed in the literature. This relationship, 
however, strongly varies across industries: it is strongly significant in “Electronic” 
and “Food and Textile”, but insignificant in the other two industry categories. 
Other important results regards firms’ size and age. In all industries (except the 
electronic industry), we observed a non-linear relationship between firms’ size and the 
probability to innovate: while very small firms (below 50 employees) have a lower 
probability to innovate, this probability normally increases with size up to a certain 
threshold, after which it decreases. This ‘inverted u-shape’ has been regularly 
mentioned in the existing empirical literature. Similarly, in all industries except the 
electronic (where firms are equally young, and production processes knowledge-
intensive), we observed a negative impact of firms’ age on the probability to innovate. 
In other words, firms tend to innovate less toward the end of their life cycle. 
The fluctuations of Taiwan’s currency (the New Taiwan Dollar), observed each 
year with respect to 1986, have an overall negative effect on the probability to 
innovate, but this effect is mostly localized in the Metal & Machinery industry. Last 
but not least, the variations in Taiwan’s exportation (across the 1986-1991 and 1991-
1996 periods) globally have a significantly positive effect of the probability to 
innovate. This effect is mainly localized in the “Electronic” and “Food & Textile” 
industries (where the demand is strongly driven by the exportations), which suggests 
that innovation in Taiwan may be more “demand-pulled” than “technology-pushed”. 
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  51  Appendix (I): Seminal IO models on process innovation and market structure 
 
Arrow (1962)'s Model: 
 
Arrow (1962) was trying to provide a formal theoretical framework to examine 
Schumpeter’s hypothesis, according to which monopoly power should stimulate 
innovative activity. To simplify, it is assumed that both monopolistic and competitive 
firms face the same costs and the same demand for a particular good Q. The demand 
function is linear and given by the equation: 
(A.1)   bQ a P − =  
where P denotes price, and a and b are fixed parameters. 
In this model, the firm has a “pure incentive to innovate”, i.e. the decision to 
innovate is determined by the cost of innovation only, without any strategic 
considerations or pressure from competitors being taken into account. Innovation is 
done through internal R&D only. Innovation firms can discover a new production 
process for product Q by research that involves a fixed cost E. Firms are assumed to 
use only non-drastic (or minor) process innovations
12, that reduce the marginal cost of 
good Q from an initial high level cto c. The model then relies on a static comparison 
of two situations: (1) when firms are in a competitive market (or industry) and (2) 
when firms are monopolists (in their respective industries). 
 
The case of firms in a competitive industry (figure I): before the innovation, all firms 
price at marginal cost  c P
c = , and earn zero profit. Let  be the innovator's profit 
per unit of time and let the interest rate r be constant. By assumption, a competitive 
firm only considers the profit it can earn as a result of the innovation, and is not 
influenced by the behavior of its competitors. After the innovation, the firm will earn 
the following per-period profit:  
c π
(A.2)    
b
c a
c c c D c c
c ) (
) ( ) ( ) (
−
− = − = π  
and the total present value in the competitive industry is 
                                                 
12 A non-drastic (or minor) process innovation is an innovation that allows an innovator to gain some 
cost advantage over its rivals, but not one so large that the firm can price like a monopolist without fear 
of entry or price competition (see “Remarks on drastic and non-drastic innovations” at the end of the 
present Appendix). 
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Equation (A.3) gives the incentive to innovate in the competitive case. 
 
The case of a firms in a monopoly industry (figure II): before the innovation, the 
monopoly price is  ) (c P
m , and the innovator's profits per unit of time are ) (c
m π . After 
the innovation, the new monopoly price becomes  ) (c P
m  and the innovator's profits 
per unit of time become  ) (c
m π . The profit function is written: 
(A.4)      )) ( ( ) ) ( ( ) ( c P D c c P c
m m m − = π
After the innovation, the monopoly firm will earn per-period profit: 
(A.5)   ( ) ( ) )) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( c P D c c P c P D c c P c c





















































and the total present value the incentive to innovate in the monopolist industry is 
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The comparison of Equations (A.3) and (A.6) allows to determine whether a 
monopoly has a stronger incentive to innovate than a competitive firm. Because 
) ( ) ( c P c P c P
m m c ≤ < = , as can be seen in Figure 2, and therefore  )) ( ( ) ( c P D c D
m >  
for all c, it comes: 
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It is obvious, then, that V , which leads to the conclusion that the competitive 
firms’ profits gain due to innovation is higher than that of the monopolist. 
m c V >
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Remarks on drastic and non-drastic process innovations:  
 
We consider a simple model, in which a firm's constant marginal cost before 
innovation is denoted by c . After the innovation, the constant marginal cost becomes 
c, and the innovating firm can charge a monopoly price  ) (c P
m . We can then 
distinguish between two cases. 
 
Case 1: a (process) innovation is said to be non-drastic if  ) (c P
m >c . The innovating 
firm reduces its marginal cost from c  to c which gives it a minor advantage over its 
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Case 2: a (process) innovation is said to be drastic if  ) (c P
m < c . The innovation is a 
major one, and the innovating firm can reduce its marginal cost from c  to c. This 
dramatically large cost reduction gives the innovator a major advantage over its 
competitors. The innovating firm can charge the full monopoly price associated with 
the new low cost, and still be able to undercut the marginal costs of all other firms. In 
this case, the innovator can act as profit-maximizing monopolist would do, without 
fearing the “threat of entry”. A typical drastic process innovation case is depicted in 












Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980)’s model 
 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) consider the  -identical firms Cournot model 
where all firms determine their level of output q
n
i simultaneously. Together, firms 
produce an aggregate output Q on the market; the market price associated with this 
output is taken to be P = P(Q). Let xi denotes the R&D expenditures of firm i. The 
unit cost of production of a firm is a decreasing function of its R&D expenditures, the 
technology of R&D being the same for each firm: C = C(xi), with C’(xi) < 0, ∀i. Thus, 
each firm faces a trade-off: on the one hand, R&D is costly (a firm has to spend xi in 
order to gain new knowledge), but, on the other hand, the (process) innovations 
generated by R&D expenditures will decrease the firm’s unit cost of production. 
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(B.1)     ( ) ( ) ii i i PQq Cx q x i π = −−  
Firms are assumed to behave in a Cournot fashion (i.e. they maximize profit with 
























where ε(Q) is the inverse of the elasticity of market price with respect to output (c.f. 
“Demonstration of Equation (B.2)” below). Equation (B2) states that the Cournot 
equilibrium price-cost margin is equal to the ratio of ε(Q) to the number of firms in 
the industry. 
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The absence of barriers to entry leads to the following equilibrium condition: 








Pq q q C x q x x q
=

+− − ≤ ∀ ≥ 
 ∑ 0
where a * denotes equilibrium quantities. Condition (B.4) states that there is no way 
for a firm outside the industry to enter the market and make positive profits if the i
th 
firm in the industry chooses to produce at the (optimal) level q
*
i. This condition relies 
on the assumption that each firm i (whether inside or outside the industry) entertains 
  56  Cournot conjectures regarding all other firms, i.e. considers that the remaining firms 
will not change its course of action if firm i deviates. 
 
In order to be able to characterize a free-entry market equilibrium when it exists, 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) restrict their analysis to those where all firms in the 
industry have the same behavior (or symmetric equilibria). This restriction allow to 
write, at equilibrium, qi = q
* and xi = x






























and the free-entry equilibrium condition can be rewritten as: 
(B.7)     ()
* .( ) . 0 , , PQ qq Cxq x xq +− − ≤ ∀ ≥ 0
=
*
Finally, it can be assumed that, at equilibrium, the profit of each firm in the industry 
becomes null (zero-profit condition): 
(B.8)    
** ** * () ( ) 0 PQ q Cx q x −−
Since, by definition, q
* = Q
* / n
*, Equation (B.9) can be rewritten as : 
(B.9)    
** ** * () () PQ Q Cx Q nx −=

















Equation (B.10) is the fundamental equation of this model: given that, by assumption, 
each firm contributes to the same proportion of the total output Q (or, in other words, 
that all firms have the same market share), 1/n
* can be taken as an index of the degree 
of concentration which prevails in the industry. Moreover, Z
* is defined as the fraction 
of industry sales, P(Q
*)Q
*, devoted to total R&D expenditures, n
*x
*, and can thus be 
considered as an index of research intensity in the industry. Thus, if ε(Q
*) is constant, 
research intensity is proportional to the degree of concentration. This is not, however, 
a causal relationship: in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980)’s model, concentration and 
research intensity are simultaneously determined. 
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 Demonstration of Equation (B.10): 
 
From (B.9), it comes that :
**
**






























































  58  Appendix (II): Industry Dummies 
 
The table bellows gives a thorough description of the 16 industry dummies 
defined at the two-digit industry level: 
 
 
The 16 industry dummies* 
D1:  (11) Food Manufacturing  
D2:  (13) Textile Mill Products 
D3: 
(14) Wearing Apparel & Accessories 
 (16) Wood & Bamboo Products, 
and (17) Furniture & Fixtures 
D4:  (15) Leather & Fur Products, (18) Pulp, Paper & Paper Products, and (19) 
Printing Processing 
D5:  (21) Chemical Matter Manufacturing 
D6:  (22) Chemical Products, and (23) Petroleum & Coal Products 
D7:  (24) Rubber Products Manufacturing 
D8:  (25) Plastic Products Manufacturing 
D9:  (26) Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
D10: (27) Basic Metal Industries 
D11: (28) Fabricated Metal Products 
D12: (29) Machinery & Equipment 
D13: (31) Electrical & Electronic Machinery 
D14: (32) Transport Equipment 
D15: (33) Precision Instruments 
D16: (39) Misc. Industrial Products 





  59  Appendix (III):  Estimations with CR4_lag1 and CR4_lag2 by industry group 
 
Table 12: parameter estimates of the panel Logit model by industry with 1-year lagged CR4 








Constant  -4.813 (0.778)***  -5.223 (0.903)***  -5.073 (0.772)***  -8.025 (1.278)*** 
Grexp86-91  0.153 (0.083)*  -0.167 (0.176)  -0.004 (0.047)  0.474 (0.182)*** 
Grexp91-96  0.155 (0.041)***  0.225 (0.074)***  -0.010 (0.006)  0.887 (0.189)*** 
Et-1986  -0.125 (0.074)*  -0.151 (0.084)*  -0.277 (0.072)***  -0.342 (0.116)*** 
Size 50  -3.457 (0.187)***  -3.890 (0.205)***  -4.092 (0.193)***  -3.189 (0.271)*** 
Size 100  (ref.)  (ref.)  (ref.)  (ref.) 
Size 500  3.082 (0.219)***  2.730 (0.284)***  2.311 (0.238)***  3.587 (0.363)*** 
Size 1000  5.346 (0.504)***  9.978 (1.184)***  8.573 (0.908)***  7.048 (0.914)*** 
Size 1001  -3.302 (0.376)***  -2.786 (0.435)***  -3.237 (0.502)***  0.185 (0.648) 
Age  -0.038 (0.006)***  -0.018 (0.013)  -0.064 (0.012)***  0.007 (0.021) 
CR4_lag1  0.006 (0.002)***  -0.005 (0.005)  0.0004 (0.004)  0.025 (0.008)*** 
D1 (ref.)       
D2 0.144  (0.190)       
D3 -1.420  (0.255)***       
D4    (ref.)     
D5    3.984 (0.314)***     
D6    3.894 (0.290)***     
D7    1.409 (0.421)***     
D8    0.206 (0.213)     
D9 -0.357  (0.248)       
D10      (ref.)   
D11      -0.193 (0.236)   
D12      0.822 (0.235)***   
D13        1.904 (0.410)*** 
D14      1.008 (0.249)***   
D15        (ref.) 
D16   0.964 (0.240)***       
Log-
Likelihood 
-4725.02 -3788.69  -5054.93  -2085.90 
Chi-Square 1151.92***  968.33***  1022.69***  474.53*** 
Rho  0.819 (0.003)***  0.832 (0.003)***  0.824 (0.003)***  0.863 (0.003)*** 
Standard errors are reported in brackets. Significance levels are: *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
The one before last line reports the Chi-Square associated with the LR test of the null hypothesis 











  60  Table 13: parameter estimates of the panel Logit model by industry with 2-years lagged CR4 
Standard errors are reported in brackets. Significance levels are: *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 








Constant  -0.931 (2.923)  -4.163 (3.327)  1.848 (3.168)  3.885 (4.384) 
Grexp86-91  0.327 (0.114)***  -0.532 (0.293)*  0.094 (0.070)  0.915 (0.241)*** 
Grexp91-96  0.123 (0.066)**  0.338 (0.128)***  -0.001 (0.011)  1.541 (0.241)*** 
Et-1986  0.375 (0.323)  0.081 (0.364)  0.590 (0.347)*  1.104 (0.490)** 
Size 50  -5.420 (0.370)***  -6.027 (0.410)***  -6.084 (0.392)***  -6.587 (0.725)*** 
Size 100  (ref.)  (ref.)  (ref.)  (ref.) 
Size 500  4.851 (0.575)***  4.703 (0.506)***  4.123 (0.462)***  4.353 (0.709)*** 
Size 1000  7.908 (0.701)***  13.61(1.484)***  12.028 (1.596)***  9.146 (1.229)*** 
Size 1001  -5.527 (0.689)***  -4.021 (0.971)***  -5.636 (1.422)***  0.030 (1.229) 
Age  -0.056 (0.019)***  -0.051 (0.021)**  -0.101 (0.024)***  0.014 (0.038) 
CR4_lag2 0.003  (0.006)  0.003 (0.009)  -0.003 (0.008)  0.042 (0.013)*** 
D1 (ref.)       
D2 0.111  (0.314)       
D3 -2.422  (0.423)***       
D4    (ref.)     
D5    4.902 (0.502)***     
D6    5.366 (0.499)***     
D7    2.255 (0.789)***     
D8    0.277 (0.408)     
D9 -0.178  (0.429)       
D10      (ref.)   
D11      -0.526 (0.352)   
D12      0.720 (0.344)**   
D13        2.855 (0.698)*** 
D14      1.340 (0.459)***   
D15        (ref.) 
D16   0.618 (0.342)*       
Log-Likelihood -3028.85  -2481.74  -3194.42  -1385.98 
Chi-Square 547.58***  597.44*** 605.87*** 181.15*** 
Rho  0.912 (0.002)***  0.917 (0.002)***  0.919 (0.002)***  0.941 (0.002)*** 
The one before last line reports the Chi-Square associated with the LR test of the null hypothesis 
H0: “β = 0” ; the stars indicate the level of significance at which H0 is rejected. 
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Doing R&D and Importing Technology: 














The objective of this chapter is to identify the determinants of the choice of innovation 
strategy in Taiwan. Using a panel of more than 27000 manufacturing firms (5000 of 
which can be classified as “innovation firms”), we develop a two-step empirical 
analysis to estimate the effect of market structure, firm size and firm age on the 
probability to adopt a specific innovation strategy. Four possible strategies are 
considered:  to do R&D only, to import (disembodied) technology only, to mix both, 
and to forego innovation (either on the whole period or in a given year only). We find 
a positive effect of firm size on the probability of doing R&D (with or without 
importing technology). A more concentrated market structure seems to spur R&D, but 
leads to a trade-off between the “R&D only” and the “mixed” strategy. Finally, 
innovation firms seem to be, on average, younger firms. Our empirical methodology 




  62  1. Introduction 
 
Several studies have been dedicated to the effects of market structure on 
innovation, which – at the microeconomic level – is generally defined as a firm’s 
internal R&D activity
1. Another, more recent, line of research has focused on 
alternative, external, sources of knowledge and technology. Indeed, knowledge (and 
technology) transfers may occur, for instance, when a firm buys a patent, hires new 
qualified personnel, or acquires another firm. However, in the empirical literature, 
firms’ characteristics are often the only variable explaining the choice of innovation 
strategy.
2 However, with a few exceptions (including Caves and Uekusa, 1976, and 
Bozeman and Link, 1983), studies that empirically examine the relationship between 
market structure and innovation strategy remain scarce. 
 
The acquisition of external technology (as an alternative to in-house R&D) may 
come from several sources; in this chapter, however, we will focus on the importation 
of disembodied knowledge in Taiwan through licensing from foreign firms. Given 
that major new technologies are not always immediately available in Taiwan, buying 
licenses from international firms has become vital for the survival of Taiwanese firms. 
There is some evidence as to how helpful technology purchases have been in post-war 
Japan; and Taiwan has encouraged such licensing agreement in the hope of 
stimulating industrial innovation in the 1990s
3. 
 
Technology sourcing strategies explored in the theoretical literature are twofold: 
(1) conduct R&D internally or (2) purchase technology on the market. These two 
strategies are generally supposed to be substitutes, and the decision to rely on one or 
the other can be seen as a special case of Coase (1937)’s classical considerations on 
the trade-off between “make or buy”. Recently, a third strategy (the “combination 
strategy”) has been taken into account in the literature, drawing on the absorptive 
capacity theory. This theory considers that some internal R&D activity is needed in 
order to effectively absorb external knowledge (c.f., Cohen and Levinthal, 1989, 
1990). It may be very difficult, for a firm that does little R&D, to successfully 
                                                 
1 See Cohen and Levin (1989) for a review of the empirical literature related to market structure and 
innovation activity. 
2 See section 2 of this chapter for an extensive review of this literature. 
  63  integrate in the production process the technologies it purchased on the international 
market (Randor, 1991). In this chapter, we will thus consider that a firm faces three 
strategic options: it can (1) internalize the innovation process by doing R&D, (2) 
purchase the requisite technology on foreign markets without doing any R&D, or (3) 
purchase technologies and conduct some absorptive R&D. 
 
Most applied studies are unable to achieve this, due to data limitation: they 
generally rely on cross-section data collected by means of questionnaires. 
Longitudinal data would be more appropriate, since it may take some time before the 
effects of innovation activity can be observed. Moreover, questionnaire surveys may 
lead to a sample biased toward larger firms, which is a form of selection bias. The 
present research, however, is not submitted to these limitations: it uses a panel of 
Taiwanese firms observed between 1992 and 1995. Moreover, this data is census data 
collected by the Statistic Bureau of Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) 
on a yearly basis. 
 
With this data, we intend to develop an empirical investigation on innovation 
strategy choice, testing a number of hypotheses derived from the existing theoretical 
literature on market structure and innovation. Our empirical models can be seen as 
extensions of the classical studies on the effects of firm size and market structure on 
the decision to innovate. But, rather than focusing on this “yes/no” decision, we will 
examine whether the “classical” factors mentioned above influence the choice of 
innovation strategy in Taiwan. In other words, the main question we address here is 
not only “under which circumstances do firms innovate ?”, but also “how do they 
innovate ?” and “do they innovate consistently over time ?”. Another objective is to 
examine the potential complementarity that may exist between both innovation 
activities, i.e. doing R&D and importing technology. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the theoretical and 
empirical literature on market structure and innovation, and puts forward some 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes methodology. Section 4 presents the data and 
variables, and gives some descriptive statistics on firm size, market structure and 
                                                                                                                                            
3 See chapter 3 for a thorough description of Taiwan’s Science and Technology Policy. 
  64  innovation strategy in Taiwan. Section 5 uses econometric models to test the 
hypotheses proposed in Section 2. Finally, Section 6 summarizes our main findings 
and concludes the chapter. 
 
2. Survey of the literature and hypotheses. 
2.1 Market structure, firm size, and R&D activity. 
 
According to classical industrial organization theory, innovations in product 
industries are largely determined by market structure. Following Schumpeter (1942), 
several studies have stressed the role of monopoly power in innovation activity. In 
principle, a monopolistic firm should be worried about the entry of potential rivals on 
its market, which would lead to a decrease of its monopolistic profit. Because of that 
threat, a monopoly should always remains on guard, and this very threat is a strong 
incentive to invent. While Arrow (1962) has contested the existence of a quasi causal 
relationship between market structure and innovation, Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) 
provide an alternative explanation for Schumpeter (1942)’s hypothesis: innovation 
and market structure would be codetermined by basic factors such as demand 
conditions, laws on property rights, and technological opportunities. In the short run, 
however, a causal relationship may exist. 
 
Many attempts have been made to test empirically Schumpeter’s hypothesis. 
Several empirical studies have thus been dedicated to the effects of market structure 
on the decision to do R&D (often considered as the only possible way to innovate). 
They generally conclude that some degree of actual monopoly power (in the form of 
structural concentration) tends to increase research activities. This is especially true in 
industries where R&D intensity is traditionally low (a.k.a. low technological 
opportunities industries). However, some empirical studies conclude that the effect of 
monopoly power on innovative behavior is rather undetermined. Scherer (1965), 
using U.S. data, found that a moderate amount of competition in an industry is the 
most appropriate context to foster innovation. In Scherer (1965)’s study, R&D 
intensity was found to increase with concentration only up to a  certain threshold, 
after which it began to decrease. In other words, the relationship between R&D 
intensity and sellers’ concentration may be graphically represented by a non-linear, 
concave, inverted-U curve. Scherer (1965) went as far as to say that a very high 
  65  concentration can generally be expected to retard R&D-induced technological 
progress, as it restricts the number of independent sources of initiative and dampens 
firms’ incentive to gain market power. Similarly, Geroski (2001), using 73 British 
manufacturing (3-digit) industries over the 1970-1979 period, and controlling for 
technological opportunities, found that a high concentration was more likely to retard 
(rather than stimulate) innovation. 
 
Some studies (e.g., Kamien and Schwartz, 1987) distinguish between actual and 
anticipated monopoly power, the latter referring to an innovator’s ability to enjoy the 
full benefits of its research by preventing imitation. As Geroski (2001) underlines, the 
assertion that firms do R&D only if they expect that, by preventing imitation, they 
will be able to achieve some degree of market power and at least cover their costs is 
rather uncontroversial. However, Schumpeter’s hypothesis is more questionable, as it 
states that an actual  monopoly power will give a firm a direct and an indirect 
incentive to conduct R&D. The direct incentive occurs through the monetary returns 
to innovation, while the indirect incentive occurs via the control that the monopolistic 
firm can exert over the size of the returns to innovation. To test Schumpeter’s 
hypothesis, Geroski (2001) develops an empirical model which control for both types 
of incentives; he finds that an actual monopoly power is likely to have a negative 
direct effect and a positive indirect effect on the decision to do research. Which one of 
these effects will prevail is uncertain, and thus the “net” effect of an actual monopoly 
power on the decision to conduct R&D remains unclear. 
 
Another traditional Schumpeterian hypothesis about R&D activity is its 
(positive) relationship to firm size: innovation costs being generally quite high, large 
firms are more likely to get both the financial resources required for risky R&D 
projects and the ability to spread risk by undertaking a “portfolio” of R&D projects. 
Moreover, economies of scale may arise from this large scale R&D activity. 
However, as firms grow large, research may become over-organized and efficiency 
may be undermined by bureaucracy and red tape. The underlying question here is that 
of optimal firm size.  
 
Many empirical studies have examined the relationship between R&D 
expenditures and firm size. They suggest that this relation is positive across industries 
  66  (e.g. Soete, 1979; Link, 1980) as well as in selected industries (e.g. Mansfield, 1964, 
for chemicals; Lall, 1983 for engineering). According to Cohen and Klepper (1996), 
the share of process innovation in total innovation (measured by R&D expenditures) 
may also rise with firm size within most industries. Acs and Audretsch (1987) suggest 
that the size-R&D relationship depends on the type of industry: large enterprises may 
be more innovative in sectors with high concentration and barriers to entry, while 
small firms may be more innovative sectors where the concentration is low (such as 
emerging or growing technologies). 
 
In addition, there is some strong empirical evidence that the impact of firm size 
on R&D activity may be non-linear: R&D intensity increases with firm size but starts 
to decrease after reaching a certain threshold. This non-linear relationship has been 
identified using U.S. data; in the United States, both small and very large firms tend 
to be more R&D-intensive than medium-sized ones. Bound, Cummins et al. (1984) 
show that large firms innovate in proportion to their size (mainly by achieving 
economies of scale), whereas small firms innovate out of proportion. Medium-size 
firms, however, are seldom concerned with R&D and innovation. A review of the 
empirical literature, conducted by Scherer and Ross (1990) also suggest such a “u-
shaped” relationship between firm size and R&D activity. None of these studies 
managed to find convincing evidence, in the United States, of a Schumpeterian 
positive relationship between firm size and innovation. 
 
2.2 Introducing alternative innovation strategies 
 
 The classical literature about innovation rarely pays attention to the innovative 
strategy, i.e. to the way through which firms acquire new knowledge and technology. 
It is generally considered, in this literature, that internal R&D is the only source of 
new technology, thus the terms “innovation” and “R&D activity” are often used as 
synonymous. Moreover, studies who pay attention to innovation strategies are 
generally not concerned with the effects of firm size and market structure on 
innovation activity. Our aim here is to bring together these two strands of literature, 
and examine whether (and how) market structure and firm size influence the choice of 
innovation strategy.  
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4, the present 
research will focus on the importation of disembodied technology by Taiwanese 
firms, as an alternative to internal R&D. “Disembodied technology” or “disembodied 
knowledge” here refers to these knowledge and technology that are protected by 
intellectual property rights, but can be purchased by a firm and included in its 
production process. These include patented technologies, licensed technologies and 
royalties-inducing technologies. 
 
The importation of technology generally involves not only disembodied, but 
also embodied, knowledge. The latter can be embodied in newly-acquired assets, such 
as intermediate inputs, new machines, or new technical personnel. However, the flow 
of embodied knowledge is difficult to follow using the available data in Taiwan. 
Moreover, there is some empirical evidence (in Basant and Fikkert, 1996, for 
instance) that, in developing and newly-industrialized countries, licensing agreements 
with foreign firms are at least as important a source of technology as R&D. For these 
reasons, we will focus here on the importation of disembodied technology, as the 
main alternative (or complement) to internal R&D. 
 
However, the access to a disembodied technology at one moment in time is 
more or less difficult, depending on which stage of its life cycle this technology  has 
currently reached. A technology close to its maturity stage can easily be purchased on 
the international market, and used to improve the production process of firms that 
belong to a “traditional” industry, for instance. On the contrary, new technologies (at 
an early stage in their life cycle) are frequently the intellectual property of a few 
dominant foreign firms, which will charge a high price for licensing. The access to 
these technologies is thus far more difficult, all the more since they cannot be directly 
integrated in a production process that is not “state of the art”. Thus, in newly 
industrialized countries, firms which want to acquire a new and complex technology 
needs a certain research capacity: indeed, they will very often have to reorganize 
and/or update their whole production process, before being able to draw the full 
potential from this technology. However, many of these firms have to buy recently 
                                                 
4 Bozeman and Link (1983) have established a list of alternative technology sources according to their 
relative importance: internal (or indigenous) R&D, purchase of new capital equipment, mergers and 
acquisitions, licensing from domestic & international firms, and government-sponsored R&D. 
  68  licensed technologies, if they want to innovate and create their own new 
product/technology.  
 
Finally, if a firm wants to distinguish itself from its competitors, the best policy 
may be, ultimately, to increase its investment on in-house R&D, rather than to rely on 
the importation of technology. This strategy may prove quite efficient when all the 
competitors rely on imported technologies only. Depending on the type of technology 
needed (e.g. its maturity, degree of complexity, etc.), a firm can choose between three 
strategies: (1) only importing technology, (2) partially importing technology, or (3) 
only doing R&D. Which of these innovation strategies will be actually chosen 
depends, in principle, on the firm’s organizational structure and on the structure of the 
industry it belongs to. Thus, to empirically investigate the relationship between 
innovation strategy and market structure, it is necessary to control as well for firms’ 
size and organizational structure. 
 
To explain the choice between internal R&D and/or external knowledge 
acquisition, the theoretical literature relies on the concept of knowledge spillovers 
(Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962; Spence, 1984). Knowledge spillovers are defined as the 
part of knowledge generated by R&D that is not fully appropriable by the firm which 
conducted the R&D. That part of R&D-generated knowledge can be considered as a 
public good. Thus, if spillovers occur in an economy, firms can acquire new 
knowledge from external sources at no cost. In the absence of spillovers (for example, 
if new knowledge is perfectly protected by patents), acquiring new knowledge is 
possible through in-house R&D only. This theoretical literature generally considers 
that external knowledge acquisition is done through R&D cooperation (Katz, 1986; 
D'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; and Suzumura, 1992). In this chapter, however, 
we will rather focus on the imports of technology, since in the Taiwanese case, this 
strategy is more represented than cooperation with foreign firms (NSC, 1998). 
 
The trade-off relationship between doing in-house R&D and acquiring external 
knowledge may be reinterpreted in the terms of the transaction costs theory (Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1986, Pisano, 1990). In that 
perspective, acquiring external knowledge is costly, because it relies on a contractual 
agreement, which defines the conditions under which a technology can be used 
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expected costs of in-house R&D, then a firm should choose to conduct its own 
research rather than buying external knowledge. In other words, firms simply choose 
the innovation strategy which minimize transaction costs. 
 
2..3. R&D, importation of technology and absorptive capacity 
 
  Although (theoretical) research on innovation traditionally considers that firms 
innovate through R&D only, the recent literature has begun to develop reflections  
(based on empirical analyses) about alternative modes of knowledge acquisition. For 
instance, Mohnen and Dagenais (2002)’s examination of the first Community 
Innovation Survey (CIS1) leads to the statement that R&D is really only a component 
of innovation. Baldwin, Hanel et al (2002) consider that innovation activities 
encompass R&D and intellectual property protection; using Canadian data, they 
estimate an empirical model that distinguish between product and process innovation. 
Cabagnols and LeBas (2002) and Martines-Ros and Labeaga (2002) conducts similar 
investigations in the cases of France and Spain respectively. 
  
Taking into account several innovation activities (and not only R&D) raises the 
question of the relationships that may exist between these activities. One way to 
address this question in economic terms is to wonder whether different innovation 
activities (for instance, in-house R&D and the purchase of technology) are 
complements or substitutes. To capture the specificity of the question, Cohen and 
Levinthal (1989, 1990) developed the concept of “absorptive capacity” ; the 
absorptive capacity of a firm is defined as its capacity to effectively absorb external 
knowledge and use it in its innovation and production processes. Cohen and Levinthal 
(1989, 1990) stress that a firm’s own R&D activity may allow it to better scan the 
environment for existing technologies, and may contribute to efficiently absorb these 
technologies. This was  further developed by Kamien and Zang (2000), who suggest 
that a stock of prior knowledge is needed to effectively absorb external knowledge.  
 
Following Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990), many studies relate the 
“absorptive capacity” of a firm to its in-house R&D capacity. Randor (1991), 
suggested that it may be very difficult, for a firm that does little R&D, to successfully 
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market. Rosenberg (1990) argued that “a basic research capability is often 
indispensable in order to monitor and evaluate research being conducted elsewhere”. 
 
If the “absorptive capacity” theory is correct, then there is a good reason to 
investigate whether the two innovation activities considered in our research (in-house 
R&D and the importation of technology) are complementary or not. There are not 
many studies providing evidence on complementarity between in-house R&D and the 
purchase of technology (often identified by the payment streams for licenses). Using 
data from the Community Innovation Survey, Veugelers and Cassiman (1999) suggest 
that the choice of innovation activities of Belgian manufacturing firms strongly 
depends on the appropriation opportunities. The authors restrict their attention to in-
house R&D, external technology acquisition, and cooperation in R&D
5. Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2002) implement different econometric models, and find converging 
evidence of complementarities between the different innovation activities. Their other 
findings include the existence of common determinants in the different innovation 
activities. In particular, firms with a higher basic R&D capacity, and a better capacity 
to protect intellectual property will tend to innovate more, and through different 
channels. In the next subs-section, we give more details about the methodology that 
may be used to investigate the existence of complementarity between different 
innovation activities. 
 
2.4. Dealing with the complementarity of innovation strategies 
 
According to supermodularity (or “revealed preferences”) theory (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990, 1995), two practices are complementary if they are positively 
correlated.  This theory thus states a necessary condition for activities to be 
complementary. Following this statement, most empirical studies about 
complementarity between innovation strategies have used cross-sectional data to 
regress a measure of R&D on a set of covariates, including a proxy for the purchase 
of technology (Blumenthal, 1979, Katrak, 1983).  
                                                 
5 The existing appropriation opportunities indicate whether technology will dissipate easily, or, whether 
the firm  need complementary assets to appropriate the returns to its innovation strategy (see also 
Teece, 1986). 
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Athey and Stern (1998), however, have shown that this empirical approach may 
suffer from a severe bias. Indeed, both the decision to do R&D and the decision to 
import technology may be determined by the same (confounding) variables. In that 
case, the authors recommend to regress both the R&D and the imported technology 
proxies on the same set of covariates, and to test for correlation between the error 
terms of the two equations. If, after including the relevant covariates, the errors terms 
are no longer correlated, then a complementarity relationship has been identified. This 
method is known as the correlation or “indirect” approach to complementarity. 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) call it the “adoption” approach, and use it on the 
EUROSTAT/CIS data; they provide consistent evidence on complementarity between 
several innovation strategy.  
 
Although the lack of theoretical work treats the complementarity among 
innovative activities as important in assessing innovation success. However, R&D and 
the importation of technology are perfectly substitutable could be only one of the 
cases. Even transaction cost theory considers that, in general, firms do not either buy 
or make, but partly buy and partly make (Williamson, 1985). The same may be true 
regarding innovation strategies: while some firms may rely only on R&D (or on the 
importation of technology), there may still be an important number of firms which 
will both conduct R&D and import technologies. This being said, we are now ready to 
examine the determinants of the choice of innovation strategies; in the following sub-




The first hypothesis to be examined regards firms’ size. According to 
Schumpeter (1942), large firms are more likely to get the financial resources required 
for implementing large and risky R&D projects. They may also have the ability to 
spread risks by undertaking a portfolio of R&D projects. Therefore, a large firm, able 
to benefit from economies of scale, could have a stronger incentive to rely only on in-
house R&D. However, a large firm with higher internal R&D capabilities may be able 
to absorb more effectively external technologies, and thus may also be actively 
                                                                                                                                            
 
  72  involved in the pursuit of external knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Aurora and 
Gambardella, 1990; Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999). If that is the case, large firms 
may adopt a “mixed” innovation strategy, i.e. may import technology while doing a 
significant amount of internal R&D.  
   
Reciprocally, small firms may be deterred from carrying on a regular R&D 
activity by the high fixed costs of such a practice (c.f. Caves and Uekusa, 1976). 
Because of this lack of R&D capacity, small firms are restricted to the adoption of 
simple technologies that can be integrated in the production process at a reasonably 
low cost. Although theoretical works do not offer clear predictions on that respect, 
some empirical evidence can be found in Bozeman and Link (1983), and in Veugelers 
and Cassiman (1999)
6. All these considerations lead to the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: the larger a firm is, the more likely it is that will either (a) rely on internal 
technology sourcing only (i.e. adopt a “R&D only” innovation strategy), or (b) 
import technology as a complement to internal R&D (i.e. adopt a “mixed” strategy). 
On the contrary, small firms are more likely to rely only on the importation of 
technology. 
 
Our second hypothesis is concerned with market structure.  As was highlighted 
in Point 2.1., a fair amount of literature has been dedicated to the effect of market 
structure on firms’ decision to innovate. But, as shown in Point 2.2., this literature 
generally considers that R&D is the only possible source of technology : it almost 
never takes into account alternative innovation strategies, such as the importation of 
technology. However, Caves and Uekusa (1976) and Bozeman and Link (1983) have 
suggested that the market structure in which a firm operates may influence not only its 
decision to innovate, but also its choice of innovation strategy. 
 
According to classical industrial organization theory, in competitive markets 
where product competition exerts itself primarily in terms of prices, a firm may 
emphasize process-related innovations aimed at reducing operating costs. In that case, 
adopting external (possibly foreign) technologies to improve the production process 
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the contrary, in emerging markets, improved product quality or design may be a more 
fundamental concern (e.g., Link and Zmud, 1984).  It therefore becomes vital for 
firms to have some substantial in-house R&D capacity, possibly complemented by 
occasional purchases of technology.  
 
To put it in a nutshell, the overall market structure may lead firms to focus on a 
certain type of innovation (process/product), which constitutes the most appropriate 
response from the firms’ viewpoint. Firms that have a dominant market position can 
only be challenged by (potential) competitors proposing more innovative products, 
whereas firms with many competitors fear the consequences of the late adoption of a 
process innovation. The type of innovation a firm focuses on may in turn influence its 
choice of innovation strategy. This causal relationship leads to the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: the stronger the competition is, the more likely firms are to import 
technology. On the contrary, firms with more dominant positions (monopoly, 
oligopoly) are more likely to rely primarily on internal R&D, possibly importing 
technology as a complement. 
 
Finally, the third hypothesis deals with the relationship between firms’ age and 
their choice of innovation strategy. It has often been found that young firms, due to 
limited resources and/or experience, have a relatively low R&D capacity, and thus are 
more likely to rely exclusively on the purchase of technology when they innovate. For 
instance, Shan (1989) has shown how new biotechnology firms in the U.S. manage to 
innovate by acquiring external technology through cooperative agreements. A 
possible exception to this rule are the start-ups, which rely on highly specialized 
human capital in order to develop specific internal R&D. As will be explained in 
Section 4, our data does not allow to identify start-ups, but there were assumedly very 
few of those in Taiwan during the period we focus on in this study (the early 1990s). 
Accordingly, we will test the following hypothesis regarding the effect of firm’s age: 
 
                                                                                                                                            
6 The former questioned 146 R&D vice-presidents in U.S. manufacturing firms belonging to various 
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adopt the “only importing technology” innovation strategy. 
 
An interesting interpretation of hypothesis H3 stems from the fact that firm age 
is likely to be correlated with firm’s R&D experience: older firms, which have 
acquired a significant amount of experience in doing, may be more reluctant to 
purchase knowledge when the technological context changes. Pisano (1990) has 
found some empirical evidence of such a behavior in the case of U.S. biotechnology 
firms. Pisano (1990) interpreted this result as a ‘proof’ that firms tend to follow 
routines in their technology procurement activity, a behavioral model which may 
contrast with that of forward-looking, profit-maximizing firms
7. 
 
3. Econometric Modeling and Choice of Variables 
  
Our empirical analysis relies on the exploitation of original panel data, that 
will be presented in the next section. In order to model the choice of innovation 
strategy (and to identify the determinants of that choice), we follow successively two 
approaches. The first one is static and aggregate the information of our panel over the 
years. This approach is relevant because, as will be explained in Section 4, the 
observation period is restricted to four years. The second approach is “dynamic” in 
the sense that it makes use of the panel nature of our data. 
 
Both approaches rely on the same definition of an “innovation firm”, i.e. a 
firm that innovates (i.e. does R&D or  imports technology) in any of the four years. 
By contrast, a non-innovation firm is a firm that do not innovate in any way (i.e. 
neither does R&D nor imports technology) in any of the four years. But each 
approach is used to address a specific question. 
 
The “static”, or “aggregate”, approach, based on the time-aggregate cross-
section data, addresses the question: why do firms innovate, i.e. what are the factors 
leading a firm to do R&D and/or import technology ? To answer this question, 
econometric models are estimated on the whole population of firms (both innovation 
                                                                                                                                            
industries, while the latter used survey data collected in 1993 on 1335 Belgium manufacturing firms. 
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of the data, and is concerned with another question: why do some innovation firms 
neither do R&D nor import technology on certain years ?  To answer this question, 
the models are estimated on the sub-population of innovation firms only. 
 
In both the “dynamic” and “aggregate” settings, two alternative models are 
implemented: the multinomial Logit on the one hand and the bivariate Probit on the 
other. Both models make use of the same set of explanatory variables. In this section, 
we first present each model (and its specification in the dynamic and aggregate 
approaches respectively). We then detail our set of explanatory variables. 
 
3.1. The multinomial Logit for time-aggregate and panel data 
 
Our first econometric model is the Multinomial Logit. We first present its 
specification for the “aggregate” version of our panel, i.e. the cross-section data. 
When that specification is used, the choice set of firm i across the period is 
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The four alternatives are mutually exclusive. Taking 0 as the reference, the 
choice of innovation strategy by firm i in the period can then be represented by : 
 















 for j = 1, 2, 3 
where  Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, and βj its associated vector of 
parameters, to be estimated for category j. Category 0 being the reference, we 
normalize, quite conventionally, β0 = 0. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
7 The notion of routine has been proposed by Nelson and Winter, (1982), p. 134. 
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multinomial Logit model is written: 
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We now want to adapt for panel data. When that specification is used, the 
choice set of firm i  at any period t is represented by the categorical variable 
STRATEGYit: 












  period in    strategy)   mixed" "   (a   IT   and   D & R both    does     firm   if
  period in    (IT) y   technolog imports only      firm   if
                                  period in    D & R   internal only    does     firm   if






Looking at this variable, it is clear that the four alternatives are independent, and that 
they fully describe the choice set of firm i at time t. Taking category 0 as the 
reference, the choice of innovation strategy by firm i at time t can then be represented 
by a series of equations: 
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where  Xit is the vector of explanatory variables, and βj its associated vector of 
parameters, to estimated for category j. As before, we normalize β0 = 0. 
 
Estimating the multinomial Logit model for panel data, as described in 
Equations (3.a) and (3.b), however, would be a computational burden; the choice of 
an appropriate estimation technique itself is still a debated topic in the literature. 
Thus, following Begg and Gray (1984), we approximate Equations (3.a) and (3.b) by 
running a set of binary Logit models for panel data, each equation corresponding to a 
comparison between two of the categories of the dependent variable. This admittedly 
yields fairly reasonable estimates of the βj’s, although they may be somewhat less 
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convenience, and a considerable gain in computation time. 
 
Moreover, using a set of binary Logits for panel data allows to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity by adding an individual-specific effect in the model. 
Keeping the same notations as above, let pijt denotes the probability that firm i adopts 
the innovation strategy j (with j =1, 2, 3) at time t. We now estimate the following set 
of three binary equations: 
(4)  












, where j = 1, 2, 3 
where uij is an individual-specific effect for model j. The model is estimated by the 
Maximum Likelihood technique, the Likelihood function being computed using the 
Gauss-Hermite quadrature technique implemented by Butler and Moffit (1982). 
 
3.2. The bivariate Probit model 
 
  Our first modelling approach seems quite adapted to the problem at hand, but 
it relies nonetheless on an approximation. We now develop an alternative modeling, 
in a comparative perspective. Our second modeling approach relies on the bivariate 
Probit specification. Comparison with the multinomial Logit should reveal the 
strongest determinants of each innovation strategy (i.e. those which remain consistent 
whether the choice set is define as a set of mutually exclusive strategies or as a set of 
non exclusive strategies). 
We implement the bivariate Probit for both aggregate/cross-section and 
dynamic/panel data. The model is exactly the same in both cases; but the definition of 
the endogenous variables will be somewhat different. First, let us start with the 
“aggregate”, cross-section model, for which we define: 
  i RD  =   1 if firm i does some R&D,  
 0  otherwise 
  i IT  =  1 if firm i does import technology, 
 0  otherwise 
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may import technology while conducting R&D. If one considers  i RD  and  i IT as 
random variables, then their joint distribution will describe the same four situations as 
variable  i STRATEGY did in the previous model: 
i IT    
1 0 
1  (1, 1)  (1, 0) 
i RD  
0  (0, 1)  (0, 0) 
 
Relating the table above to the definition of  i STRATEGY , it is obvious that: 
(1, 1) correspond to the “mixed” strategy (doing R&D and importing technology) 
(1, 0) correspond to the “R&D only” strategy 
(0, 1) correspond to the “IT only” strategy 
(0, 0) correspond to “non innovation” firms. 
These four situations constitute the choice set of firm i. 
 
Now, we also want to examine, in a dynamic perspective, in the factors 
leading an innovation firm to do R&D, to import technology, to mix these strategy or 
to opt for a non-innovation option in a given year. We thus define two dichotomous 
variables, RDit and ITit, so that: 
  
  RDit =  1 if firm i does some R&D in year t,  
 0  otherwise 
  ITit =   1 if firm i imports technology in year t, 
  0  otherwise 
 
As above, the joint distribution of RDit and ITit describe the same four 
situations as variable STRATEGYit did in the multinomial Logit model: 
ITit   
1 0 
1  (1, 1)  (1, 0) 
RDit 
0  (0, 1)  (0, 0) 
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(1, 1) correspond to the “mixed” strategy (both  doing R&D and importing 
technology in year t) 
(1, 0) correspond to doing only R&D in year t 
(0, 1) correspond only import technology in year t  
(0, 0) correspond to innovation firms which decide not to innovate in year t, 
although they innovate in at least another year of the observation period. 
 
The remainder of the modeling is the same for both approaches. For the sake 
of concision, we detail only the Bivariate Probit for panel data (the Bivariate Probit 
for the aggregate data would be written in a similar way, but without the t subscript on 




it2 such that:  
  RDit = 1   if   y
*
it1 > 0  
and   ITit = 1   if   y
*
it2 > 0. 
 
This leads to the following bivariate Probit specification:  




















where Xitj (j = 1, 2) is a vector of explanatory variables, and βj (j = 1, 2) its associated 
vector of parameters (to be estimated). The errors terms ui1 and ui2 are supposed to 
follow a joint normal distribution, with mean 0, variance 1. The correlation coefficient 
of the error terms is denoted by ρ. The correlation of the error terms stems from the 
possible presence of omitted variables in the determinants of the firms’ choices of 
innovation strategy, which would affect each equation. In our empirical application, 
the vectors Xit1 and Xit2 will be identical. Our bivariate Probit model was estimated by 
the conventional Maximum Likelihood technique.  
 
3.3. The question of complementarity: the correlation approach 
 
Another advantage of using the bivariate Probit model (besides comparison 
purposes) lies in the possibility of testing for complementarity between the different 
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Equation (5) can be rewritten
8 as: 
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where Φ is the cumulative distribution function (c.d.f.) of the Normal distribution. As 
above, ui1 and ui2 are supposed to be correlated : ρ = corr(ui1, ui2).  
 
According to Athey and Stern (1998) and Cassiman and Veugelers (2002), a 
positive correlation between RDit and ITit is a necessary (but insufficient) condition 
for complementarity, as the correlation could stem from (potentially unobservable) 
confounding factors. The bivariate Probit model allows to overcome this problem, by 
testing for correlation between the residuals of the regression, ui1 and ui2. If ui1 and ui2 
remain  positively  correlated (ρ  >  0) after including the explanatory variables, then 
there is evidence of complementary strategies, but one is unable to explain  the 
remaining correlation (Arora & Gambardella, 1990; Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002). 
On the contrary, if, after including the covariates, ui1 and ui2 are no longer correlated, 
then it is quite possible that the explanatory variables have identified all the relevant 
determinants of complementarity. 
 
One potential limitation of this method, as we apply it to our data, is that we 
do not control for firm-specific effects, which could the residuals to remain correlated 
and/or cause the estimated coefficients to be biased. The estimation of a bivariate 
Probit with firm-specific effect could be the objective of a further research. 
 
3.4. Choice of explanatory variables 
 
In each approach (time-aggregate and panel), both models (multinomial Logit 
and bivariate Probit) make use of the same vector of explanatory variables, which 
includes: (1) proxies for firm size, (2) proxies for market structure, (3) an indicator of 
                                                 
8 As in 3.2., we use panel data notations; the notations for the aggregate approach are similar, but do 
not make use of the t subscript. 
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literature, the number of employees has been used as a proxy for firm’s size: 
Sizeit = number of employees of  the i  firm in year t in the panel approach.  
th
i Size = average number of employees of the i
th firm in the time-aggregate 
approach 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, using a continuous variable for firm size sometimes 
causes important scaling problems, especially when including the square of size in the 
regression (in order to check for a possible non-linear effect of firm size). In order to 
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where  i N is the average number of employees of the i  firm across the period (time-
aggregate approach). In each case, taking Category 2 as the reference allows to 
control for the presence of non-linearity in the size-innovation relationship. According 
to hypothesis H1, we expect this variable to have a positive effect on the probability 
to use R&D only and/or on the probability to adopt a “mixed” strategy.   
th
 
Several indexes can be computed and used as proxies for market 
structure/power
9. We rely here on the two most widely used in empirical industrial 
organization research: the concentration rate (at different levels) on the one hand, and 
the Herfindhal index on the other hand. The formulas for these indicators are given 
below using the panel notation, i.e. CR(K)jt and Hjt respectively, where j denotes the 
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th firm belongs. The time-aggregate versions of these indicators 
are simply their average values over time (and would thus be written without the t 
subscript:  j K CR ) ( and  j H ). 
 
The concentration rate (or concentration ratio) is probably the oldest of the two 
indicators; it gives the total market share of the K largest firms (in terms of sales) in 
an industry, according to the formula: 





ijt jt S K CR
1
) ( 
where  jt it ijt S S S =  is the market share of the i  firm at time t in industry j, S
th
it being 
the sales level of firm i at time t and Sjt the total sales of industry j at time t
10. The 




The main problem with this indicator is that the choice of level K is somewhat 
arbitrary. In the existing literature, the value of K (for 4-digit industries), is usually set 
to be between 3 and 8. For instance, CR(4) and CR(8) are commonly used in the 
U.S.A., while CR(3) is more common in Germany, and CR(5) in Japan and U.K. 
Higher levels of K are seldom used, except to calculate the concentration ratio of the 
whole manufacturing industry in a country, in which case values of 100 or 200 are the 
most commonly observed (Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp. 58-59). 
 
In this chapter, the concentration ratio is computed at the four-digit industry 
level. Given the high number of publications using CR(4) and CR(8), we chose to 
compute these measures, for the sake of comparability, and because they seemed 
appropriate to check hypothesis H2
11: 
CRKjt = market share of the K (K = 4, 8) largest firms in industry j at time t. 
                                                                                                                                            
9 E.g.: Gini coefficient, comprehensive concentration index, Rosenbluth index, Entropy index. More 
info concerning the measurement of market power may be found in Curry and George (1983). 
10 In this chapter, following classical IO literature, we use sales to compute the CR. In some cases, 
alternatives have been used, such as: the number of employees, the value added, and the output. 
11 According to Scherer (1979), if the CR(4) goes over 40%, then the industry may be characterized as 
an oligopoly. 
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models involving regarding CR(4) will be reported in the main body of the text; those 
involving CR(8) are presented in the Appendix.  
 
The other very common index used in this contribution is the Herfindahl index, 
or H index, given by the formula: 





ijt jt S H
1
2
where  Sijt is the market share of firm i in industry j at year t
12. The main 
advantage of the H index over the CR(K) is that the former it takes into account all 
firms, whereas the latter may neglect the importance of the relative size of firms. By 
squaring market shares, the H index weights more heavily the sales values of large 
firms, which allows for a more accurate measure of the largest sellers’ shares. This 
has lead several studies to favor the H index
13.  
 
In order to complete these indicators, we included in our explanatory variables a 
measure of the degree of change in the market structure (i.e. in the concentration), 
with respect to a fixed previous situation. In the panel approach, this is simply the 
difference in market structure indexes between year t (t = 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995) 
and year 1989
14: 
CR4jt – CR4j89 denotes the change in the CR(4) index between 1989 and year t. 
CR8jt – CR8j89 denotes the change in the CR(8) index between 1989 and year t. 
Hjt – Hj89 denotes the change in the Herfindahl index between 1989 and year t. 
In the time-aggregate approach, these variables are redefined as the difference 
between the average values of the market structure indicators across the period and 
their values in 1989: 
j CR4 – CR4j89  
j CR8 – CR8j89  
j H  – Hj89 
                                                 
12 The market shares being expressed in percentage here, the H index would reach its maximum value 
of 10,000 in an industry with a single, purely monopolistic, firm. 
13 C.f. Scherer (1990) for a theoretical justification. 
14 As will be explained in Section 4, our data is a panel of firms observed on a yearly basis between 
1992 and 1995; however, it allows for the computation of concentration indexes in year 1989 as well. 
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Finally, we used the logarithm of the minimum efficient scale (MES) as a proxy 
for the ability of the firms to erect barriers to entry, as these may be important 
determinants of their innovative behavior (Bain, 1956; Levin, 1978; Geroski, 2001)
15. 
The MES was originally defined by Bain (1956) as the average size (in terms of sales) 
of all firms accounting for 50% of industry sales; our data allowed for the direct 
calculation of this indicator
16. Given low correlation, it may be a useful complement 
(rather than a substitute) to concentration indexes. As before, in the time-aggregate 
approach, we computed the average of the MES across the period (and then took its 
logarithm). 
 
The indicator of firms’ age, Ageit (needed to test hypothesis H3) was computed 
in years: in the panel approach, it is the difference between year t (t = 1992, 1993, 
1994, 1995) and the date of creation of firm i, according to the Western calendar. In 
the time-aggregate approach, computing an “average value of age” would have been 
rather meaningless. Instead, we compute firm age at the end of the period, i.e. the 
difference between 1995 and the date of creation of each firm. We could also have 
computed firm age at the beginning of the period, but these measures are equivalent. 
 
The remaining controls variables include: 16 industry dummies (dummy n° 15 
being used as the reference category), a dummy (ET)  indicating whether or not firms 
export technology in any one year (which may imply different innovation 
opportunities), a dummy indicating if firms are part of a group. Since these dummies 
do not vary over time, they are used in both approaches. Finally, in the panel 
approach, we added a time (year) fixed-effect. 
 
4. The MOEA Data  
 
  In this section, we describe two alternative presentations of the data used in 
this research. This data was collected by the Statistic Bureau of Taiwan's Ministry of 
                                                 
15 Other common proxies for barriers to entry include advertising intensity and capital intensity. 
16 Later studies (Scherer et al., 1975; Gilbert, 1986) used the average firm size in an industry as a proxy 
for MES. 
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covering the years 1992 to 1995. The Statistical Bureau of MOEA conducted a yearly 
census survey and collected data on every plant in operation that held a registered 
certificate in the manufacturing sector. In Taiwan, most manufacturing firms are 
single-plant producers, so the plant/firm distinction is not as relevant as in Western 
industrialized countries. Thus, the data will be referred to as “firm-level data”.  
 
This survey has been conducted since 1980, but information on innovation 
activity (and more specifically on importing technology) has been available since 
1987 only. The MOEA survey was not conducted in 1991 and 1996, for it would have 
been redundant with another investigation, the Industrial and Commercial Census
17. 
Moreover, prior to 1991, the proportion of missing information on innovation activity 
was significantly higher than after 1991, and is generally less reliable. For all these 
reasons, the present analysis will focus only on the yearly panel data observed from 
1992 to 1995.  
 
On this period, the MOEA data provides reliable information on the amount 
firm’s total R&D expenditures, as well as on the purchase of foreign technology. 
These variables will be used to build our indicators of firms’ innovation strategy (i.e., 
the dependent variables in our empirical analysis). Additional information available in 
the MOEA data include sales, number of employees, and firms’ age; this is used to 
build our explanatory variables, as explained in the previous section. Furthermore, 
this data covers all manufacturing sectors in the Taiwanese economy. 
 
To answer our first question (why and how do firms innovate), we aggregated 
the whole panel across the year. We refer to this method as the “time-aggregate” 
approach already mentioned in the previous section. To answer our second question 
(why do some innovation firms neither do R&D nor import technology in a given 
year), we make use of the panel nature of our data. However, we concentrate only on 
the sub-populations of innovation firms, i.e. firms which innovate at least one year 
                                                                                                                                            
 
17 The Industrial and Commercial Census is held every five years by the Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics of Taiwan’s Executive Yuan. This data, however, does not include 
information on the importation of technology. 
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approaches are described successively below. 
 
4.1. The “time-aggregate” approach to the MOEA data 
4.1.1. Innovation behaviors in the time-aggregate approach 
 
Table 1 presents the various sources of new knowledge firms can tap, as 
described in the literature. As was mentioned in Section 2, firms acquire and/or 
develop new technologies through a combination of internal and external strategies. 
First, a firm can develop a new technology through in-house R&D. A firm can also 
acquire a new technology, partially or fully, by purchasing it. Finally, a firm can get 
knowledge through cooperative agreements with other firms, or with public research 
institutions (including universities). Not all of these sources can be tracked in the 
MOEA data: for instance, it lacks variables describing firms’ agreements with other 
organizations and research institutions. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The MOEA panel data allow to identify, for each year of the observation period, 
firms that conduct R&D and firms that import technology (and, more precisely 
disembodied knowledge, such as licensed technologies and patents). Since it does not 
provide any information on cooperation or technology agreement, “innovation firms” 
will be defined (in the perspective of our empirical investigation) as firms that have 
reported doing R&D and/or importing technology in any given year of the 1992-1995 
period.  
 
As was explained in the previous sections, our observation period (1992-1995) 
being comparatively small, we can aggregate the MOEA data over time in order to 
answer our first research question (why and how do firms innovate). Time-
aggregating the data provides us with a cross-sectional population of more than 27000 
firms, some of which never innovate. These firms were recorded, prior to the 
aggregation,  as “non-innovation” firms, i.e. firms which do not engage in any 
innovation activity in any of the four years of the observation period. In the time-
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behaviors” (as explained in Section 3, in points 3.1. and 3.2.):  
(1) Innovating through in-house R&D only 
(2) Innovating through the importation of technology only 
(3) Innovating both through in-house R&D and the importation of technology  
(4) Not innovating 
 
Once again, “not innovating” means here that the firm has neither reported 
doing R&D nor importing technology the four years of observation period. In other 
words, we consider the whole population of manufacturing firms (more than 27000 
firms, leading to the same number of observations, since in the time-aggregate 
approach one firm = one observation). 
 
Table 2 gives a breakdown of the population by innovation behavior according 
to the time-aggregated approach. More than 4/5 of the 27754 manufacturing firms 
(i.e. 81% of the population) did not engage in any innovation activity. Firms 
systematically choosing R&D as their source of new knowledge over the period 
represent approximately 15% of the population. Firms that rely only on the 
importation of technology are scarce: they represent less than 1% of the population. 
Finally, firms which either do R&D and import technology simultaneously, or which 
rely alternatively on R&D and on the importation of technology (i.e. firms following a 
mixed strategy over the period) account for about 3% of the population.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
                                                     ------------------------------- 
 
4.1.2.  A large proportion of small firms (time-aggregate approach) 
 
One interesting feature of the MOEA data is that small firms represent a large 
share of Taiwanese innovation firms, as can be seen in Table 3, which gives a 
breakdown of the population by size classes. The average size over time is computed 
using the number of employees, and this averaged size is then divided in 5 categories 
(as explained in Section 3.4). On the average, over the period, 99% of the population 
is made of firms recording less than 500 employees. Moreover, approximately 84% of 
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and 250 workers. The largest firms (over than 500 employees) represent a very 
marginal 1% of the population: this figure reveals that the main power of  Taiwanese 
manufacturing industry comes from  small and medium enterprises (SME).   
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
                                                     ------------------------------- 
 
The relative importance of SME varies according to the innovation behavior. 
Table 4 gives of breakdown of the population by  firm size and by innovation 
behavior. Most of the very small firms (less than 50 employees) actually are non-
innovating firms: precisely, only 11% of the very small firms innovate in one way or 
another. Small-to-medium firms (between 50 and 500 employees) tend to be mostly 
innovation firms that rely only on in-house R&D; medium-to-large firms (more than 
250 employees) are mostly innovation firms, which either do only R&D or mix in-
house R&D and the importation of technology. Indeed, 41.5% of the firms employing 
between 50 and 250 employees do in-house R&D only, while 46% do not innovate at 
all. Among the next category (250 to 499 employees), 54% rely exclusively on in-
house R&D, while 31% rely on both R&D and the importation of technology. Finally, 
the majority (55%) of the largest firms (more than 500 employees) use both internal 
and external technology sources (i.e., do R&D and import technology). 
    ------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
                                           ------------------------------- 
 
4.1.3.  Market structure and innovation behavior in the time-aggregate approach 
 
The other main focus of this chapter – besides the effect of firm size – is the 
relationship between market structure and innovation strategy. As explained in 
Section 3, our first indicator of market structure is the Level 4 Concentration Ratio 
(CR4) applied to of Taiwanese manufacturing industry. Although the Herfindhal 
index may be more relevant in an analytic perspective, the CR4 is more convenient 
when providing descriptive statistics. This CR4 was first computed for each year, 
using the four largest sales values; when then computed the average across time. 
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and to the value of CR4. As was done with firm size, we use the (continuous) value of 
CR4 to classify firms into seven categories (going from a low to a high degree of 
market concentration). According to Scherer (1979), if the CR goes over 40% then 
the market (or industry) may be characterized as an oligopoly. If we adopt Scherer 
(1979)’s point of view, only 17% of the population falls into the “oligopolistic” 
category. The rest of the firms will be in a more competitive environment, which, 
together with our previous findings (Taiwan’s industry is mostly made of small / very 




Using the breakdown by innovation behavior shows that the proportion of 
“oligopolistic” firms in  the “R&D only” and “IT only” categories is about 21% and 
19% respectively, which is quite similar to the 17% observed in the whole population. 
The proportion of “oligopolistic” firms seems to be somewhat higher (29%) among 
those doing both internal and external knowledge acquisition (i.e. relying on both 
R&D and the importation of technology) category. We saw before that this category is 
made of larger firms, which suggests a positive relation between firm size and market 
power. However, this relation may not be strongly consistent: indeed, 16.5% of the 
non-innovation firms may be classified as “oligopolistic”, which is similar to both the 
whole population and the firm relying on a single source of knowledge. But, while the 
later consist mostly of medium-sized firms, the non-innovation firms are usually very 
small, as observed in 4.1.2. 
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
4.2. The “panel” approach to the MOEA data 
4.2.1. Patterns of innovation strategy in the panel approach 
 
Answering our second research question (why do some innovation firms neither 
do R&D nor import technology in a given year) imply to focus on innovation firms 
alone. Using the same definition as in 4.1. (“innovation firms” are firms which have 
reported doing R&D and/or importing technology in any given year of the 1992-1995 
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population of 27000 firms. We focus here on these 5000 firms, and make use of the 
panel structure of the data to answer our second research question. Since an 
observation is now a firm observed in year t, we retain a large number of observations 
(20,876 “firm-years”). 
 
In the panel approach, we consider that every year t, a firm faces four possible 
innovation strategies:  
(1) only doing in-house R&D in year t,  
(2) only importing technology in year t,  
(3) both doing R&D and importing technology in year t,  
(4) not engaging into innovation activities for that particular year.  
As explained in Section 3 (points 3.1. and 3.2.) these four strategies are modeled first 
as a set of four mutually exclusive categories (which gives rise to the estimation of the 
multinomial Logit model) and then as a matrix of two non-exclusive categories 
(which gives rise to the estimation of the bivariate Probit model).  
 
Table 6 gives a breakdown of our sub-population of 5000 innovation firms by 
innovation strategy and by year. Among the 5219 innovation firms, those doing only 
R&D are the most numerous in any given year (from a minimum of 36% in 1992 to a 
maximum of 59% in 1993). Each year, however, more than one third of the 
innovation firms choose not to innovate (although by definition they innovate in at 
least one other year). Firms which choose to import technology while doing R&D 
represent, each year, 6% to 7% of the sample. Finally, relying on the importation of 
technology as the sole source of new knowledge seems to be a marginal strategy, 
which does not involve more than 3% of the sample in any given year. These figures 
correspond, overall, to what might be expected according to the classical literature on 
innovation (e.g. Mowery, 1983). They are consistent with the patterns that appeared in 
the aggregate approach described in 4.1. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------- 
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strategy (R&D, importation of technology, “mixed” technology sourcing, or non 
innovation) over the 1992-1995 period. This table clearly indicates that, when the 
number of firms doing R&D only increases (as is the case between 1992 and 1993), 
then the number of firms importing technology (with or without doing R&D) 
decreases. Reciprocally, an increase in the number of firms importing technology 
(with or without doing R&D) correspond to a decrease in the number of firms 
engaged in R&D only. This suggest that doing R&D – as the sole source of knew 
knowledge – and importing technology (with or without doing R&D on the side) may 
be substitute strategies. As explained in Section 3, estimating a bivariate Probit model 
will allow us to investigate more systematically this phenomenon. 
 ------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
4.2.2. The size of innovation firms (panel approach) 
  
We observed in 4.1.2 (time-aggregate approach) that the innovation firms were 
somewhat larger in size (i.e. number of employees) than their non-innovation 
counterparts. The panel approach to the innovation sub-population makes this 
statement more precise: on the average, 49% of the innovation firms employ over 50 
employees, as can be seen in Table 8. In other words, the proportion of very small 
firms (less than 50 employees) reaches an average of 51% among innovation firms, 
which is much smaller than the 88% observed in the whole population. Let us remark, 
nonetheless, that 88% of the innovation firms employ less than 500 employees, which 
still suggests that innovation activities in Taiwan’s manufacturing industry are mostly 
the responsibility of small and medium-sized firms.   
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
As in the time-aggregate approach, the relative weigh of SME among innovation 
firms varies with the innovation strategies. Table 9 gives of breakdown of the average 
number of firms (over the 1992-1995 period) by type of innovation strategy. 
According to this table, “doing only R&D” appears as the “preferred” innovation 
strategy, no matter the size of the firm (in every size class, 50% to 70% of firms are, 
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small firms (less than 50 employees) and small firms (50 and 250 employees). As 
firms get larger, they tend to rely more on a mix of internal and external knowledge, 
as was observed in the whole (time-aggregated) population. Indeed, the “mixed” 
strategy (doing R&D and importing technology) is mostly adopted by firms recording 
more than 50 employees, and especially by those belonging to the “50-250” size class.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 9 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
4.2.3. Market structure and innovation strategy in the panel approach 
  
As we explained in 4.1.3, we adopted CR4 as our preferred indicator of market 
concentration for the descriptive statistics part of this chapter. The CR4 was computed 
for each year (from 1992 to 1995) using the four largest sales values. Table 10 gives a 
breakdown of the innovation firms according to innovation strategy and to the value 
of CR4. As before, we use the value of CR4 to classify firms into seven categories 
(from low to high), each of them corresponding to a certain degree of market 
concentration. For the sake of convenience and comparability, we only report in Table 
10 the average number of firms over the 1992-1995 period. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 10 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
A look at the innovation strategies reveals that the proportion of “oligopolistic” 
firms (using Scherer (1979)’s definition as in 4.1.3.) is almost equal among 
innovation firms and in the whole population (approximately 17% in both cases). This 
proportion raises to 20.5% and 19% among firms using the “R&D only” and “IT 
only” strategies respectively. Again, this is consistent with our previous observations, 
conducted on the whole population. Similarly, the proportion of “oligopolists” is 
somewhat higher (29%) among firms relying on a “mixed” innovation strategy” (i.e. 
firms which both conduct R&D and import technology). These figures suggest that 
firms facing stronger competition will rely on a single innovation strategy (“R&D 
only” or “IT only”), whereas firms in more concentrated markets will rather adopt the 
“mixed” strategy. The econometric analysis will allow us to examine this intuition 
more closely. 
  93   
5. Empirical Results 
 
As explained in Section 3, our empirical analysis relied on two approaches: a 
time-aggregate analysis of the MOEA panel on the one hand, and a genuine panel 
analysis of that same data on the other. With the first approach, we examine the whole 
population of 27754 innovation firms, which allows us to identify the determinants of 
the different innovation behaviors. With the second approach, we focus on the 5129 
innovation firms only, which allows us to explain why some innovation firms may 
restrain from innovating on certain years. The results of these two approaches are 
presented here in two separate sub-sections; each approach relies on the successive 
estimation of two models: a multinomial Logit and a bivariate Probit, that are also 
presented separately. 
 
5.1. Results of the “time-aggregate” approach 
   
  The multinomial Logit and the bivariate Probit models estimated on the time-
aggregate data use the same vectors of explanatory variables (to avoid scaling 
problems (c.f. Section 3), firm size is depicted by a categorical variable). Table 11 
give the summary statistics for the vector of explanatory variables. We present first 
the results of the Multinomial Logit model, and then those of the bivariate Probit. 
    ------------------------------- 
Insert Table 11 about here 
                                           ------------------------------- 
 
5.1.1 Multinomial Logit estimation on the time-aggregate data 
 
Table 12 presents the results obtained by estimating the multinomial Logit on 
the panel of 27754 innovation firms. On the left hand-side (columns (1), (2), and (3)) 
are featured the results of the estimations when CR(4) is used as an indicator of 
market structure. On the right hand-side (columns (4), (5), and (6)) are featured the 
results when the indicator of market structure is the Herfindhal index. A third 
specification of the Logit using CR8 was also estimated; the results were similar to 
those of the model involving CR(4), and are thus presented in the Appendix. 
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Insert Table 12 about here 
                                       ------------------------------- 
 
The results in Table 12 seem to validate hypothesis H1 : medium-large firms 
tend to be more inclined to do R&D, with or without importing technology on the 
side. This result remains stable whether the Concentration Ratio or the Herfindhal 
index is used. Hypothesis H2 seems to be only partly verified: a high level of CR4 (or 
CR8) increases the probability to innovate through a “mixed strategy”, i.e. to import 
technology while doing R&D, but slightly decreases the probability to do R&D 
only
18. In other words, the closer the market structure is to an oligopoly, the lower the 
chances that firms do only R&D, the higher the chances that they adopt a mixed 
strategy. This last result is consistent with our preliminary statistical analysis, but 
does not seem to hold in a “dynamic” perspective: indeed, when an industry becomes, 
on the average, more concentrated across the period, it tends to rely less and less on a 
mixed strategy to innovate.  
  
The effect of MES is consistent in all specification (i.e. it doesn’t matter whether 
CR4, CR8 or the Herfindhal index are used): a high MES significantly increases both 
the probability to do only R&D across the period and the probability to rely only on 
the importation of technology. It has no significant effect on the probability to rely 
both on R&D and on the importation of technology across the period. This result 
partially supports post-Schumpeterian theories: firms that are able to erect barriers to 
entries tend to innovate more, as they are more able to appropriate the results of an 
innovation. According to our results, Taiwanese firms tend to innovate more through 
a single strategy (such as doing internal R&D or importing technology) than through a 
mix of strategies. 
 
The estimation of the multinomial Logit model on time-aggregate data also 
suggests that young firms are more likely to innovate, no matter which strategy they 
choose. This result supports hypothesis H3. Table 12 shows that, as firms grow older, 
their probability to innovate decreases, whatever strategy is considered (doing R&D 
                                                 
18 When using the Herfindhal index, market concentration significantly decreases the probability to do 
R&D only, but has no significant effect on the probability to adopt a mixed strategy. 
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technology). 
 
 Finally, our two control variables yields sensible and stable results: first of all, 
Taiwanese firms that export technology have a higher probability to import 
technology, either as a “single strategy” or as part of a “mixed strategy”. Exportation 
of technology probably implies that a larger technology trading occurs at the 
international level and facilitates the importation of technology. The second result, is 
that subsidiaries tend to rely more on R&D (with or without importing technology on 
the side) than the other firms. It is probable that, being subsidiaries, these firms focus 
on a single activity, such as R&D and innovation (in that case, the importation of 
technology would be a complement to the internal R&D process of those firms). 
 
5.1.2. Bivariate Probit estimation on the time-aggregate data 
 
Table 9 shows the results of the bivariate Probit model estimated by maximum 
likelihood on the time-aggregate data. As was explained in Section 3, the endogenous 
variables of the bivariate Probit model were two dummy variables indicating: 
(1) whether or not a firm did R&D over the period and (2) whether a firm did import 
technology over the period. These variables were regressed on the same sets of 
explanatory variables as the ones used for the multinomial Logit. The left hand-side of 
Table 9 presents a Probit model using the CR4 as an indicator of market structure, 
whereas the right hand-side presents a model using the Herfindhal index. A third 
model using CR8 was estimated; due to similarity in the results, this model is 
presented in the Appendix. Since our main purpose here is to sketch a comparison 
with the multinomial Logit presented in 5.1.1., we will focus our interpretation of the 
bivariate Probit model on the four main explanatory variables: firm size, market 
concentration, firm age and barriers to entry. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 13 about here 
------------------------------- 
  
  The results of the bivariate Probit are quite consistent with those of the 
multinomial Logit, which allows us to identify the common drivers of each innovation 
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probability to innovate; however, the bivariate Probit specification does not detail 
every innovation strategy. Thus, we can only say that, the larger the firm, the higher 
the probability that it innovates (i.e; that it conducts R&D and/or imports technology). 
This relation is consistent across specifications, and tends to support hypothesis H1 .  
 
When using CR(K) as an indicator, market concentration seems to influence 
positively the probability to do IT, but this influence is rather weak (it becomes 
insignificant when using the Herfindhal index). The effect of concentration on the 
probability to do R&D is, at best, uncertain (it is significantly negative when using the 
Herfindhal index, and significantly positive when using CR8). Our most clear-cut and 
consistent result regarding market concentration can be read in a “dynamic” 
perspective, using the difference between the averaged value and the 1989 value of 
the concentration indicator. Overall, the more concentrated an industry is, the less 
firms in that industry will innovate (and, more precisely, the less they will rely on 
R&D). This result is consistent with that of the multinomial Logit model, and tends to 
support hypothesis H2. 
 
  According to Table 13, firms’ ability to erect barriers to entry (as measured by 
the MES) strongly influences their propensity to innovate: the more a firm is able to 
forbid its competitors the entrance to its market, the higher its probability to innovate 
(through both channels). This supports the theory according to which a higher ability 
to appropriate the results of an innovation will give firms a higher incentive to 
innovate. Finally, according to the results in Table 13, older firms tend to innovate 
less, which comforts hypothesis H3.  
  
An important feature of the bivariate Probit model is that the sign and 
significance of Rho (the estimated correlation coefficient of the residuals) may help us 
drawing conclusions about the issue of complementarity between R&D and IT. Table 
13 indicates that this parameter is positive and significantly different from zero. Thus, 
according to the methodology exposed in Sub-section 3.3., there is evidence of 
complementarity between both innovation activities, but we are not unable to explain 
the remaining correlation. Since we are looking here at the whole population of 
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influence the firms’ innovation decisions. 
 
5.1.3. Estimated joint probabilities in the time-aggregate approach 
 
Another interesting feature of the bivariate Probit model is that it allows to 
compute the joint and conditional probabilities of occurrence of the dependent 
variables. Table 14 reports the average of these estimated probabilities in the time-
aggregate framework. These results are quite stable across specifications (i.e., do not 
change significantly when the Herfindhal index or CR8 are used instead of the CR4); 
we will thus present them only for the bivariate Probit using the CR4 as an indicator 
of market concentration. 
    ------------------------------- 
Insert Table 14 about here 
    ------------------------------- 
  
Table 14 shows that the non-innovation behavior has the highest probability of 
occurrence (approximately 0.81), followed by the “R&D only” strategy (with a 
probability of occurrence of 0.15 only). This is consistent with the pattern of our 
population, in which 4/5 of the firms do not innovate.  The two other innovation 
strategies (“mixed” and “IT only”) have very low probabilities of occurrence. The last 
two lines of Table 14 are the most interesting, as they give the probability to do R&D 
(import technology) conditional on importing technology (doing R&D). The later has 
a very low value (0.08), whereas the former is fairly high (0.5). These results do not 
conform to the classical view according to which a basic R&D capability is required 
in order to effectively absorb external knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). They 
rather suggest that the R&D conducted by Taiwan’s manufacturing firms is more 
“creative” than “absorptive”. It could be that these firms want to develop their own 
R&D, but need to purchase existing patents before being able to do so. 
 
  The results of Table 14 are complemented by a “graphical analysis” of the 
estimated probabilities of adopting each of the three innovation strategies (“R&D 
only”, “IT only” and “R&D + IT”)  as a function of firm size, market structure, and 
firm age. Figure 1 nicely supports hypothesis H1: it shows that the probability to rely 
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probability to do only R&D first grows with firm size, but decreases after a certain 
threshold has been reached. This non-linear relationship is consistent with a large 
proportion of the literature (c.f. Section 2 in this chapter). 
    ------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
     ------------------------------- 
 
  Figure 2 shows that the relationship between market concentration and the 
probability to innovate through R&D only is not a very strong one; On the contrary, 
the probability to rely both on  R&D and external technology does grow with our 
indicator of market concentration. These results only partially confirm hypothesis H2. 
  ------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
  Figure 3 shows surprising results in respect to our previous findings: indeed, it 
suggests that both very young  (less than 10 years) and very old (more than 27 years) 
firms have a higher probability to innovate, either through R&D only, or through a 
“mixed” strategy. These results thus only partially confirm hypothesis H3. However, 
the increase of probability observed in older firms may be caused by purely statistical 
effects (e.g., a small number of outliers). In order to get a clearer view of the influence 
of firm age on the probability to import technology, we plotted the later on a separate 
graph (Figure 4). It shows a dependence to firm age that is quite similar to that of the 
two other probabilities, although in that case probability of importing technology 
remain slightly lower in very old firms than in very young firms. The same 
explanation (a small number of older outliers) may be proposed here. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
     ------------------------------- 
 
     ------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
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The time-aggregate analysis on the whole population of 27754 firms has 
allowed us to identify the main determinants of the various innovation activities 
(doing R&D, importing technology, and combining both). We will now use the panel 
structure of the data on the sub-population of 5219 innovation firms. Our main 
objective is to determine why some innovation firms do not spend money on 
innovation regularly (i.e. every year). A second objective is to investigate whether the 
results of the analysis are consistent with those obtained for the whole population. As 
before, we estimate first a multinomial Logit model, and then a bivariate Probit model 
using the same vector of covariates. Table 15 give the summary statistics for these 
variables. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 15 about here 
------------------------------- 
  
5.2.1. Estimation of a multinomial Logit for panel data 
 
Table 16 presents the results of the multinomial Logit estimated on the panel of 
5219 innovation firms. The left hand-side of the table features the results of the 
estimations when CR(4) is the indicator of market structure, and the right hand-side 
features the results when the Herfindhal index is chosen. As before, the results 
involving CR(8) are presented in the Appendix. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 16 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Overall, the results of the panel estimation on the sub-population of innovation 
are quite similar to those of the time-aggregate estimation on the whole population. In 
particular, larger firms tend to do more R&D, with or without importing technology, 
which once again comforts hypothesis H1. Similarly, a higher concentration 
(measured by CR4 and CR8) strongly increases the probability to rely on both R&D 
and IT, which partially supports hypothesis H2. However, the yearly evolution of 
concentration (with respect to 1989) has a negative impact on the probability to adopt 
this “mixed” strategy.  In other words, as the various industries tend to become less 
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innovate through both channels decreases. 
 
The main difference with the results of the time-aggregate approach concerns 
the MES, our indicator of firms’ ability to erect barriers to entry. While it was 
significant in the time-aggregate analysis of the whole population, it now becomes 
insignificant in almost all specifications, except in that using the Herfindhal index. In 
that specification, a higher MES tends to increase the probability to innovate through 
a mixed strategy. Similarly, the effect of age becomes globally insignificant, probably 
because all innovation firms have approximately the same age; if we believe the 
results of the time-aggregate analysis, innovation firms are, on the average, younger 
than the rest. Finally, the effect of the control dummies (“exporting technology” and  
“being a subsidiary”) are quite similar to those reported in 5.1.1. 
 
  Using the panel structure of our data allowed us to include both a year fixed-
effect and an firm-specific random effect. Both of them are highly significant, which 
suggests that they successfully capture the effect of some unobserved variables that 
may otherwise have affected the results of our estimations. These same unobserved 
variables may therefore have affected the results of the time-aggregate (cross section) 
analysis conducted in 5.1. 
 
5.2.2. Bivariate Probit estimation on panel data 
 
  Table 17 shows the results of the bivariate Probit model estimated by 
maximum likelihood on the panel of 5219 innovation firms. Overall, these results are 
consistent with both the multinomial Logit estimated in 5.2.1., and with those of the 
time-aggregate analysis presented in 5.1. As was done before, we will focus here on 
our four main variables of interest (firm size, firm age, market concentration and 
barriers to entry). 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 17 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
  First of all, Table 17 reveals a significant, positive correlation between firm 
size and the probability to innovate (i.e. to do R&D and/or to import technology). 
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Similarly, the effect of concentration is rather undetermined; relying on the 
Herfindhal index suggests that a higher concentration decreases the probability to do 
R&D. The yearly evolution of this index, however, tends to decreases the probability 
to import technology. 
 
Contrary to what was obtained with the estimation of the multinomial Logit in 
5.2.1., the effect of MES is quite significant in the bivariate Probit for panel data: 
when innovation firms are more able to erect barriers to entry, they while do R&D 
and import technology more regularly. Similarly, the effect of age becomes once 
again significant in the bivariate Probit, older firms being less  prone to innovate. 
 
Our last result is concerned with the possible complementarity between R&D and the 
importation of technology: after including our covariates, the residuals are no longer 
correlated (i.e. their correlation coefficient is not significantly different from zero). 
According to the methodology presented in 3.3., this result suggests that we have 
successfully identified the determinants of complementarity, in spite of the fact that 
the bivariate Probit does not include a firm-specific effect. In other word, we only 
relied on the time fixed effect to control for unobserved confounding factors. 
 
5.2.3.  Estimated joint probabilities in the panel approach 
 
As we did in the time-aggregate approach, we report in Table 18 the estimated 
probabilities of the bivariate Probit for the panel of 5219 innovation firms. As before, 
these probabilities (both joint and conditional) are quite stable across specifications. 
However, since we now focus on innovation firms only, the ranking of probabilities is 
quite different from what it was in the time-aggregate approach. Thus, Table 18 
shows that the “R&D only” strategy has the highest probability of occurrence (0.54), 
and is immediately followed by the “non innovation” strategy (which a probability of 
occurrence of 0.36). The other innovation strategies (“mixed” and IT only) have very 
low probabilities of occurrence. This is interesting, as it suggest that the traditional 
view of innovation relying mainly on R&D seems to hold, on the average, in the case 
of Taiwan. Firms which innovate regularly tend to do mostly through in-house R&D. 
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Insert Table 18 about here 
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The results concerning the estimated conditional probabilities are quite similar to 
those observed on the whole population in t he time-aggregate analysis, except that 
the trend is now stronger. More precisely, the probability of doing R&D conditional 
on importing technology much higher (0.6) than that of importing technology 
conditional on doing R&D  (0.08). This result corroborate our previous findings: 
Taiwanese firms do not seem to conduct “absorptive” R&D, but rather build on the 
purchase of foreign technologies to develop their own R&D. 
 
As in 5.1.3., we use a “graphical analysis” to investigate the relationships 
between the estimated probabilities of adopting regularly one of the three possible 
innovation strategies (“R&D only”, “IT only”, “R&D + IT”) and our main 
explanatory variables (firm size, market structure, and firm age). This allows for a sort 
of “graphical test” of our three hypothesis H1, H2 and H3, which is consistent with 
the one led in the time-aggregate analysis. Again, we only present the estimations 
obtained with the first Probit model (using CR4 as a measure of market power), since 
they are quite similar to those obtained with the other specifications.   
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Figure 1 shows that the probability of doing only R&D first increases with firm 
size (it rises steadily from 0.5 to 0.7 as firm size gradually increases from below 50 
employees to 250 employees) and then reach a threshold of approximately 0.6. The 
overall relationship of this probability to firm size seems to be non-linear (“inverted 
u-shape”). Moreover, the probability to adopt a “mixed” (R&D + IT) strategy 
increases steeply with firm size. These results suggest that hypothesis H1 makes 
sense: large firms tend to rely more extensively on R&D, with or without importing 
technology on the side.  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
  103  Figure 2 shows that the probability of doing only R&D remains stable – at a 
fairly high level, above 0.5 – when the Concentration Ratio grows, whereas the 
probability to adopt a “mixed” strategy slightly increases for high levels of 
concentration (above 50). These results suggest that oligopolistic firms tend to favor 
the latter strategy, which only partially confirms hypothesis H2. Finally, Figure 3 
shows that the probabilities of adopt the “R&D only”, “IT only” and “mixed” 
strategies respectively remain quite stable with respect to firm age. Thus, as far as our 
graphical analysis  is concerned, firm age does not seem to affect innovation strategy, 
which does not allow for a satisfactory test of hypothesis H3. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 




The objective of this chapter was to identify the effect of market structure 
(concentration and barriers to entry) and firm characteristics (age and size) on the 
choice of innovation strategies. The influence of market structure on the decision to 
do R&D has been investigated in the classical IO literature, but this literature seldom 
takes into account other, external, sources of new knowledge. These considerations 
are manifest in the recent empirical literature only. External sources of knowledge can 
be manifold, but the one on which this research focused was the importation of 
(disembodied) new technology. 
 
Using a panel of more than 27000 Taiwanese manufacturing firms observed 
over the 1992-1995 period by the Statistic Bureau of Taiwan's Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (MOEA), we developed an empirical analysis in two steps. Our first step was 
to take the time-averaged values of our variables (time-aggregate approach) to 
examine the determinants of the decision to innovate in the whole population of firms. 
The second step was to use the panel structure of the data to examine only the 
innovation firms, i.e. firms which innovate at least one year between 1992 and 1995, 
through R&D and/or the importation of technology (more than 5000 were identified 
as such). This second step of the analysis allowed us to explain why some firms 
innovate regularly, whereas others restrain from innovating on certain years. 
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In both steps, we developed econometric models allowing to distinguish 
between four options: (1) do R&D only, (2) rely only on the importation of 
technology, (3) combine the two options in a “mixed” strategy and (4) not engage in 
innovation activities. In the time-aggregate approach, a firm choosing option (4) is a 
firm that never innovates, i.e. a non-innovation firm. In the panel approach, where we 
focus on innovation firms, a firm choosing option (4) is a firm that do not innovate in 
year t only. In both steps, two econometric models were used: a multinomial Logit 
and a bivariate Probit, the latter allowing to check for complementarity between R&D 
and the importation of technology.  
 
Both approaches and both models pointed out similar results. Our main findings 
regarding the determinants of innovation are threefold; first of all, firm size appears to 
have a positive effect on the probability to do R&D, either as the only source of new 
knowledge (strategy (1) above), or together with the importation of technology 
(strategy (3) above). This result tend to confirm our somewhat “extended” 
Schumpeterian hypothesis according to which, as firms grow in size, they will be 
more inclined to do R&D. 
 
Our second finding concerns market structure, and is less clear-cut: when the 
Concentration Ratio (CR) is used as a measure of market power, we find that firms 
operating in more concentrated industries (oligopolies, for instance) will be more 
likely to adopt a “mixed” strategy, and less likely to do R&D only. When the 
Herfindhal index is used instead, no significant result emerges. However, the variation 
in market concentration (with respect to year 1989) tends to decrease the probability 
to adopt a “mixed” strategy. Overall, these results suggest (1) that the CR may capture 
the specificity of Taiwan’s industrial structure and (2) that the Schumpeterian 
hypothesis according to which oligopolistic firms are more inclined to innovate 
through R&D is only partly supported. Similarly, all models suggest that firms’ 
capacity to erect barriers to entry (as measured by the MES) tend to increase their 
propensity to innovate; all, except the multinomial model for panel data estimated in 
Step 2, where the effect of the MES is not significant. 
 
  105  Our third important finding concerning the determinants of innovation has to do 
with firm age. When we examined the whole population (Step 1 of the analysis), it 
appears that innovation are also younger firms. Thus, hypothesis H3 is comforted at 
this level of the analysis. Because of that result, when we look at the innovation firms 
only (Step 2 of the analysis), the age is not significant anymore, regardless of the 
specification we use. 
 
Besides identifying the determinants of innovation among the whole population 
and the determinants of a regular, time-consistent  innovation activity among 
innovation firms, our analysis also address the question of complementarity. When we 
examine the whole population with the time-aggregate approach, we find some 
evidence of complementarity between the two innovation activities of interest (doing 
R&D and importing technology). However, these results may to some extent be 
caused by unobserved heterogeneity, for which we are unable to control. The second 
step of the analysis then becomes fully relevant: by examining innovation firms with 
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Table 1: sources of new knowledge in the economic literature 
Source of knowledge  Type of source  Present in MOEA 
(1) in-house R&D  Internal  YES 
(2) purchase of technology 
(including importation)  External  YES 
(3) Cooperation and research 
agreements*  External  NO 
(4) purchase + improvement of 
technology  Mixed  YES 
(5) Cooperation + in-house 
R&D  Mixed  NO 
(6) Cooperation + purchase of 
technology  Mixed  NO 




Table 2: breakdown of the population by innovation strategy (time-aggregate approach) 
Number of employees   
Strategy  firms % 
Only RD  4111 14.8% 
Only IT  248 0.89% 
RDIT  828 2.98% 
NONINNO  22567 81.3% 




Table 3: breakdown of the population by firm size (time-aggregate approach) 
Firm size  % of population 
1-49  84.4% 
50-249  13.1% 
250-499  1.5% 
500+  1% 
Total  100% (27754 firms) 
 
 
Table 4: breakdown by firm size  and innovation behavior (time-aggregate approach) 
1-49 50-249  250-499  500+  Total  Innovation 
strategy  firms  %  firms  %  firms  %  firms  %  firms  % 
R&D only  2269  9.7  1519  41.5  228  53.7  95  38  4111  14.8 
IT only   159  0.7  79  2.2  8  1.9  2  0.8  248  0.9 
R&D + IT  196  0.8  361  9.9  133  31.4  138  55.2  828  3 
Non-Innov.  20802  88.8  1695  46.4  55  13  15  6  22567  81.3 
Total  23426  100  3654  100  424  100  250  100  27754  100 
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Table 5: breakdown by innovation behavior  and CR4 (time-aggregate approach) 
Innovation behavior 
R&D only  IT only  R&D + IT  Non-innovation  Total 
CR4 
firms % firms % firms %  firms  % firms % 
80-100  49  1.2 5 2.0  18  2.2 240 1.1  308  1.1 
60-80  176  4.3 12 4.8 55 6.6 898  4.0  1141  4.1 
50-60  177  4.3 11 4.4 67 8.1 770  3.4  1025  3.7 
40-50  441  10.7 20  8.1 103  12.4 1804  8.0 2368 8.5 
30-40  716  17.4 58 23.4  186  22.5 3217 14.3  4177  15.1 
20-30  937  22.8 38 15.3  159  19.2 4432 19.6  5566  20.1 
0-20  1615  39.3  104 42 240 29 11203  49.6  13162  47.4 
Total  4111  100 248 100 828 100 22567 100  27754  100 
 
 
Table 6: the sub-population of innovation firms by strategy and by year (panel approach) 







1992  2812 (35.9%)  155 (3.0%)  380 (7.3%)  1872 (35.8%)  5219 (100%) 
1993  3069 (58.8%)  114 (2.2%)  349 (6.7%)  1687 (32.3%)  5219 (100%) 
1994  2686 (51.5%)  185 (3.5%)  401 (7.7%)  1947 (37.3%)  5219 (100%) 
1995  2741 (52.5%)  104 (2.0%)  305 (5.8%)  2069 (39.7%)  5219 (100%) 
Average  2827 (54.2%)  139 (2.7%)  359 (6.9%)  1894 (36.2%)  5219 (100%) 
 
 
Table 7: yearly variation in the number of innovation firms engaged in each strategy 
Only RD  Only IT  RDIT  NONINNO  Year 
#  ∆  #  ∆  #  ∆  #  ∆ 
1992  2812  155 380 1872   
1993  3069 114  349    1687  -185 
1994  2686 185  401    1947  +260 












-96  2069 +122 
A # denotes the absolute number of firms for a year, and a ∆ the variation from one year to the next. 
 
 
Table 8: number of innovation firms by size classes over the 1992-1995 period 
Firm size (number of employees)  Year 
1-49 50-249  250-499 500+  Total 
1992  2682 1931  358  248  5219 
1993  2604 1995  375  245  5219 
1994  2660 1948  366  245  5219 
1995  2661 1946  362  250  5219 
Average  2652 1955  365  247  5219 
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Table 9: breakdown by firm size and innovation strategy (panel approach) 
1-49 50-249  250-499  500+  Total  Innovation 
strategy  firms  %  firms  %  firms  %  firms  %  firms  % 
R&D only  1240  47  1199  61  244  67  144  59  2827  54 
IT only   64  2  62  3  10  3  4  2  140  3 
R&D + IT  58  2  153  8  63  17  84  34  358  7 
Non-Innov.  1290  49  541  28  48  13  15  5  1894  36 
Total  2652  100  1955  100  365  100  247  100  5219  100 
 
 
Table 10: breakdown of the average number of innovation firms by strategy and by CR4 
Innovation strategy 
OnlyRD OnlyIT  RDIT  No-Inno  Total 
CR4 
firms % firms % firms % firms % firms % 
80-100  41 1.5  3  2.1  8  2.2 22 1.1 74 1.4 
60-80  113  4.0  5  3.5 29 8.1 71 3.7  218  4.2 
50-60  164  5.8  7  5  28 7.8 96 5.1  295  5.7 
40-50  387 13.7  20  14.3  59  16.4 226 11.9 692 13.2 
30-40  411  14.5 25 17.9 69 19.2  265 14 770  14.8 
20-30  697  24.7 26 18.6 71 19.8  460  24.2  1254 24 
0-20  1014  35.8 54 38.6 94 26.5  754 40 1916  36.7 
Total  2827 100  140  100  358  100 1894 100 5219 100 
 
  112   
Table 11: summary statistics (time-aggregate approach) 
Variable  Description  Mean (Std Error) 
Size  Firm size (number of employees)  39.17 (126.18) 
Size50  Firm size (number of employees) small than 50  0.84 (0.36) 
Size100  Firm size (number of employees) between  50 and 100  0.09 (0.28) 
Size500  Firm size (number of employees) between  100 and 500  0.06 (0.24) 
Size1000  Firm size (number of employees) between  500 and 1000  0.006 (0.08) 
Size1001  Firm size (number of employees) bigger 1000  0.003 (0.06) 
CR4  Concentration Ratio, Level 4  26.89 (15.88) 
CR8  Concentration Ratio, Level 8  37.49 (18.21) 
H  Herfindhal Index  454.35 (618.53) 
CR4t-89  Change in CR4 between year t and 1989  -7.37 (13.26) 
CR8t-89  Change  in CR8 between year t and 1989  -9.36 (12.45) 
Ht-89  Change in H between year t and 1989  -161.27 (629.84) 
MES  Log of the Minimum Efficient Scale  13.41 (1.28) 
Age  Firm’s age in years   14.70 (6.38) 
ET  1 if firm export technology, 0 otherwise  0.01 (0.07) 
Sub  1 if firm is subsidiary, 0 otherwise  0.13 (0.34) 
D1  1 if firm belong to (11) Food Industry, 0 otherwise  0.11 (0.32) 
D2  1 if firm belong to (13) Textile Industry, 0 otherwise  0.07 (0.25) 
D3  1 if firm belong to (14), (15), (16), or (17) industries 
(Wearing Apparel, Leather, Wood, Furniture), 0 otherwise  0.08 (0.27) 
D4  1 if firm belong to (18) or (19) industries (Paper, Printing) 
and 0 otherwise  0.06 (0.25) 
D5  1 if firm belong to (21) Chemical Industry, 0 otherwise  0.02 (0.15) 
D6  1 if firm belong to (22) or (23) industry (Chemical 
Products, Oil and Coal Products), 0 otherwise  0.04 (0.20) 
D7  1 if firm belong to (24) Rubber Industry, 0 otherwise  0.01 (0.11) 
D8  1 if firm belong to (25) Plastic Industry, 0 otherwise  0.08 (0.28) 
D9  1 if firm belong to (26) Non-Metal Mineral Products 
Industry, 0 otherwise  0.06 (0.23) 
D10  1 if firm belong to (27) Basic Metal Industry, 0 otherwise  0.05 (0.23) 
D11  1 if firm belong to (28) Fabricated Metal Products 
Industry, 0 otherwise  0.12 (0.32) 
D12  1 if firm belong to (29) Machinery Industry, 0 otherwise  0.08 (0.28) 
D13  1 if firm belong to (31) Electronic Industry, 0 otherwise  0.07 (0.25) 
D14  1 if firm belong to (32) Transportation Industry, 
0 otherwise  0.07 (0.25) 
D15  1 if firm belong to (33) Precision Instruments Industry, 
0 otherwise  0.02 (0.14) 
D16  1 if firm belong to (39) Miscellaneous Industry, 
0 otherwise  0.04 (0.20) 
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Table 12: innovation behavior in the time-aggregate approach (multinomial Logit estimates) 





































Size 100  (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.)  (ref.)  (ref.) 
Size 500  0.436 












































     




























































  27751 27658 27751 27751 27658 27751 
Log  L  -10876.3 -1343.3  -2439.9 -10081.8  -1343.41 -2449.7 
Number of observations: 27754 
Numbers in brackets are Standard Errors. The levels of significance are: *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%. 
In every model, a Wald Chi-2 test led to the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: “β =0”. 
Gray cells indicate that a variable has not been used in this specification. 
  114  Table 13: innovation behavior in the time-aggregate approach (Bivariate Probit estimates) 
Probit Model 1 (CR4)  Probit Model 2 (Herfindhal)  Variables 
RD IT RD IT 
Constant  -0.326 (0.151)**  -1.644 (0.251)***  -0.385 (0.151)**  -1.763 (0.247)*** 
Size 50  -0.104 (0.029)***  -0.728 (0.045)***  -1.037 (0.029)***  -0.725 (0.045)*** 
Size  100  (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) (ref.) 
Size 500  0.659 (0.042)***  0.614 (0.053)***  0.662 (0.042)***  0.618 (0.053)*** 
Size 1000  1.340 (0.150)***  1.236 (0.115)***  1.357 (0.150)***  1.252 (0.114)*** 
Size 1001  1.679 (0.267)***  1.480 (0.149)***  1.701 (0.267)***  1.504 (0.148)*** 
CR4  -0.00004 (0.0007)  0.002 (0.001)*     
CR4t-89  -0.003 (0.0007)***  -0.006 (0.001)***     
H      -0.00004 
(0.00001)** 
-6.35e-06 (0.00002) 
Ht-89      -4.16e-07 (0.00001)  -0.00008 
(0.00002)*** 
MES  0.029 (0.011)***  0.025 (0.018)  0.0367(0.010)***  0.041 (0.017)** 
Age  -0.012 (0.001)***  -0.013 (0.002)***  -0.013 (0.001)***  -0.013 (0.002)*** 
ET  0.920 (0.127)***  1.159 (0.112)***  0.926 (0.127)***  1.173 (0.112)*** 
Sub  0.402 (0.269)***  0.237 (0.039)***  0.401 (0.026)***  0.233 (0.039)*** 
      
Log L  -13089.3  -133100.5 
Wald Chi-2  6342.89***  6328.44*** 
Rho   0.43 (0.019)***  0.43 (0.019)*** 
Numbers in brackets are Standard Errors. The levels of significance are: *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%. 
Gray cells indicate that a variable has not been used in this specification. 
 
Table 14: estimated probabilities with the Probit Model (time-aggregate approach) 
Probit 1 (CR4)  Probit 2 (Herfindhal)  Probabilities 
Mean  (Std Error)  Mean  (Std Error) 
Prob(RD = 1, IT = 1)  0.03 (0.08) 0.03 (0.08) 
Prob(RD = 1, IT = 0)  0.15 (0.13) 0.15 (0.13) 
Prob(RD = 0, IT = 1)  0.009 (0.007) 0.009 (0.007) 
Prob(RD = 0, IT = 0)  0.81 (0.20) 0.81 (0.20) 
Prob(IT = 1 |  RD = 1)  0.08 (0.08) 0.08 (0.08) 
Prob(RD = 1 |  IT = 1)  0.49 (0.16) 0.50 (0.16) 
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Table 15: summary statistics (panel approach) 
Variable  Description  Mean (Std Error) 
Size  Firm size (number of employees)  125.24 (269.60) 
CR4  Concentration Ratio, Level 4  29.40 (16.81) 
CR8  Concentration Ratio, Level 8  41.42 (19.55) 
H  Herfindhal Index  499.59 (670.35) 
CR4t-89  Change in CR4 between year t and 1989  -9.40 (15.66) 
CR8t-89  Change  in CR8 between year t and 1989  -11.43 (14.25) 
Ht-89  Change in H between year t and 1989  -195.75 (577.21) 
MES  Log of the Minimum Efficient Scale  13.79 (1.28) 
Age  Firm’s age in years   12.96 (7.04) 
ET  1 if firm export technology, 0 otherwise  0.01 (0.10) 
Sub  1 if firm is subsidiary, 0 otherwise  0.30 (0.46) 
Y92  Dummy for year 1992  0.25 (0.43) 
Y93  Dummy for year 1993  0.25 (0.43) 
Y94  Dummy for year 1994  0.25 (0.43) 
Y95  Dummy for year 1995  0.25 (0.43) 
D1  1 if firm belong to (11) Food Industry, 0 otherwise  0.09 (0.29) 
D2  1 if firm belong to (13) Textile Industry, 0 otherwise  0.07 (0.26) 
D3  1 if firm belong to (14), (15), (16), or (17) industries 
(Wearing Apparel, Leather, Wood, Furniture), 0 otherwise  0.06 (0.24) 
D4  1 if firm belong to (18) or (19) industries (Paper, Printing) 
and 0 otherwise  0.03 (0.18) 
D5  1 if firm belong to (21) Chemical Industry, 0 otherwise  0.05 (0.21) 
D6  1 if firm belong to (22) or (23) industry (Chemical 
Products, Oil and Coal Products), 0 otherwise  0.09 (0.28) 
D7  1 if firm belong to (24) Rubber Industry, 0 otherwise  0.01 (0.12) 
D8  1 if firm belong to (25) Plastic Industry, 0 otherwise  0.06 (0.23) 
D9  1 if firm belong to (26) Non-Metal Mineral Products 
Industry, 0 otherwise  0.05 (0.21) 
D10  1 if firm belong to (27) Basic Metal Industry, 0 otherwise  0.05 (0.22) 
D11  1 if firm belong to (28) Fabricated Metal Products 
Industry, 0 otherwise  0.08 (0.27) 
D12  1 if firm belong to (29) Machinery Industry, 0 otherwise  0.08 (0.27) 
D13  1 if firm belong to (31) Electronic Industry, 0 otherwise  0.14 (0.35) 
D14  1 if firm belong to (32) Transportation Industry, 
0 otherwise  0.08 (0.27) 
D15  1 if firm belong to (33) Precision Instruments Industry, 
0 otherwise  0.03 (0.16) 
D16  1 if firm belong to (39) Miscellaneous Industry, 
0 otherwise  0.04 (0.19) 
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Y92(ref.)    - - - - - - 
        













Number of observations: 20876 
Numbers in brackets are Standard Errors. The levels of significance are: *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%. 
In every model, a Wald Chi-2 test led to the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: “β =0”. 
Gray cells indicate that a variable has not been used in this specification. 
In the last line of the table, “Alpha” is a parameter indicating the contribution of the individual random 
effect to the total variance. When that parameter is significantly different from zero (as it is here, at the 
1% level), then the individual effect does capture unobserved heterogeneity. 
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Probit Model 1 (CR4)  Probit Model 2 (Herfindhal)  Variables 
RD IT RD IT 
Constant  0.011 (0.135)  -2.160 (0.194)***  -0.008 (0.133)  -2.309 (0.191)*** 
Size  0.002 (0.0001)***  0.0009 (0.0004)***  0.002 (0.0001)***  0.0009 (0.0004)*** 
CR4  -0.001 (0.0007)*  0.001 (0.009)     
CR4t-89  -0.0005 (0.0007)  -0.005 (0.0008)***     




Ht-89      0.00002 (0.00002)  -0.00009 
(0.00002)*** 
MES  0.020 (0.010)**  0.045 (0.015)***  0.021 (0.010)**  0.063 (0.014)*** 
Age  -0.002 (0.001)*  -0.004 (0.002)**  -0.002 (0.001)*  -0.004 (0.002)** 
ET  0.003 (0.105)  0.912 (0.097)***  0.002 (0.105)  0.917 (0.097)*** 
Sub  0.180 (0.021)***  0.113 (0.028)***  0.179(0.021)***  0.106 (0.028)*** 
Y93  0.120 (0.026)***  -0.099 (0.036)***  0.120 (0.026)***  -0.102 (0.036)*** 
Y94  -0.049 (0.026)*  0.049 (0.035)  -0.047 (0.026)*  0051 (0.348) 
Y95  -0.073 (0.026)***  -0.194 (0.038)***  -0.070 (0.026)***  -0.193 (0.038)*** 
Y92(ref.)  - - - - 
      
Log L  -18900.4  -18902.7 
Wald Chi-2  2597.84***  2592.62*** 
Rho   0.02 (0.017)  0.02 (0.017) 
Numbers in brackets are Standard Errors. The levels of significance are: *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%. 
Gray cells indicate that a variable has not been used in this specification. 
 
Table 18 : estimated probabilities (Probit Model, panel approach) 
Probit 1 (CR4)  Probit 2 (Herfindhal)  Probabilities 
Mean  (Std Error)  Mean  (Std Error) 
Prob(RD = 1, IT = 1)  0.07 (0.09) 0.07 (0.09) 
Prob(RD = 1, IT = 0)  0.54 (0.09) 0.54 (0.09) 
Prob(RD = 0, IT = 1)  0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
Prob(RD = 0, IT = 0)  0.36 (0.13) 0.36 (0.13) 
Prob(IT = 1 |  RD= 1)  0.10 (0.09) 0.10 (0.09) 
Prob(RD = 1 |  IT = 1)  0.62 (0.12) 0.62 (0.12) 
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Table A: multinomial Logit estimates using CR8 (time-aggregate data) 
Variables  OnlyRD OnlyIT  RDIT 
Constant  -0.822  (0.278)***  -6.22 (1.01)***  -2.35 (0.619)*** 
Size 50  -1.625 (0.05)***  -0.991 (1.741)***  -1.895 (0.117)*** 
Size 100  (ref.)  (ref.)  (ref.) 
Size 500  0.432 (0.067)***  0.050 (0.225)  1.324 (0.113)*** 
Size 1000  -0.105 (0.173)  -0.874 (0.748)  2.531 (0.210)*** 
Size 1001  -0.832 (0.239)***  -  2.946 (0.274)*** 
CR8  0.0008 (0.001)  -0.001 (0.004)  0.009 (0.002)*** 
CR8t-89  -0.003 (0.001)**  -0.007 (0.005)  -0.019 (0.003)*** 
MES  0.043 (0.02)**  0.184 (0.076)**  -0.043 (0.046) 
Age  -0.014 (0.002)***  -0.018 (0.010)*  -0.027 (0.006)*** 
ET  -0.063 (0.200)  1.568 (0.353)***  1.928 (0.242)*** 
SUB  0.564 (0.047)***  0.123 (0.170)  0.509 (0.090)*** 
  27751 27658 27751 
Log Likelihood  -10081.5  -1343.2  -2434.9 
Number of observations: 27754 
Numbers in brackets are Standard Errors. The levels of significance are: *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%. 
A Wald chi-2 led to the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: “β = 0” 
 
 
Table B: bivariate Probit estimates using CR8 (time-aggregate data) 
Variables  RD IT 
Constant  0.270 (0.151)***  -1.671 (0.251)*** 
Size 50  -1.039 (0.029)***  -0.728 (0.045)*** 
Size 100  (ref.)  (ref.) 
Size 500  0.657 (0.042)***  0.614 (0.053)*** 
Size 1000  1.328 (0.149)***  1.234 (0.114)*** 
Size 1001  1.667 (0.267)***  1.479 (0.149)*** 
CR8  0.002 (0.0006)**  0.003 (0.001)*** 
CR8t-89  -0.004 (0.0008)***  -0.007 (0.001)*** 
MES  0.017 (0.011)  0.018 (0.018) 
Age  -0.011 (0.001)***  -0.013 (0.002)*** 
ET  0.922 (0.127)***  1.166 (0.112)*** 
Sub  0.401 (0.027)***  0.233 (0.039)*** 
    
Log Likelihood  -13081.3 
Chi-Squared 6348.9*** 
Rho 0.43  (0.019)*** 
Number of observations: 27754 
Numbers in brackets are Standard Errors. The levels of significance are: *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%. 
 
Table C: estimated Probabilities (Bivariate Probit with CR8 on time-aggregate data) 
Probit 3 (CR8)  Probabilities 
Mean (Std  Error) 
Prob(RD = 1, IT = 1)  0.03 (0.08) 
Prob(RD = 1, IT = 0)  0.15 (0.13) 
Prob(RD = 0, IT = 1)  0.009 (0.007) 
Prob(RD = 0, IT = 0)  0.81 (0.20) 
Prob(IT = 1 |  RD = 1)  0.08 (0.08) 
Prob(RD = 1 |  IT = 1)  0.49 (0.16) 
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Table D: multinomial Logit estimates using CR8 (panel data) 
Variables  OnlyRD OnlyIT  RDIT 
Constant  -0.016 (0.333)  -0.833 (1.26)***  -7.196 (0.829)*** 
Size  0.0002 (0.00009)**  -0.0006 (0.0004)  0.003 (0.0002)*** 
CR8  -0.002 (0.002)  0.006 (0.006)  0.014 (0.004)*** 
CR8t-89  0.004 (0.002)**  -0.010 (0.006)  -0.020 (0.005)*** 
MES  0.041 (0.025)  0.109 (0.094)  0.075 (0.069) 
Age  0.002 (0.003)  -0.021 (0.013)*  -0.010 (0.010) 
ET  -0.890 (0.202)***  1.703 (0.455)***  2.411 (0.309)*** 
SUB  0.386 (0.053)***  -0.502 (0.197)**  0.807 (0.143)*** 
Y93  0.249 (0.045)***  -0.448 (0.152)***  -0.195 (0.106)* 
Y94  -0.136 (0.046)***  0.286 (0.140)**  0.053 (0.105) 
Y95  -0.085 (0.047)*  -0.570 (0.165)***  -0.511 (0.118)*** 
Y92(ref.)  - - - 
     
Log  Likelihood  -13611.3 -2148.21 -3747.03 
Alpha  0.31 (0.003)***  0.69 (0.007)***  0.68 (0.005)*** 
Number of observations: 20876 
Numbers in brackets are Standard Errors. The levels of significance are: *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%. 
A Wald chi-2 led to the rejection of the null hypothesis H0: “β = 0” 
 
 
Table E: bivariate Probit estimates using CR8 (panel data) 
Variables  RD IT 
Constant  0.067 (0.135)  -2.188 (0.193)*** 
Size  0.002 (0.0001)***  0.0009 (0.00004)*** 
CR8  -0.0003 (0.0006)  0.002 (0.0008)*** 
CR8t-89  -0.0003 (0.0007)  -0.006 (0.001)*** 
MES  0.014 (0.010)  0.040 (0.015)*** 
Age  -0.002 (0.001)**  -0.004 (0.002)** 
ET  0.006 (0.105)  0.917 (0.097)*** 
Sub  0.180 (0.021)***  0.110 (0.028)*** 
Y93  0.121 (0.259)***  -0.099 (0.036)*** 
Y94  -0.047 (0.029)*  0.048 (0.035) 
Y95  -0.068 (0.026)***  -0.195 (0.038)*** 
Y92(ref.) -  - 
    
Log Likelihood  -18902.1 
Chi-Squared 2595.2*** 
Rho 0.02  (0.017) 
Number of observations: 20876 
Numbers in brackets are Standard Errors. The levels of significance are: *=10%, **=5%, and ***=1%. 
 
Table F: estimated Probabilities (Bivariate Probit with CR8 on panel data) 
Probit 3 (CR8)  Probabilities 
Mean (Std  Error) 
Prob(RD = 1, IT = 1)  0.07 (0.09) 
Prob(RD = 1, IT = 0)  0.54 (0.09) 
Prob(RD = 0, IT = 1)  0.03 (0.02) 
Prob(RD = 0, IT = 0)  0.36 (0.13) 
    
Prob(RD = 1 |  IT = 1)  0.10 (0.09) 
Prob(RD = 1 |  IT = 1)  0.62 (0.12) 
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Innovation Strategy and Productivity Growth: 














This chapter provides new evidence on the effect of importing technology from abroad 
on productivity growth in Taiwan. Using a panel of more than 5000 firms, we test the 
effects of importing technology (versus doing R&D) on the growth of total factor and 
labor productivity. The relationship between R&D activities and the absorption of 
foreign technologies is also explored, by including an interaction effect into the 
regression model of productivity growth. We find that both strategies contribute to the 
growth of labor productivity, whereas total factor productivity growth is mainly 
driven by R&D intensity. Moreover, our results are consistent with a possible 
complementarity relationship between the two innovation strategies in high-tech 
industries, which echoes recent findings on Western innovation firms. On the 
contrary, these strategies may be used as substitutes in traditional industries. These 
results shed new light on Taiwan’s current science and technology policy. 
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It is a fact that Taiwan has been challenged by the increasing international 
competition from other Asian developing countries since the 1990s. The steep rise in 
labor costs over that period put a heavy pressure on the Taiwanese economy. At the 
same time, the adoption of a (managed) floating exchange rate made Taiwanese 
exported products less competitive on the international market. Traditional Taiwanese 
industries faced increasing difficulties in competing with the low value-added and 
labor-intensive goods produced by more recently industrialized Asian countries. As a 
result, Taiwan had to speed up its industrial upgrading process toward an industrial 
structure in which high-technology firms are expected to play a leading role. In order 
to counterbalance the growing competitive weaknesses of traditional Taiwanese firms, 
industrial policies encouraging these firms to upgrade their technological level have 
been implemented. At the same time, policies have been designed to speed up the 
development of high-technology industries by promoting the firms’ Research and 
Development (hereafter, R&D) activities. Such policies are expected to increase the 
productivity growth at the industry level. 
 
Technology upgrading in a developing country cannot totally rely on its own 
R&D effort. This country may have to import new knowledge from foreign countries. 
Due to the unavailability of many new key technologies at the beginning of the 1990s 
in the domestic market, technology imports from foreign countries could be as 
important as endogenously conducted R&D for Taiwanese manufacturing industries. 
Importing technologies has been an alternative strategy (and, in some cases, a 
necessity) to expand the knowledge frontier in Taiwanese industries.  
 
However, the importer’s technology capacity should be consistent with the 
complexity level of imported technologies. When firms in a newly industrialized 
country import technologies that have reached a certain maturity in the West, they can 
adapt adequately these technologies to their specific needs without increasing their 
R&D expenditures. This may be the case, for instance, of Taiwanese traditional 
industries. However, when foreign technologies are more recent and sophisticated, 
technology importers should possess the capacity to absorb this new knowledge. The 
  126  more sophisticated the imported technology is, the more likely it is that the importer 
has to conduct substantial research, in order to adapt or absorb the new technology. 
 
Very few empirical studies have examined the impacts of imported technology 
from abroad on productivity growth. Using Japanese manufacturing data and focusing 
on labor productivity growth, Caves and Uekusa (1976) were among the first to 
examine this issue. Basant and Fikkert (1996) examined the impact of importing 
technology on the output level of India firms. Furthermore, purchasing technologies 
was treated as one of the possible technology sourcing strategies in some studies 
discussing the complementarity between the “doing R&D” and the “purchasing 
technology” strategies (Blumenthal, 1979; Katrak, 1983; Odagiri, 1983; Lall, 1983; 
Siddharthan, 1988; Basant and Fikkert, 1996; also Cassiman  and Veugelers, 2002). 
Two different empirical methodologies have been suggested in these empirical 
studies: 
(1)  The “correlation” (sometimes called “adoption”), based on 
supermodularity theory, states that if two strategies are complementary 
then one should expect them to be positively correlated.  
(2)  The “productivity” approach consists in including an interaction 
effects into the standard regression model of productivity. This 
approach predicts that, if the two strategies are complementary, then 
the estimate of their interaction effect in the productivity regression 
equation should be positive.  
 
So far, most empirical studies on the complementarity between these two ways 
of acquiring technology have employed the correlation approach only. Two 
exceptions can be noticed: Basant and Fikkert (1996) use the productivity approach, 
while Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) adopted both approaches to investigate the 
relationship between doing R&D, purchasing technology and cooperation in R&D. 
 
The present research differs from earlier studies on two points. First, this 
chapter uses a sample of 5219 innovation  firms collected from 21 two-digit 
manufacturing industries. This data set includes a broader range of industrial sectors 
than previous studies. The sample is large enough to allow for a comparison (of the 
complementary of innovation strategies) between firms operating in traditional 
  127  industries and those operating in high technology industries. Second, this chapter 
takes innovation strategies into account by singling out firms which, on the 1992-
1995 period, used only one innovation strategy (i.e. either doing R&D or importing 
technology). These “single-strategy” firms are put together in a first sub-sample. We 
then regroup firms with mixed innovation strategies (i.e. firms which used both 
strategies, either simultaneously or sequentially, over the period of interest) into a 
second sub-sample. 
 
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 surveys the empirical literature 
on the effects of importing technology on productivity growth, as well as on the 
relationship between doing R&D and importing technology. Section 3 briefly outlines 
the process of importing technology in Taiwan and presents some descriptive 
statistics on innovation strategies drawing from our panel data. Section 4 details the 
main econometric framework of this research; this framework relies on econometric 
models for panel data. The results of the estimations of these models are presented in 
Section 5. In Section 6, we briefly sketch an alternative econometric methodology 
relying on the time-aggregation of the panel. Section 7 provides a summary and 
conclusions. 
 
2. The Importation of Technology: a Survey of the Literature 
2.1. Imported Technology, Productivity Growth, and Innovation Performance 
 
The idea that imported foreign technology may affect industrial progress was 
first proposed by Caves and Uekusa (1976). They claimed that the rapid absorption of 
new technology from abroad has been a superior element to explain the expansion of 
the Japanese economy during the 1960s and 1970s. Using data on Japanese industry 
between 1958 and 1968, they estimated a model of labor productivity growth in which 
they sought to separate the influence of domestic and foreign sources of new 
knowledge. They suspected that Japan depended, for the bulk of its productivity 
gains, on flows of new technology from abroad. However, their statistical results 




Similarly, Odagiri (1983) estimated the effect of R&D and of the payment of 
royalties on sales growth in his cross-section study of 370 Japanese manufacturing 
firms. The author splits the sample in two categories: innovators (i.e. firms where the 
research intensity is above the sample average) and non-innovators (i.e. firms where 
the research intensity is below the sample average).  This study concludes that R&D 
has a significant effect on sales growth among innovators only, while the effect on 
sales growth of purchasing patent licenses is dubious. Other findings include the fact 
that innovators tend to rely on patent licenses rather than internal R&D when sales 
growth slows down, whereas, in similar circumstances, non-innovators tend to spend 
more on internal R&D.  
 
Investigating how firms in developing countries may improve their productivity 
by purchasing foreign technologies is a more recent concern. Using a panel of Indian 
firms observed from 1974 to 1981, Basant and Fikkert (1996) find that the import of 
foreign technologies has a significant positive effect on productivity growth. This 
result is consistent across models (i.e. doesn’t vary qualitatively with the specification 
of the underlying statistical model). After dividing the sample into scientific and non-
scientific groups, the authors conclude that the returns to foreign technology 
purchases are high and significant for both groups, but somewhat lower for the non-
scientific group. 
 
Lately, some empirical studies suggested that productivity should not be the 
only dependent variable of interest. Thus, Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) 
emphasized a specific aspect of organizational efficiency, namely innovation 
performance. Using a sample of 1335 Belgium manufacturing firms (from the 1993 
Eurostat Community Innovation Survey), they measure innovation performance as the 
percentage of sales that are generated by new or substantially improved products 
introduced in the past two years. They consider that Belgian firms can perform three 
                                                 
1 They argued that the weak statistical result regarding the flow of technology imports was probably 
due to a poor measure of the proxy variable (total number of imports of licensed technology by the 
Japanese industry). 
  129  different innovation activities: (1) in-house R&D, (2) acquisition of external 
technology and (3) cooperation in R&D. The authors regress their measure of 
innovation performance on various indicators of these activities, and find some 
evidence of complementarity between in-house R&D and external technology 
sourcing. We feel that the question of substitutability/complementarity between 
innovation strategies is an important one, and we examine it in greater details in the 
rest of this section. 
 
2.2. Imported Technology and R&D: Substitutability versus Complementarity 
 
The economic literature often considers the acquisition of external technology 
(at the firm, industry or country level) to be an alternative to in-house R&D. If this 
assertion is true, it raises the question of the relative effectiveness of these two 
strategies. In their empirical study on Indian firms, Basant and Fikkert (1996) 
conclude that the estimated rates of return to technology purchase were much higher 
than the estimated returns on R&D expenditure. 
 
The consequences of these comparatively higher returns to technology imports 
may lead to controversy. Link et al. (1983) state that purchasing technology is always 
accompanied by the possibility that a firm's internal capability to innovate effectively 
will be diminished, thus weakening the firm's long-run competitive stance within its 
industry. On the contrary, after underlining the comparatively high returns to foreign 
technology purchases in India, Basant and Fikkert (1996) suggest that restrictions on 
technology licensing agreements should be banned in this country. In an effort to 
stimulate internal R&D (and to increase India’s scientific independence), the Indian 
government has increased taxes on the purchase of technology. However, these taxes 
impose substantial costs on Indian firms, while forcing them to adopt a strategy that 
may prove less efficient
2. 
 
However, some degree of complementarity between R&D and the import of 
technology may also exist. Caves and Uekusa (1976) argue that firm must maintain 
                                                 
2 Basant (1993) also noted that the elasticity of R&D to a tax on technology purchase is very small. 
This implies that taxing technology purchase, while having substantial private and social costs, may not 
be an efficient way to increase internal R&D.  
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copy. Moreover, firms must generally modify and adapt foreign technology before 
putting it to use. Blumenthal (1979) suggests to distinguish between "absorptive" 
R&D (dedicated to the adoption of foreign technology) and "creative" R&D (oriented 
towards original inventions). The fact that internal R&D may contribute to firms’ 
absorptive capacity has also been stressed in Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990). 
 
Regarding empirical evidence on complementarity, Caves and Uekusa (1976) 
claim that the level and pattern of R&D in Japan in the 1960s and 1970s was closely 
related to the import of technology. Using a 1963 survey on Japanese manufacturers, 
they show that, on average, one-third of the respondents' R&D expenditures were 
used for the purpose of absorptive capacity. Blumenthal (1979) examined, in six 
industrialized countries, whether industries that largely import foreign know-how 
engage themselves in massive R&D expenditure. He finds evidence for 
complementarity in all six countries, although the strength of the relationship varies 
across countries.  
 
Using Indian industry-level data for years 1978-79, and assuming that Indian 
R&D was mainly of an adaptive nature, Katrak (1983) examines the complementarity 
between imported technology and R&D. He assumes that industries with higher 
expenditures on imported technologies use more complex foreign technologies. Two 
different types of imported technology are considered in the model: one is the 
expenditure on royalties and technical fees per enterprise; the other is the import of 
capital and non-capital equipment per enterprise. The dependent variable is the ratio 
of R&D expenditure (at the industry level) to the number of enterprises (in the 
industry). The results are twofold: (1) both types of imported technology stimulate 
R&D; (2) whatever the type of imported technology, the magnitude of the stimulation 
is weaker for the more complex technologies (i.e. in the industries where spending on 
imported technology is higher)
3. 
 
Odagiri (1983) uses a sample of 370 Japanese manufacturing firms to examine 
the relationship between the payment of royalties and R&D expenditure. The sample 
                                                 
3 See also Lall (1983) for a confirmation of the first result. 
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complementarity between the payment of royalties and R&D expenditure is found in 
the non-innovators group only. This tend to confirm Katrak (1983)’s second result at 
the firm level, if one assumes that firms importing more complex technologies can be 
considered as innovators. 
 
Siddharthan (1988) identifies two different behaviors, corresponding to private 
and public firms respectively. While the former are expected to do mainly “adaptive” 
R&D, the latter are often allotted a large R&D budget by the government and are thus 
encouraged to do “creative” R&D.  The statistical analysis based on a sample of 166 
Indian manufacturing firms in years 1983-84 shows a mild complementarity 
relationship between imported technologies and in-house R&D for private firms.  On 
the contrary, public firms show a substitution relationship. Additional results 
confirmed previous findings, according to which the complementary relationship is 
stronger in low-technology (rather than high-technology) industries. 
 
Finally, Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) suggest that the acquisition of 
external knowledge increases rather than decreases the level of R&D spending. 
Several recent studies (Arora and Gambaradella, 1990; Veugelers,1997; Veugelers 
and Cassiman, 1999; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002) have thus identified at least 
some degree of complementary between the two innovative strategies we consider 
here. Before addressing this question in the case of Taiwan, we need to examine more 
closely some methodological issues. 
 
2.3. Imported Technology versus R&D: Methodological Issues 
 
Most empirical studies about complementarity between internal R&D and the 
acquisition of external technology use cross-sectional data to regress a measure of 
R&D on a set of covariates, including a proxy for the import of technology. This 
approach is based on supermodularity (or revealed preferences) theory (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1990, 1995), which states that two practices are complementary if they are 
positively correlated. Athey and Stern (1998), however, have shown that this 
empirical approach may suffer from a severe bias. Indeed, both the decision to do 
R&D and the decision to import technology may be determined by the same 
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and the imported technology proxies on the same set of covariates, and to test for 
correlation between the error terms of the two equations. If, after including the 
relevant covariates, the errors terms are no longer correlated, then a complementarity 
relationship has been identified. 
 
Empirically, however, data limitations often make the method suggested by 
Athey and Stern (1998) difficult to implement. A solution to this problem is to rely on 
a totally different specification of the statistical (and underlying theoretical) model. 
Using OLS or 2SLS, one may thus regress a measure of output (or firms’ 
performance) on a set of explanatory variables, including a proxy for doing R&D, a 
proxy for importing technology, and a measure of the an interaction effect between 
these two practices. If the two practices are complementary, then the interaction effect 
should be positive. Complementarity also implies that the coefficient associated to the 
interaction effect should be higher than the sum of the coefficients associated to each 
one of the single practice. That is to say, complementarity may be established when 
introducing a second innovation activity together with an pre-existing one leads to a 
larger increase in the dependent variable, as compared to a situation where the second 
activity would be introduced alone (c.f. Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). Yet, if 
unobserved variables affect the adoption of the different innovation activities, then the 
estimates of the interaction effect may be biased (see Athey and Stern,1998, and 
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). The use of panel data, however, may help reduce 
unobserved heterogeneity biases. 
 
Basant and Fikkert (1996) implement a regression method on their panel of 
Indian manufacturing firms observed between 1974 and 1981, using productivity as 
the dependent variable. Using firms’ output as the dependent variable, they conclude 
that doing R&D and importing technology are substitutes. In most specifications, the 
interaction term has no significant effect, and, in some specifications, it is found to 
have a significant negative effect. As underlined in 2.2, Basant and Fikkert (1996) 
claim that this substitution effect may reflect India's current science policy, which 
tries to stimulate domestic R&D effort by regulating technology licensing. In their 
study on the determinants of innovative performance in of Belgian firms (cf. supra) 
Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) use the regression method outlined above and find 
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complementary activities. 
 
In this chapter, we intend to use a regression approach on a panel of Taiwanese 
manufacturing firms, using a measure of productivity as our dependent variable. 
However, before implementing our statistical analysis, we need to provide some 
stylized facts about innovation practices in Taiwan in the recent years. We will 
especially stress the key role imported technologies have played in the Taiwanese 
innovation effort in the 1990s. 
 
3. Importing Technology in Taiwan 
3.1. Stylized Facts 
 
Promoting the import of foreign technologies is a recent practice in Taiwan: it 
dates back from the late 1980s at most. In this study, we focus on the 1992-1995 
period, for two reasons. First, in 1990, the government pronounced the "statute for 
upgrading industries" instead of the "statute for investment promotion." This program 
is designed to enhance the competitiveness of traditional industries and to speed up 
the development of high technology industries. This policy is conducted primarily by 
promoting firms’ in-house R&D, and secondarily by encouraging firms to buy 
technology from other countries. Hence it makes sense to focus this research on the 
1990s. The second reason is more practical: the data set in this chapter, collected from 
the Bureau of Statistics in Taiwan, was not available for years 1991 and 1996. 
Moreover, the panel data prior to 1991 is generally of poor quantity (and maybe poor 
quality as well) at the firm level (cf. Appendix I: data and variables). 
 
There has been a strong increase in the overall payment for foreign technology 
in Taiwan since the late 1980s. The relative weight of firms’ in-house R&D to 
imported technology declined in Taiwan manufacturing industry, with the share of 
imported technology rising from 18.6% in 1987 to 20.6% in 1995. The U.S. and Japan 
are the main source of foreign technology, both countries contributing on average to 
over two-third of the total imported technology payments in Taiwan
4. Although a 
                                                 
4 Other sources include Germany, UK, France, Sweden, Switzerland, Netherlands and Belgium.  
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5, the most important one in the 
1990s has been technology trading and technology agreements between Taiwan and 
foreign companies. This is because, throughout past decades, Taiwan policy put little 
emphasis on technology development in manufacturing firms. Moreover, 
manufacturing firms lack experience in improving the production process and in 
creating new design. Many major Taiwanese inventions made use of patents held by 
foreign companies. Most technology agreements involve disembodied knowledge. 
This includes technological cooperation, technology licensing (such as patents, 
trademark, licenses, royalties, software and data banks) and technology instruction 
(such as designs, know-how, technical assistance, technical training, consulting and 
technical studies). 
 
In comparison with the leading industrialized countries, the level of Taiwanese 
R&D spending has been relatively small. Between 1992 and 1995, for example, the 
average level of US expenditures on R&D as a percentage of GDP was 2.54. This 
ratio was equal to 2.65 in Japan, whereas in Taiwan it was only 1.78. R&D 
expenditures by industry were small as well: R&D intensity (i.e. the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to sales) was only 0.95 during the same period. 
 
The Ministry of Economic Affairs (hereafter MOEA) in Taiwan has had a major 
influence on encouraging firm’s research and development. The Ministry has been 
actively promoting R&D in high-technology industries, by cutting taxes for firms 
involved in R&D activities. The Ministry has also provided funding to non-profit 
research institutions for international technology cooperation and assisted the transfer 
of technology to private enterprises. These measures were meant to reduce the risk of 
seeing national enterprises go and buy new technologies in the international market. 
 
In relating firms’ R&D activities in Taiwan to the existing empirical literature 
on innovation, two points must be made. First, the type of R&D that is conducted in 
Taiwan is mostly of an adaptive nature. It is quite obvious that firms R&D efforts do 
not focus on creating new technologies or new products. In the 1990s, they mainly 
tried to improve the production process, to promote product quality, to upgrade 
                                                 
5 See Bozeman and Link, (1980) and Cassiman and R. Veugelers (2002) for a description of the various 
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the domestic market. Second, compared to the Japanese experience in the 1960s, as 
described by Caves and Uekusa (1976), the R&D intensity of industry in Taiwan (i.e. 
R&D expenditures as a percentage of sales) is much lower. The overall R&D capacity 
of industry to effectively adapt complex foreign technologies could be quite limited in 
Taiwan. However, this does not imply that Taiwan's economy is not well suited to 
import technology from other countries. The key here is to distinguish between firms 
where the production process is innovation-intensive, and firms which seldom rely on 
innovation.  
 
More precisely, on the basis of the stylized facts we have outlined above, we 
will address several questions: (1) does importing technology really contribute to 
productivity growth in Taiwan? (2) Is there a complementary relationship between the 
“doing R&D” and the “importing technology” strategies in Taiwan? (3) If there is a 
complementarity relationship, how much does it contribute to the growth of 
productivity? (4) If, on the contrary, these strategies are substitutes, where does the 
substitution effect come from? To answer these questions, we will use a firm-level 
panel dataset provided by the MOEA, and described in the next sub-section. 
 
3.2. The MOEA Panel Data 
 
The administrative data set used in this chapter was collected by the Statistic 
Department of the Taiwanese MOEA. It provides plant-level observations, and covers 
the years 1992 to 1995. In Taiwan, most manufacturing firms are single-plant 
producers, so the distinction between plant and firms is not as important as in many 
industrialized countries. Thus here and elsewhere, this data will be referred to as 
“firm-level data”.  
 
Firms exiting before 1995 are left out of the observations
6. The focus of this 
chapter being on firm’s innovation activities, we consider only those firms which 
have reported innovation activities. Here, “innovation activities” include doing in-
house R&D (RD), importing technology from other countries (IT) or exporting 
                                                                                                                                            
modes of external technology acquisition. 
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activities between 1992 and 1995 are defined as innovation firms; the other firms are 
treated as non-innovation firms. After removing non-innovation firms, a total number 
of 20,836 observations from 5219 firms remained. Furthermore, the data set contains 
information on sales and inputs of labor, capital, and raw materials, which allow me 
to calculate Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for each firm. Details of the theoretical 
framework are given in the next section, which uses an extension of Solow's residual 
model. Before estimating a statistical model of productivity growth, however, some 
cleaning of the data set had to be done. First of all, observations with missing values 
had to be suppressed, to ensuring that there is the same number of observations per 
year, and to obtain a balanced sample. 
 
The rest of the clearing process was done in three steps. First , all observations 
that had missing values in any of the labor, capital, or materials variables, at the cross 
section level for firm i, were removed from the sample. 
 
In the second step, firms with extreme values of TFP growth were removed. 
This means that firms for which the growth of TFP (between any two years of the 
observation period) was either lower than -20 or higher than +20 were eliminated 
from the sample. In the third step, firms where either R&D intensity (i.e. the ratio of 
R&D expenditures to sales) or the intensity of technology imports (i.e. the ratio of 
technology imports to sales) overrun 100% were removed from the sample. Finally, I 
also eliminated those firms, which only undertook the selling of technology abroad 
but had no R&D input
7. After this cleaning process, the sample contained 4024 firms 
(i.e. 77% of the original population of innovation firms). The remaining sample seems 
to be rather representative of the initial population of innovation firms; in particular, 
the composition by industrial sector is very similar in both datasets (cf. Table 1). 
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
                                                                                                                                            
6 Here, an exit occurs  if a firm entering before or after 1992 is no longer in the data set in 1995. 
7 The firms recorded as only exporting technology  may have conducted R&D prior to 1992. However, 
the percentage of such firms in the sample is so low that they can be neglected for our purpose.  
  137  The MOEA data allows me to identify two innovation strategies over the 1992-
1995 period: (1) the “single” innovation strategy consists in relying on a single type of 
innovation activity (e.g., doing R&D or importing technology); (2) the “mixed” 
innovation strategy consists in relying (simultaneously or sequentially) on several 
innovation activities. Table 2 shows the distribution of firms in the sample and in the 
initial population by type of innovation strategy, and suggests again that the sample is 
fairly representative of the initial population. 
 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 3 gives a more detailed view of the composition of the sample by type of 
innovation strategy. Firms following the “single” innovation strategy are the most 
numerous (3326, accounting for 83% of the sample). Among this group, most firms 
(94%, i.e. 78% of the sample) only do R&D. These figures mean that in-house R&D 
is the main source of knowledge acquisition for innovation firms. The “mixed” 
innovation strategy is used by 698 firms (i.e. 17% of the sample).  
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Finally, Table 4 shows the distribution of the two innovation strategy groups 
across industrial sectors. Both strategy groups cover a broad range of manufacturing 
sectors. In the single strategy group, most firms come from the Electric and Electronic 
Machinery industry (383 firms, making up for 11.7% of this group). The Chemical 
Products industry comes second, with 300 firms accounting for 9.1% of the single 
strategy group. The third is Food industry, with 293 firms (8.9%), the fourth is the 
Textile industry, with 275 firms (8.4%), and the fifth is the Fabricated Metal Products 
industry, with 264 firms (8.1%). The first five industries represented in the mixed 
innovation strategy group are: the Electric and Electronic Machinery industry, the 
Transport Equipment industry, the Chemical Products industry, the Chemical 
Materials and the Transport Equipment industry, which sum up to over 70% of this 
group. Note that, whatever the strategy group, the Electric and Electronic Machinery 
and the Chemical Products are industries in which most of the Taiwanese innovation 
process is likely to occur. 
  138   




4. Econometric Modeling and Analysis  
 
This section is divided in three parts: in the first one, we develop an empirical 
measure of Total Factor Productivity (hereafter TFP) growth, stemming from an 
extension of Solow’s residual model. The second part is dedicated to modeling the 
effect of innovation activities on TFP growth, whereas the third part is focused on the 
effect of these activities on labor productivity growth. 
 
 
4.1 An Empirical Measure of Total Factor Productivity Growth 
 
By definition, the change in total factor productivity account for all productivity 
changes not due to changes in factors/inputs. Since inputs and outputs are directly 
observable but TFP is not, economists measure the change in TFP by turning the 
production function inside out, as is outlined below
8. Assuming that output in firm i 
can be represented by the Cobb-Douglas production function in year t, we have:  
 
(1)   
θ γ β α
it it it it it K M L C A Q . . . . =
 
where  Q represents output, C  the stock of physical capital (i.e. structures and 
equipment), L the labor input, M intermediate materials, and K denotes the stock of 
knowledge. A is a constant term; note that there is no time trend in the model: this is 
because we will introduce later a time-specific fixed effect.  
 
Following Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984), we treat the stock of knowledge 
as a distinct factor of production; by doing so, we assume that θ  represent the excess 
                                                 
8 Cf. the original model developed by Solow (1957), and its extensions by Griliches (1973), Terleckyj 
(1974), Mansfield (1980), Terleckyj (1980), Griliches & Lichtenberg (1984), Goto & Suzuki (1989). 
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Using a logarithmic transformation before differentiating Equation (2) with respect to 
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For our empirical purposes, we define the left hand-side of Equation (3.a) as the 
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. This definition is not as arbitrary as it might seem: it correspond to the “classical” 
definition of TFP with constant returns to scale. Thus, the term (µ - 1).(C /C it &
it) is not 
included in our empirical measure of TFP growth; it will be included in our regression 
model (cf. Section 4.2. below), where it will yield information on returns to scale. 
 
Empirically, the growth of TFP is calculated using the following formula, derived 
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where, for any given firm i at time t: 
  βit = (Wages)it/(Sales)it 
  γ it = (Material expenditure)it/(Sales)it  
 
  We use the following convention regarding time: the index t takes the values 1, 
2, 3, 4 as our year indicator takes the values 1992, 1993, 1994 and 1995 respectively. 
Using a measure of productivity growth (rather than a simple measure of productivity) 
imply to reduce the number of observations on each firm from T to T-1. Namely, in 
our database, the number of observations per firm goes down from four (for each year 
of the 1992-1995 period) to three (for the periods 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95). 
This leads to a total of 12072 observations on 4024 firms. 
 
4.2. A Regression Model of the Growth of Total Factor Productivity 
 
The first objective of our analysis is to estimate the impact of innovation 
activities on the growth of TFP. To achieve this objective, we design an econometric 
model using the measure of TFP growth developed in the previous sub-section as a 
dependent variable. To build our econometric model, we add a random error term, εit, 
in Equation (2): 
 
(5) 










Following Griliches and Mairesse (1984), we decompose εit into a firm-specific effect 
ui, an independent year effect (or “time fixed effect”) νt, and a transitory effect ωit 
(accounting for purely random disturbances). We thus write:  εit = ui + νt + ωit 
(cf. Griliches and Mairesse, 1984, footnote 5, p. 345).  
 
Differentiating, with respect to time t, the log transform of Equation (5) eliminates the 
firm-specific effect and we get: 
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where  it ω & = ωi(t+1) – ωit is a set of moving-average errors and where t ν & = νt+1 – νt.  
 
 
Substituting Equation (3.b) in Equation (6.a) yields:  
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Now, it comes from Equation (1) that θ is the elasticity of output with respect to the 
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Substituting Equation (7) into Equation (6.b) and rearranging terms leads to: 
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The term ρ denotes the marginal product of (or rate of return to) knowledge, which 
can be interpreted as the contribution of the change in the stock of knowledge to the 
















where RDit denotes R&D expenditures for firm i in year t, and δ denotes the average 
rate of depreciation of knowledge. Equation (9) simply means that knowledge is put 
to practical use in the firms’ R&D effort. Griliches (1973), Terleckyi (1980), and 
  142  Griliches & Lichtenberg (1984) assume that δ is close to zero, which allows them to 
express the growth of TFP as a function of R&D intensity. This can be done by 
setting δ = 0 in Equation (9) and substituting in Equation (8): 
 













ω ν µ ρ & &
& &
+ + − + = ) 1 ( . 
 
In the present study, however, the knowledge used in the firm’s innovation 
process may have two possible sources: in-house R&D on the one hand, and 
acquisition of foreign technology on the other hand. Assuming the rate of depreciation 
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, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 
 
where RDit denotes, as previously, the R&D expenditures of firm i at time t, and ITit 
denotes the spending on foreign (imported) technologies. 
 
If parameter p is equal to one, then firm i will belong to the single innovation 
strategy group, and will use only in-house R&D to acquire knowledge. This case is 
equivalent to the one described by Equation (10), and correspond to the models 
developed in Griliches (1973), Terleckyi (1980), or Griliches & Lichtenberg (1984). 
If parameter p is equal to zero, then firm i will belong to the single innovation strategy 
group, and will only import foreign knowledge. In that case, the model of TFP growth 
is again reduced to a single-input model, with ITit in the place of RDit. 
 
However, we want to estimate the most general model, where p can take any 
value between 0 and 1 (values 0 and 1 leading to the special cases aforementioned). 
This general model is obtained by substituting Equation (11) in Equation (8): 
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  143  where ρ1 = ρ.p and ρ2 = ρ.(1 - p). The term  it ω & , defined as a set of moving-average 
errors  ωi(t+1) - ωit, is iid and satisfies the usual assumptions of the Gauss-Markov 
theorem. It is thus reasonable to estimate Equation (12) by the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) method. 
 
After estimating Equation (12), we try another specification in order to check for 
interaction effects between innovation practices: 
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The results of both estimations are given in Section 5. 
 
 
4.3. Modeling Labor Productivity Growth 
 
To draw a comparison of sorts, we extend our analysis by estimating the effect 
of an increase in the knowledge input on labor productivity growth. The reasons for 
choosing labor productivity as the dependent variable are twofold: first, the goods 
produced in Taiwan are rather labor-intensive (compared to older industrialized 
countries), even in the high-technology industries. Second, there is a specific 
relationship between knowledge and labor, as inputs in a production function: indeed, 
a significant part of knowledge may be embodied in the (high-skilled) labor force.  
 
We start from a conventional production function, where, for a given firm i in 
year t, Q is the output, and where C denotes the stock of physical capital, L the labor 
input, M the intermediate materials, and K the stock of knowledge: 
 
(14)  Qit = f(Cit, Lit, Mit, Kit). 
 
Assuming f is a standard Cobb-Douglas function and dividing all factors by Lit yields: 
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where no assumption is made on returns to scale. 
 
We define cit = Cit/Lit and mit = Mit/Lit. Applying a logarithmic transformation 
to the right hand-side terms of Equation (15) leads to the equality: 
 
(16) Log(Qit) – (α + β + γ + θ).Log(Lit) = Log A + α.Log(cit)  
+ γ.Log(mit) + θ.Log(Kit) – θ.Log(Lit)  
 
which can be rearranged as : 
 
( ) ) Log(L . 1 ) Log(K . ) Log(m . ) Log(c . Log ) ( Log (17) it it it it − + + + + = µ θ γ α A qit  
 
where qit = Qit/Lit denotes labor productivity and where µ = α + β + γ. 
 
We now add a random error term εit to the right hand-side of Equation (17); this 
term is the sum of a firm-specific effect ui, a time specific effect νt, and a transitory 
effect ωit. Differentiating this “augmented” Equation (17) allows us to eliminate the 
first specific effect, leading to the econometric model: 
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where  it ω &  = ωi(t+1) - ωit is a set of moving-average errors and where t ν & = νt+1 – νt. 
Substituting Equations (7) and (11) in Equation (18) gives the final econometric 
model to be estimated: 
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  145  In this model, no constraint is put on (µ -1). Alternatively, we could have set 
µ = 1, which, by definition of µ, is equivalent to assuming constant returns to scales 
for all factors except knowledge (α + β + γ = 1). However, preliminary calculations 
provided no evidence of such constant returns to scale, which invited us to let (µ -1) 
free. As in section 4.2., after estimating Equation  (19), we tried an alternative 
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Again, the results of both estimations (by Ordinary Least Squares) are provided in the 
following section. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
 
Table 5 provides the means and standard deviations of all variables for the 
whole sample (12072 observations on 4024 firms), the “single strategy” sub-sample 
(9978 observations on 3326 firms), and the “mixed strategy” sub-sample (2094 
observations on 698 firms). These two sub-samples correspond, respectively, to firms 
which adopted, over the observation period, the “single” and “mixed” innovations 
strategies, as defined in Section 3.2. We now introduce more details, as the “single 
innovation strategy” sub-sample has been furthermore divided in two groups: the first 
one regroups firms that rely on R&D only (9423 observations on 3141 firms), and the 
second one gathers firms that rely on IT only (555 observations on 185 firms).   
 
The models without interaction effect (Equations (12), Section 4.2. and (19), 
section 4.3.) are estimated on the whole sample, on the mixed-strategy sub-sample 
and on the two single-strategy groups (RD only and IT only). In these two groups, 
Equation (12) and (19) are adapted to include only the relevant strategy (R&D or IT). 
The models with interaction effect (Equations (13), Section 4.2. and (20), section 4.3.) 
are estimated on the whole sample and the mixed-strategy sub-sample. Moreover, 
every regression incorporate 16 industry dummies in order to control for differences 
  146  in technological opportunities across industries (more detail about these industry 
dummies can be found in Appendix II). 
 
Insert Table 5 about here 
 
5.2 The Effect of Innovation Strategies on TFP Growth 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the estimation of Equation (12). Columns (1) 
display the results using the full sample of 12072 observations from 4024 firms. 
Columns (2) and Column (3) present the estimates of Equation (12) for the R&D-only 
and IT-only strategies, respectively. Column (4) present the estimates of Equation 
(12) for the mixed strategy sub-sample. Here, as in subsequent tables, standard errors 
are given in brackets. The time fixed effect is denoted by a set of three dummy 
variables (ν92-93, ν93-94, ν94-95) indicating the period of growth (1992-93, 1993-94 and 
1994-95 respectively), period 1992-93 being the reference. It is strongly significant 
and fairly stable across columns. Moreover, the estimated value of µ - 1  (i.e.  the 
parameter associated to the growth of the capital input) is always negative, which 
pleads for decreasing returns to scale in our production function.  
 
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
In Table 6, internal R&D has a significant positive effect on the growth of total 
factor productivity across all the specifications where it had been included. The 
returns to R&D expenditure are similar in the whole sample and in the “R&D-only” 
group (parameters being equal to 3.8 and 3.1 respectively). However, in the “mixed 
strategy” sub-sample, the effect of R&D intensity is twice as high as in the other 
groups. Although this result is rather difficult to interpret, it suggests that firms from 
this group may use R&D both as a source of new knowledge and as a mean to absorb 
recently acquired foreign knowledge. 
 
However, the coefficient associated to IT intensity is significant in the whole 
sample (and at the 10% level) only. The import of technology activity has no 
significant effect in any of the other specifications where it had been included. It thus 
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the comparatively strong effect of R&D in the mixed strategy group, the results 
regarding IT suggest that the importation of technology may be successful in Taiwan 
if and only if a significant amount of (absorptive) R&D is conducted simultaneously 
or sequentially. Overall, our results would thus plead for complementarity between 
both innovation strategies. In order to examine these questions somewhat further, we 
included an interaction effect in our model of TFP growth (Equation (13), Section 
4.2.). The estimates of this interacted model are given in Table 7. 
 
Insert Table 7 about here 
 
The model with interaction effect is estimated using the whole sample and the 
mixed strategy sub-sample. The mixed strategy sub-sample is furthermore divided in 
three groups: traditional industries, basic industries and high-technology industries 
(cf.  Appendix III for details of the coding). The interaction effect is significantly 
positive in the whole sample and in High-Tech industries group. The effect of R&D 
intensity remains strongly positive in all groups, where IT intensity is insignificant in 
all groups. Overall, the results presented in Table 7 are consistent with the possible 
existence of complementarities between R&D and the importation of technology. This 
tends to be comforted when the estimate of the interacted effect is compared to the 
sum of the parameter estimates of  R&D and IT respectively (cf. Section 2.3.): the 
former is higher than the later in the whole sample, the mixed strategy sub-sample and 
the high-technology industries. 
 
5.3. The Effect of Innovation Strategies on Labor Productivity Growth 
 
In a newly industrialized country such as Taiwan, production is generally more 
labor-intensive than in western economies. As a consequence, innovation may have a 
stronger effect on Labor Productivity (hereafter LP) growth than on the growth of 
FTP. The models described by Equation (19) and (20) allow us to investigate this idea 
a bit further. Table 8 presents the results of estimating Equation (19) on the whole 
sample, on the R&D-only and IT-only groups, and on the mixed strategy sub-sample. 
 
  148  Insert Table 8 about here 
 
The R&D intensity variable has a strongly significant positive effect in all the 
specifications where it was included; this effect is slightly stronger in the mixed 
strategy sub-sample. The effect of IT intensity is also significantly positive wherever 
the variable was included, although its effect is lower than that of R&D intensity in 
specifications where both variables appear. Moreover, the growth of the Capital to 
Labor ratio ( c c & ) has a strong significant effect in all groups. The same is true of the 
growth of the Material to Labor ratio ( m m & ), except in the “IT only” group, where it 
is insignificant. Similarly, the growth of the Labor input ( L L & ) has a strongly 
significant negative effect on the growth of labor productivity in all groups except “IT 
only”. These results may highlight a specific behavior of firms which base their 
knowledge acquisition on the importation of technology only; interpreting this result 
more extensively seems difficult and would require more detailed data on those firms.  
 
The strong significant effect of both R&D intensity and IT intensity in the 
whole sample and in the “mixed strategy” sub-sample” suggests that 
complementarities between both innovation strategies may be strong in Taiwanese 
firms. This may be the case, more specifically, in “mixed strategy” firms. However, 
the significant and positive effects of R&D intensity and IT intensity in the two 
“single strategy” groups suggest that it is possible for Taiwanese firms to innovate 
using only one of these strategies; thus, some degree of substitutability between them 
may exist.  
 
Again, we investigate the matter more deeply by introducing an interaction 
effect in the model, and by regressing Equation (20) on the whole sample and on the 
mixed strategy sub-sample. As in the previous section, the mixed strategy sub-sample 
is divided in 3 groups describing the type of industry (traditional, basic and high-
tech). The results of these estimations are given in Table 9. 
 
Insert Table 9 about here 
 
  149  The introduction of an interaction effect yields interesting results when we look 
inside the three industry-specific groups. In traditional industries, both R&D intensity 
and IT intensity have a strong positive effect on LP growth. The interaction term, 
however, has a strongly significant negative  effect, which suggests that the two 
innovation strategies are used as substitutes in these industries. In High Tech 
industries, the situation is quite different: the R&D intensity variable has a strongly 
significant positive effect, whereas the  IT intensity variable is insignificant. The 
significant positive effect of the interaction term in this group suggests that 
complementarities between in-house R&D and the importation of technology may 
prevail in Taiwanese High Tech industries. Again, the estimate of the interacted effect 
is larger than the sum of the respective parameter estimates of R&D and IT in the 
whole population, the “mixed strategy” sub-sample, and the high-technology 
industries. 
 
6. Comparative analysis based on time-aggregated data 
 
  This section proposes a comparative analysis based on an alternative approach 
to our panel data: since the observation period is very short, we average our variables 
over time rather than using the panel structure of our data. The innovation strategies 
are defined as in Section 3.2: we identified firms that were consistent over the time 
period in their choices of innovation strategy: only doing R&D, only importing 
technology or rely on both activities.  
 
6.1. Estimation strategy and summary statistics in the time-aggregate analysis 
  
In the time-aggregate framework, the econometric equations to be estimated 
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where εi is a normally-distributed residual. As in the panel approach, no constraint is 
put on µ -1. 
 
As in Section 5, the models without interaction effect are estimated on the 
whole sample (4024 firms), on the mixed-strategy sub-sample (698 firms) and on the 
two single-strategy groups (RD only and IT only), which account for 3141 and 185 
firms respectively. In these last two groups, Equations (21) and (23) are adapted to 
include only the relevant strategy (R&D or IT). The models with interaction effect 
(Equations (22) and (24)) are estimated on the whole sample and the mixed-strategy 
sub-sample only. The mixed strategy sub-sample, however, is divided into three 
categories: traditional, basic, and high-technology industries (cf.  Appendix III for 
details). Every OLS regression incorporate the same 16 industry dummies as before 
(c.f. Appendix II). Table 10 provides summary statistics for all variables in the whole 
sample and in the various sub-samples 
 
Insert Table 10 about here 
 
6.2. Innovation Strategies and time-averaged TFP Growth 
 
Table 11 presents the results of the estimation of Equation (21) on the time-
aggregate data. Columns (1) display the results using the full sample of 4024 
observations. Columns (2), (3) and (4) present the estimates for the R&D only, IT 
only and mixed strategy sub-samples respectively. Since the regressions are run on 
time-aggregated (i.e. cross-section data), there was no point in using a time 
fixed-effect here. 
 
Insert Table 11 about here 
 
  In Table 11, the coefficient associated to R&D intensity  has no significant 
effect on the growth of total factor productivity in the whole sample; it is significant 
in the “mixed-strategy” sub-sample only, where its value is also much higher than in 
  151  the other sub-groups. Although their overall significance is less than in the panel 
approach, the values of the coefficient associated to R&D expenditures in the time-
aggregate framework are quite close to those identified in the panel approach. For 
instance, in the mixed strategy sub-sample, they are equal to 7.24 in the panel 
approach and to 5.26 in the time-aggregate approach. The results regarding the 
coefficient associated to IT intensity are even more disappointing: this variable has no 
significant effect in any group. These comparatively poor results are not so surprising, 
however, since the time-aggregate approach does not allow for a precise control for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
Insert Table 12 about here 
 
  The results of the model with interaction effect (Equation (22)) are presented 
in Table 12 As in Table 11, the R&D intensity variable is significant in the mixed 
strategy sub-sample only, and the IT intensity variable is overall insignificant. The 
interaction effect, however, is strongly significant (and positive) in the whole sample. 
Moreover, its estimate is much higher than the sum of the coefficients associated to 
R&D and IT respectively, which suggest that there may be some degree of 
complementarity between both innovation activities. This finding is consistent with 
the results of the panel analysis presented in Section 5.2. 
 
6.3. Innovation Strategies and time-averaged Labor Productivity growth 
 
Table 13 presents the results of the estimation of Equation (23) on the whole 
sample, on the R&D-only and IT-only groups, and on the mixed strategy sub-sample. 
The R&D intensity variable has a strongly significant positive effect in all groups; this 
effect is slightly stronger in the mixed strategy sub-sample, which is consistent with 
the results from the panel data analysis (cf. Table 8 in Section 5.3). As in the previous 
sub-section, however, the effect of IT intensity remains insignificant in all groups.  
 
Insert Table 13 about here 
 
  152  We find some additional results regarding the control variables: thus, the 
growth of both the Capital to Labor ratio ( c c & ) and the Material to Labor ratio ( m m & ) 
has a significantly positive effect in all groups. The growth of the Labor input ( L L & ) 
has a strongly significant negative effect on the growth of labor productivity in the 
whole sample and in the “R&D-only” subsample, but is insignificant in the “IT-only” 
and “mixed strategy” sub-samples. These results totally confirm the result from the 
panel data analysis presented in Section 5.3. 
  
  The introduction of an interaction effect in the model (Equation (24)) does not 
alter the strongly significant, positive effect of R&D intensity in the whole sample and 
in the mixed strategy sub-sample, as can be seen in Table 14. Moreover, the R&D 
intensity variable is also significant in the High-Tech industries, where it increases the 
growth of TFP. On the contrary, the effect of the IT intensity variable is overall 
insignificant. These findings on the growth of labor productivity echoes those on the 
growth of TFP presented in the previous subs-section. 
 
Insert Table 14 about here 
 
The interaction term has a significant positive effect in the same groups as the 
R&D intensity variable, i.e. in the whole sample, the mixed strategy sub-sample and 
the high-tech industries. Again, this result suggests the potential presence of 
complementarities between in-house R&D and the importation of technology, all the 
more since the estimate of the interacted effect is much higher than the sum of the 
coefficients associated to each of the single innovation activities. To put it in a 
nutshell, the evidence of complementarity that we found in this study is maybe no 
definitive, but is nonetheless rather robust, as it holds both in the panel approach and 




The objective of this chapter was to evaluate the impact of innovation strategies 
on firms’ productivity in Taiwan, using a panel of 5219 innovation firms on the 1992-
1995 period. Two measures of productivity were used: first, total factor productivity 
  153  (TFP), and, second, labor productivity (LP). The rationale for using LP is that, for 
similar industries, the goods produced in Taiwan may be, on the average, more labor-
intensive than those produced in Western economies. 
 
Most existing studies on the effect of innovation on firm’s activities only take 
into account R&D; very few of them consider alternative innovation strategies 
(among these exceptions are: Basant and Fikkert, 1996; Cassiman & Veugelers, 
2002). In this chapter, two innovation strategies are considered: doing R&D on the 
one hand, and importing technology (IT) on the other. These strategies may be used 
simultaneously or as alternatives. In other words, firms may either rely on a single 
strategy, or combine both strategies, in order to innovate. A secondary objective of the 
chapter is precisely to shed some light on the relationship between these strategies: is 
there complementarity or substitutability? The matter is of importance, since it is 
related to current industrial and science policy issues in Taiwan. 
 
To achieve our goals, we built and estimate a model of productivity growth, 
using first TFP and second LP as the dependent variable. Regressions are run first on 
the whole sample, then on firms which use a single strategy (either only doing R&D 
or only importing technology) over the period, and finally on firms who adopt a 
mixed strategy (i.e. using more than one strategy over the period). Our main 
econometric framework made use of the panel structure of our data; however, we 
complemented it with a cross-sectional approach relying on the time-averaged values 
of our variables. Both methods yield consistent results.   
 
Our main findings are twofold: 
(1)  The intensity of R&D has a strongly significant positive effect on both TFP and 
LP growth, in all specifications where it was included. 
(2)  Overall, the intensity of IT has a weak or insignificant effect on the growth of 
TFP, but a strong positive effect on the growth of LP. 
 
As this called for more investigation, we added an interaction effect (RD*IT) in 
our models of productivity growth. The regressions were run on the whole sample and 
on the “mixed strategy” sub-sample; the latter being further divided into three groups: 
traditional, basic and high-tech industries. We found interesting results, depending on 
  154  which type of industry is taken into consideration : in High Tech industries, the effect 
of R&D intensity on both TFP and LP growth is strongly positive, whereas IT 
intensity has no significant effect. The interaction effect being significantly positive, 
we conclude to the possible existence of complementarity between innovation 
activities in Taiwan’s High-Tech industries. This conclusion echoes the findings of 
some recent studies conducted on the same topic. These studies cover Western and 
Japanese biotechnology firms (Arora and Gambaradella, 1990), as well as Belgian 
innovation firms (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002). 
 
Moreover, when looking specifically at the growth of labor productivity, the 
interaction effect appears to be strongly negative in the “traditional industry” group, 
whereas both R&D intensity and IT intensity have positive effects. This result 
suggests that traditional Taiwanese industries may use the two innovation strategies as 
substitutes rather than complements. 
 
Our industry-specific results have several implications regarding Taiwan 
science and technology policy. Learning from Japan’s experience of modernization by 
rapid absorption of foreign knowledge in the 1960s and 1970s, the Taiwanese 
government encouraged national “traditional” firms to upgrade their production 
process by importing technology. According to our results, this policy may lead 
traditional firms to abandon R&D activities if purchasing foreign knowledge appears 
as a less expensive alternative. Another part of Taiwan’s national science policy is 
concerned with high-technology firms, in which in-house R&D has recently been 
strongly encouraged. Our empirical results suggest that this policy may well be 
relevant, since, in High Tech industries, R&D appears, at the very least, as a potent 
and useful complement to the importation of technology, and, at most, as the main 
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  157  Table 1: distribution of innovative firms across industries (sample versus original population) 
Sample (4024 firms)  Original (5219 firms)  Code 
 
Manufacturing Sector 
Number % Number % 
11  Food  337 8.4* 490 9.4* 
13  Textile  311 7.7* 365 7.0* 
14  Wearing apparel & 
accessories 
53 1.3 69 1.3 
15  Leather, Fur & Products  61  1.5  76  1.5 
16  Wood, Bamboo Products  24  0.6  30  0.6 
17  Furniture  115 2.9 144 2.8 
18 Paper,  Pulp  88  2.2  115  2.2 
19  Print  38 0.9 61 1.2 
21  Chemical  Materials  197 4.9 238 4.6 
22  Chemical  Products  382 9.5* 441 8.4* 
23  Petroleum & Coal Products  6  0.1  7  0.1 
24  Rubber  Product  60 1.5 75 1.4 
25  Plastic  Products  234 5.8 298 5.7 
26  Non-Metal Miner Products  181  4.5  249  4.8 
27  Basic  Metal  207 5.1 258 4.9 
28  Fabricated Metal Products  301  7.5*  413  7.9* 
29  Machinery & Equipment  288  7.2*  414  7.9* 
31  Electric & Electronic 
Machinery 
566 14.1* 731 14.0* 
32  Transport  Equipment  307 7.6* 400 7.7* 
33  Precision  Instrument  109 2.7 139 2.7 
39  Miscellaneous  Industry  159 4.0 206 3.9 
Total  4024 100 5219 100 
Note: a * denotes that the industry is one of the seven most important in terms of % of the total. 
 
Table 2: composition by type of innovation strategy (sample and original data) 
Innovation strategy (1992-1995)  Sample (4024 firms)  Original (5219 firms) 
  Number % Number % 
Single strategy (I+II)  3326  83%  4391  84% 
  I. R&D only  3141  78%   4143  79% 
  II. Importing Technology only  185  5%   248  5% 
III. Mixed Strategy  698  17%  828  16% 
Total  (I+II+III)  4024 100% 5219 100% 
 
Table 3: detailed composition of the sample by type of innovation strategy 
Innovation strategy (1992-1995)  Number   % 
Group I: Single Innovation Strategy  3326  81% 
I  Only doing internal R&D   3101  77%  
II  Both internal R&D & Exporting Technology  40  1%  
III  Only import technology from other countries  178  4.9%  
IV  Both Importing & Exporting Technology  7  0.2%  
Group II: Mixed Innovation Strategy  698  19% 
V  Both internal R&D & Importing Technology  647  16%  
VI  R&D, Importing and Exporting Technology.  51  1.3%  
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Table 4: distribution of sampled firms across industries by type of innovation strategy  
Single Strategy  Mixed Strategy  Code Manufacturing  Sector 
Number % Number % 
11 Food  293  8.93*  44  5.90* 
13 Textile  275  8.38*  36  4.83 
14  Wearing apparel & 
accessories 
51 1.55  2  0.26 
15  Leather, Fur & Products  53  1.61  8  1.07 
16  Wood, Bamboo Products  23  0.70  1  0.13 
17 Furniture  110  3.35  5  0.67 
18  Paper,  Pulp  74 2.25 14 1.87 
19 Print  32  1.10  6  0.80 
21 Chemical  Materials  137  4.17  60  8.05* 
22 Chemical  Products  300  9.14*  82  11.0* 
23  Petroleum & Coal Products  5  0.15  1  0.13 
24  Rubber  Product  41 1.25 19 2.55 
25 Plastic  Products  210  6.40  24  3.22 
26  Non-Metal Miner Products  152  4.63  29  3.89 
27 Basic  Metal  178  5.42  29  3.89 
28  Fabricated Metal Products  264  8.05*  37  4.96 
29  Machinery & Equipment  248  7.56  40  5.36 
31  Electric & Electronic 
Machinery 
383 11.68* 183 24.56* 
32 Transport  Equipment  215  6.55  92  12.34* 
33  Precision  Instrument  92 2.80 17 2.28 
39 Miscellaneous  Industry  143  4.36  16  2.14 
Total 3279  100  745  100 
Note: a * denotes that the industry is one of the five most important in terms of % of the total. 
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Variables  All firms  Single strategy  Mixed strategy 
    R&D only  IT only   
  Mean (Std Dev.)  Mean (Std Dev.)  Mean (Std Dev.)  Mean (Std Dev.) 
TFP growth  -1.26 (3.07)  -1.27 (3.09)  -1.17 (3.49)  -1.22 (2.89) 
        
Labor Productivity 
(q) growth 
0.20 (1.06)  0.21 (1.11)  0.21 (0.91)  0.17 (0.85) 
        
Capital/Labor (c) 
growth 
0.72 (3.15)  0.77 (3.36)  0.64 (2.66)  0.48 (2.16) 
        
Material/Labor (m) 
growth 
3.64 (9.51)  3.68 (9.68)  3.85 (10.2)  3.42 (8.50) 
        
Labor (L) growth  0.12 (1.14)  0.12 (1.20)  0.20 (1.25)  0.10 (0.82) 
        
Capital (C) growth  0.59 (2.67)  0.63 (2.83)  0.61 (2.70)  0.44 (1.78) 
        
R&D intensity 
(RD/Sales) 
0.02 (0.04)  0.02 (0.05)  -  0.026 (0.06) 
        
IT intensity 
(IT/Sales) 
0.002(0.02)  --  0.02 (0.06)  0.01 (0.04) 
        
ET dummy  0.02 (0.15)  0.03 (0.11)  0.04 (0.19)  0.07 (0.26) 
        
D1  0.083 (0.27)  0.091 (0.29)  0.065 (0.25)  0.057 (0.23) 
D2  0.077 (0.26)  0.085 (0.28)  0.043 (0.20)  0.051 (0.22) 
D3  0.062 (0.24)  0.073 (0.26)  0.049 (0.22)  0.018 (0.14) 
D4  0.031 (0.17)  0.031 (0.17)  0.059 (0.24)  0.026 (0.16) 
D5  0.048 (0.21)  0.042 (0.20)  0.032 (0.18)  0.083 (0.28) 
D6  0.096 (0.29)  0.091 (0.28)  0.114 (0.32)  0.113 (0.32) 
D7  0.014 (0.12)  0.012 (0.11)  0.016 (0.13)  0.027 (0.16) 
D8  0.058 (0.23)  0.063 (0.24)  0.076 (0.26)  0.032 (0.17) 
D9  0.044 (0.20)  0.048 (0.21)  0.032 (0.18)  0.034 (0.18) 
D10  0.051 (0.22)  0.054 (0.23)  0.038 (0.19)  0.042 (0.20) 
D11  0.074 (0.26)  0.080 (0.27)  0.097 (0.30)  0.047 (0.21) 
D12  0.071 (0.25)  0.075 (0.26)  0.070 (0.26)  0.056 (0.23) 
D13  0.140 (0.34)  0.120 (0.33)  0.102 (0.30)  0.239 (0.43) 
D14  0.076 (0.26)  0.060 (0.23)  0.151 (0.36)  0.129 (0.34) 
D15  0.027 (0.16)  0.029 (0.16)  0.011 (0.10)  0.024 (0.15) 
D16  0.039 (0.19)  0.043 (0.20)  0.043 (0.20)  0.020 (0.14) 
        
Observations 12072 9423  555  2094 
 
  160  Table 6: parameter estimates of the TFP Growth regression model (no interaction effect) 
Single Strategy  Variables  All firms  
(1)  Only RD (2)  Only IT (3) 
Mixed Strategy  
(4) 
RD intensity  3.81 (0.46)***  3.04 (0.53)***  -  7.24 (0.87)*** 
IT intensity  1.84 (1.03)*  -  1.45 (2.02)  1.44 (1.22) 
C C &   -0.38 (0.008)***  -0.38 (0.009)***  -0.34 (0.05)***  -0.46 (0.03)*** 
ν93-94  -0.62 (0.05)***  -0.62 (0.06)***  -0.86 (0.31)***  -0.51 (0.11)*** 
ν94-95  -0.34 (0.05)***  -3.33 (0.06)***  -3.57 (0.31)***  -3.81 (0.11)*** 
ν92-93 (ref.)  - -  -  . 
ET dummy  0.05 (0.15)  -0.09 (0.23)  0.46 (0.73)  0.15 (0.18) 
D1  0.10 (0.09)  0.12 (0.09)  -0.30 (0.56)  -0.03 (0.21) 
D2  0.30 (0.09)***  0.24 (0.10)**  0.62 (0.64)  0.57 (0.22)*** 
D3  0.36 (0.10)***  0.31 (0.10)***  0.85 (0.61)  0.73 (0.36)** 
D4  0.15 (0.13)  0.07 (0.15)  0.29 (0.57)  0.49 (0.30 
D5  0.04 (0.11)  -0.05 (0.13)  0.50 (0.73)  0.24 (0.18) 
D6  0.49 (0.08)***  0.51 (0.10)***  1.07 (0.42)**  0.28 (0.16)* 
D7  0.13 (0.19)  0.45 (0.24)*  -1.30 (1.01)  -0.26 (0.30) 
D8  0.14 (0.10)  0.12 (0.11)  -0.05 (0.50)  0.39 (0.27) 
D9  0.43 (0.11)***  0.44 (0.12)***  0.26 (0.74)  0.43 (0.26) 
D10  0.06 (0.11)  0.09 (0.12)  -0.49 (0.68)  0.02 (0.24) 
D11  -0.01 (0.09)  -0.05 (0.10)  0.70 (0.45)  -0.07 (0.23) 
D12  0.27 (0.91)***  0.28 (0.10)***  0.90 (0.51)*  0.008 (0.21) 
D13  0.28 (0.07)***  0.27 (0.09)***  0.65 (0.44)  0.22 (0.12)* 
D14  0.24 (0.09)***  0.24 (0.11)**  0.95 (0.37)**  0.07 (0.15) 
D15(ref.)  - -  -  - 
D16   0.14 (0.12)  0.18 (0.13)  -1.26 (0.64)*  0.52 (0.34) 
2 R   0.44 0.43  0.36  0.53 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.44 0.43  0.34  0.53 
Observations 12072  9423  555  2235 
Numbers in brackets are standard errors. Significance levels are: *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
For a complete description of the industry dummies, see Appendix II. 
 
  161  Table 7: parameter estimates of the TFP Growth regression model with interaction effect 
















3.67 (0.47)***  6.9 (0.93)***  11.41 (1.78)***  10.38 
(2.86)*** 
4.95 (1.16)*** 
IT intensity  0.81 (1.19)  0.40 (1.57)  2.73 (5.71)  -2.28 (2.96)  2.01 (2.10) 
RD int* IT int  13.23 (7.47)*  8.25 (7.80)  -31.75 (51.61)  -2.73 (15.0)  17.88 (9.73)* 




-0.39 (0.05)***  -0.67 
(0.07)*** 
-0.43 (0.03)*** 




-0.57 (0.19)***  -0.36 
(0.18)** 
-0.490 (0.17)*** 




-3.66 (0.20)***  -3.73 
(0.18)*** 
-3.85 (0.17)*** 
ν92-93 (ref.)  - -  -  -  - 
ET dummy  0.05 (0.15)  0.16 (0.18)  -0.03 (0.37)  0.46 (0.41)  0.04 (0.24) 
D1  0.10 (0.08)  -0.02  (0.21)  (ref.)     
D2 0.30  (0.09)***  0.57 
(0.22)*** 
0.47 (0.22)**     
D3  0.36 (0.10)***  0.73 (0.36)**  0.66 (0.34)**     
D4  0.16 (0.13)  0.51 (0.30)*  0.30 (0.29)     
D5  0.04 (0.11)  0.24 (0.18)    (ref.)   
D6  0.49 (0.08)***  0.33 (0.16)*    0.23 (0.19)*   
D7  0.12 (0.19)  -0.27 (0.30)    -0.28 (0.32)   
D8  0.14 (0.10)  0.39 (0.27))    0.34 (0.30)   
D9  0.43 (0.11)***  0.44 (0.26)*  0.30 (0.25)     
D10  0.06 (0.11)  0.03 (0.24)    0.01 (0.26)   
D11  -0.01 (0.09)  - 0.06 (0.23)    -0.12 (0.25)   
D12  0.27 (0.09)***  0.02 (0.21)      0.07 (0.23) 
D13  0.28 (0.07)***  0.24 (0.13)**      0.30 (0.15)** 
D14  0.24 (0.09)***  0.08 (0.15)      0.10 (0.17) 
D15  (ref.)  (ref.)      (ref.) 
D16   0.14 (0.12)  0.53 (0.34)  0.36 (0.32)     
2 R   0.44 0.53  0.56  0.51  0.55 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.44 0.53  0.55  0.50  0.54 
Observations 12072  2094  435  720  939 
Number reported in parentheses are standard errors. Significance levels are: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
Note: the industry dummies that are not relevant for a given industry group (traditional, basic and high-




  162  Table 8: parameter estimates of the LP growth regression model (no interaction effect) 
 Single strategy   Variables  All firms  
(1)  RD only (2)  IT only (3) 
Mixed strategy  
(4) 
c c &   0.06 (0.003)***  0.05 (0.003)***  0.08 (0.01)***  0.04 (0.01)*** 
m m &   0.02 (0.001)***  0.02 (0.001)***  0.006 (0.004)  0.02 (0.003)*** 
L L &   -0.09 (0.01)***  -0.09 (0.01)***  -0.07 (0.03)**  -0.09 (0.02)*** 
RD intensity  2.58 (0.19)***  2.20 (0.23)***  -  4.13 (0.33)*** 
IT intensity  1.21 (0.42)***  -  1.75 (0.60)***  0.56 (0.46) 
ν93-94  0.04 (0.02)*  0.05 (0.03)**  -0.05 (0.09)  -0.01 (0.04) 
ν94-95  -0.18 (0.03)***  -0.17 (0.03)***  -0.08 (0.10)  -0.26 (0.05)*** 
ν92-93 (ref.)  - -  -  - 
ET dummy  0.05 (0.06)  0.02 (0.10)  0.33 (0.21)  0.05 (0.07) 
D1  0.07 (0.04)**  0.06 (0.04)  0.06 (0.17)  0.11 (0.08) 
D2  0.12 (0.04)***  0.12 (0.04)***  0.15 (0.19)  0.10 (0.08) 
D3  0.16 (0.04)***  0.16 (0.04)***  0.24 (0.18)  0.06 (0.13) 
D4  0.03 (0.05)  0.01 (0.07)  -0.10 (0.17)  0.17 (0.11) 
D5  0.09 (0.04)**  0.07 (0.06)  0.07 (0.21)  0.15 (0.07)** 
D6  0.11 (0.03)***  0.11 (0.04)***  0.35 (0.12)***  0.06 (0.06) 
D7  0.11 (0.08)  0.19 (0.10)*  0.10 (0.30)  -0.03 (0.11) 
D8  0.13 (0.04)***  0.15 (0.047)***  0.07 (0.15)  0.02 (0.10) 
D9  0.18 (0.05)***  0.21 (0.53)***  -0.01 (0.22)  0.04 (0.10) 
D10  0.08 (0.04)*  0.08 (0.05)  0.16 (0.20)  0.07 (0.09) 
D11  0.08 (0.04)**  0.07 (0.04)*  0.20 (0.13)  0.03 (0.09) 
D12  0.16 (0.04)***  0.14 (0.04)***  0.10 (0.15)  0.30 (0.08)*** 
D13  0.11 (0.03)***  0.11 (0.04)***  0.19 (0.13)  0.09 (0.05)* 
D14  0.04 (0.04)  0.08 (0.05)  0.16 (0.11)  -0.05 (0.06) 
D15 (ref.) -  -  -  - 
D16  0.03 (0.05)  0.02 (0.06)  0.06 (0.19)  0.10 (0.13) 
2 R   0.11 0.11  0.15  0.15 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.11 0.10  0.12  0.15 
Obs. 12072  9423  555  2094 
Standard errors are reported in brackets. Significance levels are: *10%, **5%, and ***1%.  
For a complete description of the industry dummies, see Appendix II. 
 
 
  163  Table 9: parameter estimates of the LP growth model with interaction effects 














c c &   0.06 
(0.003)*** 
0.04 (0.01)***  0.03 (0.02)  0.06 
(0.02)*** 
0.04 (0.01)*** 




0.01 (0.005)**  0.01 (0.004)  0.02 
(0.004)*** 




-0.11 (0.05)**  -0.33 
(0.06)*** 
-0.06 (0.03)** 
RD intensity  2.52 (0.19)***  3.96 (0.35)***  11.44 (0.60)***  2.60 
(0.92)*** 
1.81 (0.46)*** 
IT intensity  0.84 (0.49)*  0.04 (0.59)  4.05 (1.92)**  1.12 (0.95)  - 0.23 (0.83) 
RD int* IT 
int 
5.01 (3.06)  4.06 (2.90)  -70.27 
(17.36)*** 
-3.96 (4.88)  14.30 
(3.85)*** 
ν93-94  0.04 (0.02)*  -0.01 (0.04)  0.08 (0.07)  0.10 (0.06)*  -0.02 (0.07) 




-0.26 (0.08)***  -0.13  (0.07)*  -0.22 (0.08) 
ν92-93 (ref.)  - -  -  - - 
ET dummy   0.05 (0.06)  0.05 (0.07)  -0.15 (0.12)  -0.03 (0.13)  0.11 (0.10) 
D1  0.07 (0.04)**  0.11 (0.08)  (ref.)     
D2  0.12 (0.04)***  0.10 (0.08)  -0.02 (0.07)     
D3  0.16 (0.04)***  0.06 (0.13)  -0.01 (0.11)     
D4  0.04 (0.05)  0.18 (0.11)  -0.06 (0.10)     
D5  0.09 (0.04)**  0.15 (0.07)**    (ref.)   
D6  0.11 (0.03)***  0.06 (0.06)    0.06 (0.06)   
D7  0.10 (0.77)  -0.03 (0.11)    0.02 (0.10)   
D8  0.14 (0.04)***  0.03 (0.10)    -0.01 (0.10)   
D9  0.18 (0.04)***  0.04 (0.10)  -0.09 (0.09)     
D10  0.08 (0.04)*  0.07 (0.09)    0.05 (0.08)   
D11  0.08 (0.04)**  0.03 (0.09)    0.04 (0.08)   
D12  0.17 (0.04)***  0.31 (0.08)***      0.32 (0.09)*** 
D13  0.11 (0.29)***  0.09 (0.05)*      0.13 (0.06)** 
D14  0.04 (0.04)  -0.04 (0.05)      -0.04 (0.07) 
D15  (ref.)  (ref.)      (ref.) 
D16   0.03 (0.05)  0.10 (0.13)  -0.11 (0.11)     
2 R   0.11 0.16  0.49  0.11 0.16 
Adjust 
2 R   0.11 0.15  0.48  0.09 0.15 
Obs. 12072  2094  435  720  939 
Standard errors are reported in brackets. Significance levels are: *10%, **5%, and ***1%. 
Note: the industry dummies that are not relevant for a given industry group (traditional, basic and high-











  164  Table 10. summary statistics on the time-aggregated data 
Variables  All firms  Single strategy  Mixed strategy 
    R&D only  IT only   
  Mean (Std Dev.)  Mean (Std Dev.)  Mean (Std Dev.)  Mean (Std Dev.) 
TFP growth  -1.52 (2.45)  -1.55 (2.52)  -1.70 (3.90)  -1.31 (1.48) 
        
Labor Productivity 
(q) growth 
0.13 (0.54)  0.13 (0.58)  0.12 (0.37)  0.13 (0.40) 
        
Capital/Labor (c) 
growth 
0.50 (2.71)  0.52 (2.82)  0.38 (1.13)  0.41 (2.51) 
        
Material/Labor (m) 
growth 
0.48 (8.30)  0.54 (9.37)  0.33 (1.54)  0.23 (0.95) 
        
Labor (L) growth  0.06 (0.38)  0.05 (0.36)  0.15 (0.64)  0.07 (0.37) 
        
Capital (C) growth  0.60 (1.45)  0.63 (1.54)  0.61 (1.41)  0.44 (0.95) 
        
R&D intensity 
(RD/Sales) 
0.02 (0.03)  0.02 (0.03)  -  0.03 (0.04) 
        
IT intensity 
(IT/Sales) 
0.003 (0.001)  -  0.02 (0.03)  0.01 (0.02) 
        
ET dummy  0.03 (0.02)  0.01 (0.11)  0.07 (0.26)  0.07 (0.26) 
        
D1  0.08 (0.27)  0.09 (0.28)  0.06 (0.23)  0.06 (0.23) 
D2  0.08 (0.26)  0.09 (0.27)  0.05 (0.22)  0.05 (0.22) 
D3  0.06 (0.24)  0.07 (0.26)  0.05 (0.21)  0.02 (0.13) 
D4  0.03 (0.17)  0.03 (0.17)  0.06 (0.23)  0.03 (0.15) 
D5  0.05 (0.21)  0.04 (0.20)  0.03 (0.17)  0.08 (0.27) 
D6  0.10 (0.29)  0.09 (0.28)  0.11 (0.31)  0.11 (0.31) 
D7  0.01 (0.12)  0.01 (0.10)  0.02 (0.12)  0.03 (0.16) 
D8  0.06 (0.23)  0.06 (0.24)  0.08 (0.26)  0.03 (0.17) 
D9  0.04 (0.20)  0.05 (0.21)  0.03 (0.17)  0.03 (0.18) 
D10  0.05 (0.22)  0.05 (0.22)  0.03 (0.19)  0.04 (0.19) 
D11  0.07 (0.26)  0.08 (0.27)  0.10 (0.29)  0.05 (0.21) 
D12  0.07 (0.25)  0.08 (0.26)  0.07 (0.25)  0.05 (0.22) 
D13  0.14 (0.34)  0.12 (0.32)  0.10 (0.30)  0.24 (0.42) 
D14  0.07 (0.26)  0.06 (0.23)  0.15 (0.35)  0.13 (0.33) 
D15  0.03 (0.16)  0.03 (0.16)  0.01 (0.10)  0.22 (0.15) 
D16  0.04 (0.19)  0.04 (0.20)  0.04 (0.20)  0.22 (0.14) 
        





  165  Table 11: cross-section estimates of the TFP Growth regression model (no interaction effect) 
Single Strategy  Variables  All firms  
(1)  Only RD (2)  Only IT (3) 
Mixed Strategy  
(4) 
RD intensity  1.42 (0.92)  -0.28 (1.10)  -  5.26 (1.19)*** 
IT intensity  -1.43 (2.43)  -  -2.12 (5.96)  -1.59 (2.22) 
C C &   -0.90 (0.02)***  -0.88 (0.24)***  -1.34 (0.15)***  -0.69 (0.52)*** 
ET dummy  -0.27 (0.22)  0.17 (0.34)  -5.65 (1.23)***  0.30 (0.19) 
D1  -1.66 (0.11)***  -1.47 (0.12)***  -4.05 (0.88)***  -1.83 (0.21)*** 
D2  -0.92 (0.11)***  -0.93 (0.13)***  -0.49 (1.02)  -0.95 (0.22)*** 
D3  -0.81 (0.13)***  -0.82 (0.13)***  -0.42 (0.98)  -0.63 (0.37)* 
D4  -1.06 (0.18)***  -1.14 (0.21)***  0.21 (0.92)  -0.80 (0.31)** 
D5  -1.27 (0.14)***  -1.38 (0.18)***  -0.82 (1.16)  -1.16 (0.17)*** 
D6  -0.81 (0.10)***  -0.81 (0.13)***  0.38 (0.63)  -1.12 (0.15)*** 
D7  -1.06 (0.27)***  -0.73 (0.34)**  -2.52 (1.64)  -1.67 (0.39)*** 
D8  -1.07 (0.13)***  -1.06 (0.15)***  -1.09 (0.78)  -0.94 (0.28)*** 
D9  -0.86 (0.15)***  -0.82 (0.17)***  -0.14 (1.17)  -1.08 (0.27)*** 
D10  -1.30 (0.15)***  -1.22 (0.16)***  -2.46 (1.07)**  -1.41 (0.24)*** 
D11  -1.08 (0.12)***  -1.10 (0.13)***  0.36 (0.70)  -1.39 (0.23)*** 
D12  -0.86 (0.12)***  -0.84 (0.17)***  -0.35 (0.79)  -1.21 (0.21)*** 
D13  -0.78 (0.09)***  -0.83 (0.11)***  -0.09 (0.66)  -0.96 (0.11)*** 
D14  -0.94 (0.12)***  -0.91 (0.15)***  -0.24 (0.54)  -1.26 (0.14)*** 
D15(ref.) -  -  -  - 
D16   -0.88 (0.16)***  -0.80 (0.18)***  -2.44 (1.00)**  -0.78 (0.36)*** 
2 R   0.48 0.49  0.60  0.56 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.48 0.49  0.55  0.55 
















  166  Table 12: cross-section estimates of the TFP Growth regression model with interaction effect 













RD intensity  0.64 (0.96)  4.34 (1.44)***  4.25 (4.27)  3.53 (4.12)  2.80 (1.64)* 
IT intensity  -5.08 (2.79)*  -3.63 (2.87)  -5.99 (12.3)  -12.64 (6.96)*  0.19 (3.64) 
RD int* IT int  86.17 (32.5)***  31.13 (27.7)  -97.2 (248.4)  5.97 (98.6)  47.2 (29.5) 
C C &   -0.90 (0.02)***  -0.70 (0.05)***  -1.12 (0.13)***  -1.05 (0.15)***  -0.58 (0.06)*** 
ET dummy  -0.29 (0.21)  0.30 (0.19)  0.24 (0.54)  0.33 (0.46)  0.17 (0.24) 
D1  -1.65 (0.11)***  -1.80 (0.21)***  (ref.)     
D2  -0.91 (0.11)***  0.92 (0.22)***  -0.76 (0.28)**     
D3  -0.79 (0.13)***  -0.61 (0.37)  -0.25 (0.47)     
D4  -1.03 (0.18)***  -0.74 (0.32)**  -0.37 (0.42)     
D5  -1.24 (0.14)***  -1.13 (0.17)***    (ref.)   
D6  -0.78 (0.11)***  -1.08 (0.15)***    -0.82 (0.20)***   
D7  -1.06 (0.26)***  -1.64 (0.30)***    -1.27 (0.36)***   
D8  -1.04 (0.13)***  -0.91 (0.28)***    -0.76 (0.32)**   
D9  -0.83 (0.15)***  -1.04 (0.27)***  -0.77 (0.35)**     
D10  -1.28 (0.14)***  -1.38 (0.25)***    -1.12 (0.29)***   
D11  -1.05 (0.12)***  -1.36 (0.23)***     
D12  -0.84 (0.12)***  -1.17 (0.22)***      1.24 (0.21)*** 
D13  -0.76 (0.09)***  -0.93 (0.12)***      -0.98 (0.13)*** 
D14  -0.91 (0.12)***  -1.22 (0.14)***      -1.28 (0.14)*** 
D15  (ref.)  (ref.)      (ref.) 
D16   -0.86 (0.16)***  -0.75 (0.35)**  -0.51 (0.44)     
2 R   0.48 0.57 0.47 0.50 0.57 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.48 0.55 0.43 0.48 0.56 



















  167  Table 13: parameter estimates of the LP growth regression model (no interaction effect) 
 Single strategy   Variables  All firms  
(1)  RD only (2)  IT only (3) 
Mixed strategy  
(4) 
c c &   0.03 (0.003)***  0.03 (0.003)***  0.13 (0.02)***  0.03 (0.004)*** 
m m &   0.01 (0.001)***  0.005 (0.001)***  0.08 (0.01)***  0.20 (0.01)*** 
L L &   -0.07 (0.02)***  -0.11 (0.02)***  -0.01 (0.03)  0.01 (0.03) 
RD intensity  1.37 (0.23)***  0.93 (0.29)***  -  1.69 (0.29)*** 
IT intensity  0.69 (0.62)  -  0.53 (0.68)  0.23 (0.53) 
ET dummy  0.03 (0.05)  -0.01 (0.09)  0.18 (0.13)  0.07 (0.04) 
D1  0.05 (0.03)  0.05 (0.03)  0.11 (0.09)  0.03 (0.05) 
D2  0.08 (0.03)***  0.10 (0.03)***  0.10 (0.11)  0.003 (0.05) 
D3  0.05 (0.03)  0.07 (0.04)*  0.04 (0.11)  -0.05 (0.08) 
D4  0.02 (0.04)  0.02 (0.05)  -0.07 (0.10)  -0.001 (0.07) 
D5  0.08 (0.03)**  0.08 (0.04)  0.03 (0.12)  0.06 (0.04) 
D6  0.13 (0.02)***  0.17 (0.03)***  0.05 (0.08)  -0.01 (0.03) 
D7  0.08 (0.06)  0.12 (0.09)  0.10 (0.18)  0.02 (0.07) 
D8  0.13 (0.03)***  0.16 (0.04)***  -0.06 (0.09)  -0.01 (0.06) 
D9  0.15 (0.03)***  0.19 (0.04)***  -0.09 (0.13)  -0.02 (0.06) 
D10  0.04 (0.03)  0.05 (0.04)  -0.05 (0.12)  0.02 (0.05) 
D11  0.05 (0.03)  0.06 (0.03)  0.11 (0.08)  0.01 (0.05) 
D12  0.14 (0.03)***  0.17 (0.04)***  0.07 (0.09)  0.07 (0.05) 
D13  0.14 (0.02)***  0.15 (0.03)***  -0.01 (0.07)  0.07 (0.02)** 
D14  0.005 (0.03)  0.03 (0.04)  0.09 (0.06)  -0.08 (0.03)** 
D15 (ref.) -  -  -  - 
D16  0.02 (0.04)  0.03 (0.04)  -0.08 (0.11)  0.04 (0.08) 
2 R   0.11 0.10  0.42  0.44 
Adjusted 
2 R   0.10 0.09  0.35  0.43 














  168  Table 14: parameter estimates of the LP growth model with interaction effects 














c c &   0.03 (0.003)***  0.03 
(0.004)*** 
0.004 (0.01)  0.07 (0.01)***  0.03 
(0.005)*** 
m m &   0.006 
(0.001)*** 
0.20 (0.01)***  0.48 
(0.03)*** 
0.49 (0.01)***  0.10 (0.01)*** 
L L &   -0.07 (0.02)***  0.002 (0.03)  0.03 (0.04)  -0.20 
(0.06)*** 
0.07 (0.04) 
RD intensity  1.16 (0.24)***  1.02 (0.35)***  0.21 (0.62)  0.43 (0.44)  1.24 (0.48)*** 
IT intensity  -0.30 (0.71)  -1.24 (0.68)*  -1.59 (1.49)  -1.24 (0.75)  -1.56 (1.04) 
RD int* IT 
int 
23.39 (8.29)***  22.47 
(6.64)*** 
20.59 (31.5)  11.80 (10.6)  25.88 
(8.49)*** 
ET dummy   0.03 (0.05)  0.07 (0.04)  0.00005 
(0.06) 
0.02 (0.05)  0.10 (0.06) 
D1  0.05 (0.02)*  0.04 (0.05)  (ref.)     
D2  0.09 (0.03)***  0.02 (0.05)  -0.01 (0.03)     
D3  0.06 (0.03)*  -0.04 (0.08)  0.02 (0.05)     
D4  0.02 (0.04)  0.03 (0.07)  -0.02 (0.05)     
D5  0.09 (0.03)**  0.08 (0.04)*    (ref.)   
D6  0.14 (0.02)***  0.02 (0.03)    -0.01 (0.02)   
D7  0.08 (0.06)  0.03 (0.07)    0.06 (0.03)   
D8  0.14 (0.03)***  0.007 (0.06)    -0.03 (0.03)   
D9  0.16 (0.03)***  0.006 (0.06)  -0.0005 (0.04)     
D10  0.04 (0.03)  0.04 (0.05)    0.003 (0.03)   
D11  0.06 (0.03)  0.03 (0.05)    0.01 (0.02)   
D12  0.15 (0.03)***  0.10 (0.05)*      0.11 (0.06)* 
D13  0.15 (0.02)***  0.09 (0.02)***      0.11 (0.03)*** 
D14  0.01 (0.03)  -0.06 (0.03)*      -0.05 (0.04) 
D15  (ref.)  (ref.)      (ref.) 
D16   0.02 (0.04)  0.06 (0.08)  0.01 (0.05)     
2 R   0.11 0.45  0.71  0.85  0.44 
Adjust 
2 R   0.11 0.43  0.69  0.84  0.42 















  169  Appendix (I): Data and Variables 
 
The data used in this chapter is a compilation of the Industrial Census, collected 
by the Statistical Bureau of Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA) from 
1992 to 1995. The Statistical Bureau of the MOEA conducts a yearly investigation 
and collects data on each operating plant that holds a registered certificate in the 
manufacturing sector. The investigation was suspended for years 1991 and 1996 while 
the Industrial and Commercial Census was hold by the Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics of Taiwan's Executive Yuan. However, the Director 
General of Executive Yuan collects census data every five years on each plant in 
operation (registered or not). This data could not be included in our database, since it 
does not contain information on the value of foreign technologies purchases. 
 
In any case, the Statistical Bureau of MOEA provides information on sales, 
employment (size of personnel, as well as total sum of gross wages), total value of 
fixed assets in operation at the end of the year, and total expenditures on raw 
materials. Furthermore, the Bureau of MOEA also provides information on R&D 
expenditures as well as on the “technological balance of payments at the plant level”. 
This balance is defined as the value of exporting technology minus the value of 
importing technology.  
 
In Taiwan, over 85 percent of the manufacturing firms are single-plant 
producers, according to Aw, Chung and Roberts (1998)
9. In the sample used in this 
work, over 70 percent of innovation firms are single-plant producers; hence, we refer 
to this data as “firm level data” in the main body of the present chapter. 
 
In our study, firms’ output is defined as firms’ sales deflated by a wholesale 
price index defined at the three-digit industry level. This price index was normalized 
to 1 in 1991. The wholesale price index was obtained from "Commodity-Price 
Statistics Monthly in Taiwan," published by Directorate-General of Budget, 
Accounting and Statistics of Taiwan's Executive Yuan, 1996. 
                                                 
9  Aw et al. (1998) conduct an empirical study about productivity and the decision to export, using 
manufacturing data from the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive 
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The labor input can be defined using two alternative proxies: the total sum of 
wages per firm on the one hand, and the number of employees on the other hand. The 
capital input is measured by the total value of fixed assets in operation at the end of 
the year. The proxy for the materials input is the value of raw materials consumed per 
year, deflated by the intermediate input-output price index (defined at the two-digit 
industry level). The intermediate input-output price index was obtained from 
"Commodity-Price Statistics Monthly in Taiwan," published by Directorate-General 
of Budget, Accounting and Statistics of Taiwan's Executive Yuan, 1996. 
 
The R&D (RD) intensity is defined as the ratio of R&D expenditures to sales. 
Imported technology (IT) is defined as advanced technology obtained from abroad 
either through technology licensing (such as patents, trademark, licenses, and 
royalties) or technology instruction (such as technical training and consulting). The IT 
intensity is defined as the ratio of payments for imported technology to sales. The 
exported technology is defined as domestic technology provided to foreign buyers by 
way of technological cooperation, technology licensing, technology instruction and 
investing foreign hi-tech industries. We do not make use of this variable in our model. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Yuan, Taiwan. In this data, over 95 percent of manufacturing firm in 1991 were single-plant producers, 
according to our own calculations. 
  171  Appendix(II): Industry Dummies 
 
The industry dummies defined at two-digit industry level. For complete 
description of dummy variables as follows: 
 
 
The industry dummies*: 
D1: (11) Food Manufacturing  
D2: (13) Textile Mill Products 
D3: 
(14) Wearing Apparel & Accessories 
(15) Leather & Fur Products, (16) Wood & Bamboo Products, 
and (17) Furniture & Fixtures 
D4: (18) Pulp, Paper & Paper Products, and (19) Printing Processing 
D5: (21) Chemical Matter Manufacturing 
D6: (22) Chemical Products, and (23) Petroleum & Coal Products 
D7: (24) Rubber Products Manufacturing 
D8: (25) Plastic Products Manufacturing 
D9: (26) Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
D10: (27) Basic Metal Industries 
D11: (28) Fabricated Metal Products 
D12: (29) Machinery & Equipment 
D13: (31) Electrical & Electronic Machinery 
D14: (32) Transport Equipment 
D15: (33) Precision Instruments 
D16: (39) Misc. Industrial Products 










Three Industry Categories of Firms 
Traditional Industry: 
(11) Food;  
(13) Textile Mill Products;  
(14) Wearing Apparel & Accessories;  
(15) Leather & Fur Products;  
(16) Wood & Bamboo Products;  
(17) Furniture & Fixtures;  
(18) Pulp, Paper & Paper Products;  
(19) Printing Processing;  
(26) Non-Metallic Mineral Products  
(39) Misc. Industrial Products. 
Basic Industry: 
(21) Chemical Matter Manufacturing;  
(22) Chemical Products;  
(23) Petroleum & Coal Products;  
(24) Rubber Products Manufacturing;  
(25) Plastic Products Manufacturing;  
(27) Basic Metal Industries;  
(28) Fabricated Metal Products 
High Technology Industry: 
(29) Machinery & Equipment;  
(31) Electrical & Electronic Machinery;  
(32) Transport Equipment;  
(33) Precision Instruments 
Number reported in parentheses means 2-digit industry code.  
 





















  174  This research was an in-depth investigation into the causes and consequences of 
firms’ innovation activity in Taiwan’s manufacturing industries. It was organized in 
three chapters, each of them dealing with a specific question. To answer these 
questions, the  research relied mainly on the econometric analysis of an impressive 
dataset (more than 27000 manufacturing firms) provided by Taiwan’s Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (MOEA).  
 
In the first chapter, we tried to identify the determinants of firms’ decision to 
innovate; following the recent literature, we considered that innovation include other 
activities than just in-house R&D. Logically, then, we had to explain, in the second 
chapter, how do firms innovate, i.e. what leads them to choose a particular innovation 
strategy. The issue of complementarity between innovation activities was treated as a 
corollary to this question. While Chapters 1 and 2 were dedicated to the causes of 
innovation activities in Taiwan’s manufacturing industries, the third chapter focused 
on the consequences of this activities, by examining their influence on the growth of 
firms’ productivity. Our methodology and findings are summarized below; in that 
summary, we will also try to emphasize the specificity and limitations of our research. 
 
The determinants of the decision to innovate in Taiwan 
 
 
The objective of the first chapter was to identify the determinants of firms’ 
decision to innovate in Taiwan’s manufacturing industries. To do so, we estimated an 
empirical model of innovation decision at the firm level using a panel of more than 
27,000 Taiwanese manufacturing firms observed from 1992 to 1995.  This panel 
consisted in census data collected yearly by the Statistic Bureau of Taiwan's MOEA, 
and covered the whole of Taiwan’s manufacturing sector. Moreover, the MOEA panel 
identified firms which engage in R&D, and firms which purchase foreign technology.  
This allowed us to define an “innovation firm” has a firm who either did engage in 
R&D or imported technology during the observation period (rather than considering 
R&D as the only source of knowledge). By doing so, we follow the most recent 
developments of the literature on innovation, which considers that innovation activity 
cannot be summarized by in-house R&D only. However, while this literature often 
focuses on the product/process dichotomy, we consider here another dichotomy : 
  175  doing in-house R&D / importing disembodied technology. Unfortunately, data 
limitations did not allowed us to consider more innovation activities (e.g., cooperation 
in R&D) 
 
We used a Logit specification to model empirically the probability that a firm 
engages in innovation (in the above sense) in any given year between 1992 and 1995. 
This model considered the impacts of both economic changes and firm-level  / 
industry-level factors traditionally emphasized in the literature. The former include 
the fluctuations of Taiwan’s currency and the growth of Taiwan’s exportations; the 
latter include market structure, firm size, and firm age. The econometric model was 
estimated first on the whole panel, and the on four sub-groups (industry categories): 
“Electronic”, “Metal and Machinery”, “Chemistry”, and “Food & Textile”. 
 
Our main findings are the following: first of all, market concentration has an 
overall positive effect on the probability to innovate. A similar relationship between 
market structure and firm size has often been observed in the literature. This 
relationship, however, strongly varies across industries: it is strongly significant in 
“Electronic” and “Food and Textile”, but insignificant in the other two industry 
categories. 
 
Other important results regards firms’ size and age. In all industries (except 
the electronic industry), we observed a non-linear relationship between firms’ size and 
the probability to innovate: while very small firms (below 50 employees) have a 
lower probability to innovate, this probability normally increases with size up to a 
certain threshold, after which it decreases. This ‘inverted u-shape’ has been regularly 
mentioned in the existing empirical literature. Similarly, in all industries except the 
electronic (where firms are equally young, and production processes knowledge-
intensive), we observed a negative impact of firms’ age on the probability to innovate. 
In other words, firms tend to innovate less toward the end of their life cycle. 
The fluctuations of Taiwan’s currency (the New Taiwan Dollar), observed 
each year with respect to 1986, have an overall negative effect on the probability to 
innovate, but this effect is mostly localized in the Metal & Machinery industry. Last 
but not least, the variations in Taiwan’s exportation (across the 1986-1991 and 1991-
1996 periods) globally have a significantly positive effect of the probability to 
  176  innovate. This effect is mainly localized in the “Electronic” and “Food & Textile” 
industries (where the demand is strongly driven by the exportations), which suggests 
that innovation in Taiwan may be more “demand-pulled” than “technology-pushed”. 
 
Innovation behavior and the issue of complementarity 
 
The objective of Chapter 2 was to open up the “black box” of innovation as 
defined in Chapter 1, and to consider the different innovation strategies that a firm can 
adopt. Since we can only distinguish between two innovation activities (in-house 
R&D and the purchase of foreign disembodied technologies), we assume Taiwan’s 
firms may choose between three strategies: doing R&D only, only importing 
technology, and combining both.  
 
The main objective of this chapter was to explain that choice (and its consistency 
over time), focusing on the effect of market structure (concentration and barriers to 
entry) and firm characteristics (age and size). The influence of market structure on the 
decision to do R&D has been investigated in the classical literature, but this literature 
seldom takes into account external sources of new knowledge. These considerations 
are manifest in the recent empirical literature only. A secondary objective of the 
chapter was to address the issue of complementarity between R&D and the 
importation of technology, an issue which has also bred some recent developments in 
the literature.  
 
The determinants of the choice of innovation strategy 
 
Let us first give an account of our main research objective. Using the same panel 
of 27000 Taiwanese manufacturing firms as in Chapter 1, we developed an empirical 
analysis in two steps. Our first step was to take the time-averaged values of our 
variables (a time-aggregate approach) to examine the determinants of the innovation 
behavior in the whole population of firms. Firms in our population have four possible 
innovation behaviors: (1) to innovate through R&D only; (2) to innovate through the 
importation of disembodied technologies only; (3) to innovate through a combination 
of both activities; and (4) not to innovate. In this time-aggregate approach, a firm 
  177  choosing option (4) is a firm that never innovates, i.e. a non-innovation firm. This first 
step allowed us to explain not only why do firms innovate, but also how they do so. 
 
The second step of the analysis was to use the panel structure of the data to 
examine only the innovation firms, i.e. firms which innovate at least one year between 
1992 and 1995, through R&D and/or the importation of technology (more than 5000 
firms were identified as such). In the panel approach, firms face four options in each 
year t: (1) do R&D only, (2) rely only on the importation of technology, (3) combine 
both options in a “mixed” strategy and (4) not to engage in innovation activities for 
that year. It is important to note that, since we focus here on innovation firms, a firm 
choosing option (4) is a firm that do not innovate in year t only. This second step of 
the analysis was a comparison of sorts; it also allowed us to explain why some firms 
innovate regularly, whereas others restrain from innovating on certain years. 
 
In both steps, two econometric models were used to model the choice between 
the aforementioned four options. We used respectively a multinomial Logit and a 
bivariate Probit, the latter allowing to check for complementarity between R&D and 
the importation of technology (cf. infra).  
 
Both approaches and both models pointed out similar results. Our main findings 
regarding the determinants of innovation are threefold; first of all, firm size appears to 
have a positive effect on the probability to do R&D, either as the only source of new 
knowledge (strategy (1) above), or together with the importation of technology 
(strategy (3) above). This result tend to confirm the Schumpeterian hypothesis 
according to which, as firms grow in size, they will be more inclined to do R&D. 
 
Our second finding concerns market structure, and is less clear-cut: when the 
Concentration Ratio (CR) is used as a measure of market power, we find that firms 
operating in more concentrated industries (oligopolies, for instance) will be more 
likely to adopt a “mixed” strategy, and less likely to do R&D only. When the 
Herfindhal index is used instead, no significant result emerges. However, the variation 
in market concentration (with respect to year 1989) tends to decrease the probability 
to adopt a “mixed” strategy. Overall, these results suggest (1) that the CR may capture 
the specificity of Taiwan’s industrial structure and (2) that the Schumpeterian 
  178  hypothesis according to which oligopolistic firms are more inclined to innovate 
through R&D is only partly supported. Similarly, all models suggest that firms’ 
capacity to erect barriers to entry (as measured by the MES) tend to increase their 
propensity to innovate; all, except the multinomial model for panel data estimated in 
Step 2, where the effect of the MES is not significant. 
 
Our third important finding concerning the determinants of innovation has to 
do with firm age. When we examined the whole population (Step 1 of the analysis), it 
appears that innovation are also younger firms. Because of that result, when we look 
at the innovation firms only (Step 2 of the analysis), the age is not significant 
anymore, regardless of the specification we use. 
 
Complementarity between innovation activities: some empirical evidence 
 
Besides identifying the determinants of innovation among the whole 
population and the determinants of a regular, time-consistent  innovation activity 
among innovation firms, our analysis also addressed the question of complementarity. 
To do so, we used an indirect (or “activity adoption”) approach, which consists in 
examining the correlation of the residuals in the bivariate Probit model. The rule to 
check for complementarity is fairly simple: if, after including the relevant covariates, 
the residuals are still positively correlated, then there is some evidence consistent with 
complementarity, but it is impossible to explain the remaining correlation. On the 
contrary, if the residuals are no longer correlated, one can find some convincing 
evidence of complementarity. 
 
 When we examine the whole population with the time-aggregate approach, 
we find some evidence of complementarity between the two innovation activities of 
interest (doing R&D and importing technology). However, these results may to some 
extent be caused by unobserved heterogeneity, for which we are unable to control. 
The second step of the analysis then becomes fully relevant: by examining innovation 
firms with the panel approach, we are able to bring to the light more convincing 
evidence of complementarity. 
 
  179  The impact of innovation strategies on productivity growth 
 
After examining, in the first and second chapters of this dissertation, how 
Taiwan’s manufacturing firms build their innovation strategies, we addressed, in the 
last chapter, the question of the consequences, at the firm level, of these strategic 
choices. The objective of the third chapter was to evaluate the impact of innovation 
strategies on firms’ productivity in Taiwan, focusing only on the sub-population of 
5219  innovation  firms that we began to examine in Chapter 2. Two measures of 
productivity were used: first, total factor productivity (TFP), and, second, labor 
productivity (LP). The rationale for using LP is that, for similar industries, the goods 
produced in Taiwan may be, on the average, more labor-intensive than those produced 
in Western economies. 
 
Most existing studies on the effect of innovation on firm’s activities only take 
into account R&D, and rarely consider alternative innovation strategies. In this 
chapter, two innovation strategies were considered: doing R&D on the one hand, and 
importing technology (IT) on the other. These strategies may be used simultaneously 
or as alternatives. In other words, firms may either rely on a single strategy, or 
combine both strategies, in order to innovate. We thus addressed again (with a 
different method) the issue of the relationship between these strategies: is there 
complementarity or substitutability? The matter is of importance, since it is related to 
current industrial and science policy issues in Taiwan. 
 
To achieve our goals, we built and estimate a model of productivity growth, 
using first TFP and second LP as the dependent variable. Regressions are run first on 
the whole sample, then on firms which use a single strategy (either only doing R&D 
or only importing technology) over the period, and finally on firms who adopt a 
mixed strategy (i.e. using more than one strategy over the period). Our main 
econometric framework made use of the panel structure of our data; however, we 
complemented it with a cross-sectional approach relying on the time-averaged values 
of our variables. Both methods yield consistent results.   
 
 
  180  Our main findings are twofold: 
(1)  The intensity of R&D has a strongly significant positive effect on both TFP 
and LP growth, in all specifications where it was included. 
(2)  Overall, the intensity of IT has a weak or insignificant effect on the growth 
of TFP, but a strong positive effect on the growth of LP. 
 
To examine the question of complementarity, we added an interaction effect 
(RD*IT) in our models of productivity growth (a direct approach to complementarity 
issues). Using both the panel and the time-averaged methods, the regressions were run 
on the whole sample and on the “mixed strategy” sub-sample. The latter was further 
divided into three groups: traditional, basic and high-tech industries. We found 
convergent results in our by-industry analysis: in High Tech industries, the effect of 
R&D intensity on both TFP and LP growth is strongly positive, whereas IT intensity 
has no significant effect. The interaction effect is significantly positive, which is 
consistent with the possible existence of complementarity between innovation 
activities. This conclusion echoes the findings of some recent studies conducted on 
the same topic, and covering Western and Japanese biotechnology firms, as well as 
Belgian innovation firms.  
 
Moreover, when looking specifically at the growth of LP, the interaction effect 
appears to be strongly negative in the “traditional industry” group, whereas both R&D 
intensity and IT intensity have positive effects. This result suggests that traditional 
Taiwanese industries may use the two innovation strategies as substitutes rather than 
complements.  
 
Our industry-specific results have several implications regarding Taiwan 
science and technology policy. Learning from Japan’s experience of modernization by 
rapid absorption of foreign knowledge in the 1960s and 1970s, the Taiwanese 
government encouraged national “traditional” firms to upgrade their production 
process by importing technology. According to our results, this policy may lead 
traditional firms to abandon R&D activities if purchasing foreign knowledge appears 
as a less expensive alternative. Another part of Taiwan’s national science policy is 
concerned with high-technology firms, in which in-house R&D has recently been 
strongly encouraged. Our empirical results suggest that this policy may well be 
  181  relevant, since, in High Tech industries, R&D appears as the main source of new 
knowledge, while the importation of technology may just be a possible complement. 

















Index of Content  
  183  INTRODUCTION          1 
 
Chapter 1: Firms’ Decision to Innovate in Taiwan: 
Evidence  from  Manufacturing  Industries        11 
 
1.  Introduction          12 
2.  The stylized facts of innovation in Taiwan          13 
2.1. The innovation process at the macroeconomic level : R&D expenditures    15 
2.2. Innovation expenditures at the industry level          17 
2.3. Innovation process and patenting activity in Taiwan        19 
3.  Firms’ decision to innovate : a survey of the literature        21 
3.1. Schumpeter (1942) and the theoretical debate on market power      21 
3.2. Market power and innovation: empirical  investigations     23 
3.3. The impact of appropriability on innovation          24 
3.4. Market demand and innovation (the  demand  condition)     25 
3.5. Technological opportunities and innovation (the supply condition)    26 
3.6. The Impact of Firm Size on R&D Activity          27 
4.   The determinants of Taiwanese firms’ decision to innovate        28 
  4.1. A steep rise in labor cost              29 
4.2. Fluctuations in the value of  Taiwan’s  currency      30 
4.3.  Growth  of  exportations         31 
5.  Econometric  Modeling         34 
6 .   D a t a            3 5  
  6.1. Data source : the MOEA panel            35 
6.2. Composition of the MOEA panel by type of firms        36 
6.3.  Explanatory  variables         38 
7.  Results  of  the  empirical  analysis        42 
  7.1. Results of the Logit estimation on the whole panel        42 
  7.2. Results of the estimations by categories of industry        45 
8.  Conclusion           47 
 
 
References           49 
Appendix (I): Seminal IO models on process innovation and market structure    52 
Appendix  (II):  Industry  Dummies        59 
Appendix (III): estimations with CR4_lag1 and CR4_lag2 by industry groups    60 
 
 
Chapter 2: Doing R&D and Importing Technology: Recent Evidence from Taiwan  62 
 
1.  Introduction          63 
2.  Survey of the literature and hypotheses            65 
2.1 Market structure, firm size, and R&D activity          65 
2.2  Introducing  alternative  innovation  strategies      67 
2.3 R&D, importation of technology and absorptive capacity       70 
2.4 Dealing with the complementarity of innovation strategies      71 
2.5  Hypotheses          72 
3.  Econometric Modeling and Choice of Variables          75 
3.1 The multinomial Logit for time-aggregate and panel data       76 
3.2  The  bivariate  Probit  model        78 
3.3 The question of complementarity: the correlation approach      80 
3.4  Choice  of  explanatory  variables        81 
4 .   T h e   M O E A   D a t a           8 5  
4.1.  The “time-aggregate” approach to the MOEA data        87 
4.1.1.  Innovation behaviors in the time-aggregate approach      87 
  184  4.1.2.  A large proportion of small firms (time-aggregate approach)    88 
4.1.3.  Market structure and innovation behavior in the time-aggregate approach 89 
4.2. The “panel” approach to the MOEA data          90 
4.2.1.  Patterns of innovation strategy in the panel approach      90 
4.2.2.  The size of innovation firms (panel approach)        92 
4.2.3.  Market structure and innovation strategy in the panel approach    93 
5 .   E m p i r i c a l   R e s u l t s          9 4  
5.1. Results of the “time-aggregate” approach          94 
5.1.1.  Multinomial Logit estimation on the time-aggregate data     94 
5.1.2.  Bivariate Probit estimation on the time-aggregate data      96 
5.1.3.  Estimated joint probabilities in the time-aggregate approach    98 
5.2.  Results  of  the  panel  approach        100 
5.2.1.  Estimation of a multinomial Logit for panel data       100 
5.2.2.  Bivariate Probit estimation on panel data          101 
5.2.3.  Estimated joint probabilities in the panel approach      102 
6.  Conclusion           104 
 
References           106 
Appendix  (I):  estimations  involving  CR8      123 
 
Chapter 3: Innovation Strategy and Productivity Growth: Micro Evidence from Taiwan 
Manufacturing  Firms          125 
 
1.  Introduction         126 
2.  The Import of Technology: a Survey of the Literature        128 
2.1. Imported Technology, Productivity Growth, and Innovation Performance   128 
2.2. Imported Technology and R&D: Substitutability versus Complementarity  130 
2.3. Imported Technology versus R&D: Methodological Issues      132 
3.  Importing  Technology  in  Taiwan        134 
3.1.  Stylized  Facts          134 
3.2.  The  MOEA  Panel  Data         136 
4.  Econometric  Modeling  and  Analysis        139 
4.1. An Empirical Measure of Total Factor Productivity Growth      139 
4.2. A Regression Model of the Growth of Total Factor Productivity      141 
4.3.  Modeling  Labor  Productivity  Growth       144 
5.  Empirical  Results          146 
5.1.  Summary  Statistics         146 
5.2. The Effect of Innovation Strategies on TFP Growth        147 
5.3. The Effect of Innovation Strategies on Labor Productivity Growth    148 
6.  Comparative analysis based on time-aggregated data         150 
6.1. Estimation strategy and summary statistics in the time-aggregate analysis   150 
6.2. Innovation Strategies and time-averaged TFP Growth        151 
6.3. Innovation Strategies and time-averaged Labor Productivity growth    152 
 
7.  Conclusion           153 
 
References           155 
Appendix  (I):  Data  and  Variables        170 
Appendix(II):  Industry  Dummies       172 
Appendix(III):Three Industry Categories--a list of the industries contained in the category  173 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSION         1 7 4  
 
 




















Index of  Graphics and Tables 





Figure 1.a: Taiwan’s R&D expenditures in NT$ (1982-2000)        16 
Figure 1.b: Taiwan’s R&D expenditures in US $ (1982-2000)        16 
Figure 2.a: R&D expenditures and importing technology in Taiwan (1982-2000)    18 
Figure 2.b: Innovation expenditures (R&D + IT) for 4 Taiwanese industries (1982-2000)  19 
Figure 3.a: Number of patents of Taiwanese origin granted in the US      20 





Table 1: Taiwan’s economic growth and innovation intensity        14 
Table 2: R&D growth in Taiwan and NT$/US$ exchange rate (1981-2000)    17 
Table 3: Change in the ratio of  annual real wages per employee (by industry)    29 
Table 4: Yearly variation in Exchange Rate in Taiwan (1981-1996)      31 
Table 5: Exportations Intensity (and variation) in Taiwan by Industry      32 
Table 6: Rate of growth of the monetary value of Taiwan’s exportations by industry   33 
Table 7: Breakdown of the MOEA panel by type of firm         37 
Table 8: The distribution of  sample (1992-1995) by industries        37 
Table  9:  Summary  statistics         39 
Table10: Parameter estimates of the panel Logit model (27754 manufacturing firms)  43 
Table11: Parameter estimates of the panel Logit model by category of industry    46 
Table12: Parameter estimates of the panel Logit model by industry with 1-year lagged CR4 
60 










Figure 1: Estimated probabilities (Probit with CR4) as a function of size (time-aggregate data)
           116 
Figure 2: Estimated probabilities as a function of concentration (time-aggregate data)  116 
Figure 3: Estimated probabilities as a function of firm age (time-aggregate data)    117 
Figure 4: Estimated probabilities of “IT only” as a function of firm age (time-aggregate data)
           117 
Figure 5: Estimated probabilities (Probit with CR4, panel approach) as a function of size  121 
Figure 6: Estimated probabilities (panel approach) as a function of concentration    121 





Table 1: Sources of new knowledge in the economic literature        110 
Table 2: Breakdown of the population by innovation strategy (time-aggregate approach)  110 
Table 3: Breakdown of the population by firm size (time-aggregate approach)    110 
Table 4: Breakdown by firm size  and innovation behavior (time-aggregate approach)  110 
  187  Table 5: Breakdown by innovation behavior  and CR4 (time-aggregate approach)   111 
Table 6: The sub-population of innovation firms by strategy and by year (panel approach)  111 
Table 7: Yearly variation in the number of innovation firms engaged in each strategy  111 
Table 8: Number of innovation firms by size classes over the 1992-1995 period    111 
Table 9: Breakdown by firm size and innovation strategy (panel approach)    112 
Table 10: Breakdown of the average number of innovation firms by strategy and by CR4 112 
Table 11: Summary statistics (time-aggregate approach)          113 
Table 12: Innovation behavior in the time-aggregate approach (multinomial Logit estimates) 
           114 
Table 13: Innovation behavior in the time-aggregate approach (Bivariate Probit estimates)
           115 
Table 14: Estimated probabilities with the Probit Model (time-aggregate approach)  115 
Table 15: Summary statistics (panel approach)            118 
Table 16: Choice of innovation strategy (multinomial Logit estimates, panel approach)  119 
Table 17: Choice of innovation strategy (Bivariate Probit estimates, panel approach)  120 
Table 18: Estimated probabilities (Probit Model, panel approach)       120 
Table A: Multinomial Logit estimates using CR8 (time-aggregate data)      123 
Table B: Bivariate Probit estimates using CR8 (time-aggregate data)      123 
Table C: Estimated Probabilities (Bivariate Probit with CR8 on time-aggregate data)  123 
Table D: Multinomial Logit estimates using CR8 (panel data)        124 
Table E: Bivariate Probit estimates using CR8 (panel data)        124 









Table 1: Distribution of innovative firms across industries (sample versus original population) 
           158 
Table 2: Composition by type of innovation strategy (sample and original data)    158 
Table 3: Detailed composition of the sample by type of innovation strategy    158 
Table 4: Distribution of sampled firms across industries by type of innovation strategy  159 
Table 5. Sample Means and Standard Deviations of Variables        160 
Table 6: Parameter estimates of the TFP Growth regression model (no interaction effect)  161 
Table 7: Parameter estimates of the TFP Growth regression model with interaction effect 162 
Table 8: Parameter estimates of the LP growth regression model (no interaction effect)  163 
Table 9: Parameter estimates of the LP growth model with interaction effects    164 
Table 10: Summary statistics on the time-aggregated data        165 
Table 11: Cross-section estimates of the TFP Growth regression model (no interaction effect) 
           166 
Table 12: Cross-section estimates of the TFP Growth regression model with interaction effect 
           167 
Table 13: Parameter estimates of the LP growth regression model (no interaction effect)  168 




  188  